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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Lauren Eichler 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
June 2019 
 
Title: Dehumanization and the Metaphysics of Genocide: A New Theory for Genocide 
Prevention 
 
 
I argue that dehumanization is a necessary condition of modern genocide, and that 
preventing dehumanization should be part of efforts to prevent genocide. Unlike other 
scholarship that addresses this issue, I hold that attending to the moral status and role of 
nonhuman animals in the process of dehumanization is integral to this effort. Throughout 
the history of Western philosophy, nonhuman animals have been used to define the 
human and, in dehumanization, provide the excuse for one group of humans to do 
violence to another. The absence of a concern for nonhuman animals from both 
dehumanization and genocide literature generally speaking needs to be rectified if new 
solutions for these problems are to be developed.  
Dehumanization is typically treated as an epistemological problem in which one 
person or group fails to recognize the humanity of the Other, taking the Other to be a 
subhuman animal. However, I hold that dehumanization and, subsequently, genocide, are 
possible because of the metaphysical commitments that render humans and nonhumans 
as fundamentally different and possessing of different moral and ontological statuses. I 
point to three metaphysical principles widely accepted within Western thought and 
culture that contribute to the logic of dehumanization: essentialism, purity, and human 
v 
exceptionalism. I argue that these principles must be re-evaluated and eventually 
discarded. Current solutions to dehumanization such as rehumanization and human rights 
function within this metaphysical framework, maintaining an essential distinction 
between humans and other animals while retaining the notion that the human is superior 
to the animal. In response, I contend that we need a different set of metaphysical 
principles on which to base a practice of ethics and politics that would challenge this 
human/animal dualism, thereby significantly reducing the possibility of dehumanization 
and genocide as we know it. To do this, I draw on three metaphysical principles of Native 
American philosophy: diversity, relatedness, and nonhuman liveliness. I argue that the 
values of respect, recognition, reciprocity, and consent, which are present in Native 
American philosophies, stories, and pedagogies, can provide the basis for an ethics of 
relationality that affirms difference and nonhuman agency rather than sameness and 
human exceptionalism.  
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For the most part a civilized white man can discover very few points of 
sympathy between his own nature that of an Indian…Nay, so alien to 
himself do they appear that…he begins to look upon them as a 
troublesome and dangerous species of wild beast, and if expedient, he 
could shoot them with as little compunction as they themselves would 
experience after performing the same office upon him. 
Francis Parkman, The Oregon Trail
1
 
 
Wherever rats appear they bring ruin, by destroying mankind’s goods and 
foodstuffs. In this way, they spread disease, plague, leprosy, typhoid fever, 
cholera, dysentery, and so on. They are cunning, cowardly, and cruel, and 
are found mostly in large packs. Among the animals, they represent the 
rudiment of an insidious and underground destruction, just like the Jews 
among human beings. 
The Eternal Jew
2
  
 
We called them “cockroaches,” an insect that chews up clothing and nests 
in it, so you have to squash them hard to get rid of them. We didn’t want 
any more Tutsis on the land. We imagined an existence without them. 
  Ignace, Machete Season
3
  
To Animal Studies scholars there is an undeniable connection between genocidal 
violence and the popular assumption that animals are inferior to humans. In the 
introduction to his book Animal Rites Cary Wolfe asserts that –isms like racism, sexism, 
and classicism are all entangled with speciesism, the favoring of human interests and the 
human species over the interests and lives of other species. This institution of speciesism, 
which excludes nonhuman animals from the same moral consideration that humans give 
to other humans, has the twofold effect of helping to create and sustain Western notions 
of subjectivity and sociality while making “possible a symbolic economy in which we 
                                                 
1
 Parkman, Oregon Trail, 267-8. 
 
2
 Quoted in Smith, Less Than Human, 139. 
 
3
 Hatzfeld, Machete Season, 231. 
2 
can engage in what Jacques Derrida will call a ‘noncriminal putting to death’ of other 
humans as well as marking them as animal.”4 In other words, when nonhuman animals 
are excluded from human moral and ethical relations it becomes possible to justify 
violence toward other humans by dehumanizing them—that is, by seeing them as animal-
like or subhuman. Similarly, Kelly Oliver argues in Animal Lessons that human rights 
discourse and humanism will not suffice in solving problems of inter-human violence. 
She writes, “Without interrogating the man/animal opposition on the symbolic and 
imaginary levels, we can only scratch the surface in understanding exploitation and 
genocide of people and animals.”5 Oliver contends that throughout the history of Western 
thought philosophers have, for the most part, maintained a “metaphysical separationism” 
between humans and other animals. This separation takes both types of beings to be 
fundamentally or essentially different while holding similarities to be superficial or 
anthropocentric. Clinging to this notion of metaphysical separationism, human animals 
have often defined themselves at the expense of other animals. Like Wolfe, Oliver sees 
this speciesism as inseparable from dehumanization and the human mistreatment of other 
humans.   
 Even though there exist assertions about the connection between human-animal 
relations and genocide, and human-animal relations and dehumanization, genocide 
scholars have almost uniformly omitted considerations of animals and human-animal 
relations from their analysis of genocidal violence and genocide prevention. Genocide is 
typically treated as a uniquely human problem because of the moral standing we grant 
humans, because the crime of genocide is defined as the destruction of a group based on 
                                                 
4
 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 6. 
 
5
 Oliver, Animal Lessons, 19. 
3 
its religious, national, racial, or ethnic identity, and because humans appear to be the only 
creatures who commit genocide because, in current definitions, genocide requires intent. 
However, in genocide the status of the nonhuman animal matters immensely. Throughout 
Western history humans have used “the animal” to define themselves and position 
themselves as unique from and superior to other life forms. In addition, in Western 
traditions commandments against murder do not apply to nonhuman animals because it is 
widely believed that they exhibit no or low levels of self-awareness, they cannot act with 
purpose, and they are amoral.  
When nonhuman animals and genocide are discussed together, they are usually 
broached by Animal and Environmental Studies scholars rather than genocide scholars, 
who are typically arguing that the human mistreatment of nonhuman animals and the 
environment consists of genocidal activity or ecocide.
6
 These scholars want to draw 
attention to the fact that the methods of the “crime of crimes” are used in factory farming, 
rainforest destruction, mountaintop removal and more. These arguments tend to focus on 
the welfare of nonhuman animals in particular, while acknowledging that the 
mistreatment of nonhuman animals and the -isms Wolfe enumerates above exist on the 
same spectrum. However, from the standpoint of genocide scholars, these arguments 
appear to be irrelevant to the problem of genocide because they do little to help us 
understand why humans act with such violence toward one another. Nor do these 
arguments help to solve the problem of genocide, because they do not have anything to 
say about the causes of genocide within and between human communities. At times such 
arguments will even oversimplify genocide, focusing on the treatment of victims rather 
                                                 
6
 Adams, Sexual Politics of Meat; Bales, Blood and Earth; Coetzee, Animal Lives; Higgens, Eradicating 
Ecocide; Patterson, Eternal Treblinka; Scully, Dominion; Singer, Animal Liberation; Spiegel, Dreaded 
Comparison.  
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than the causes, economics, and politics of particular genocides. Furthermore, the 
definitions of genocide focus on human relationships and institutions that are typically 
not affiliated with other-than-human animal life such as religious organization, political 
affiliation, and ethnicity. Even though definitions of genocide do not include nonhuman 
animals and even though the causes of genocide are largely within the human realm 
(politics, economics, ideology), the status of nonhuman animals needs to remain part of 
the conversation on genocide prevention for one significant reason: dehumanization. 
Putting it simply, to dehumanize is to treat some humans as subhuman, as lacking 
the characteristics and qualities that define or indicate humanness. This preliminary 
definition of dehumanization does not mention other animals, but many of the most 
common examples of genocidal dehumanization involve comparing humans to and 
treating them like other animals. Though dehumanization has been present in every 
modern genocide, few genocide scholars engage in a critical analysis of the topic despite 
their frequent assumption of the ubiquity of dehumanization in genocide. Genocide 
scholars will readily use this word as if the mere mention of dehumanization covers the 
issue sufficiently and as if the meaning of the word, how it is carried out, its functions, 
and its results are self-evident. Yet its frequent presence in genocide should provoke 
further investigation of the issue. The lack of research on dehumanization by genocide 
scholars is compounded by the fact that dehumanization is also typically framed as a 
human problem by the social psychologists and sociologists who study the phenomenon. 
This is remarkable because in order to establish that a being is human, there needs to be 
something that is not human to define it. Throughout human history and across the 
various forms dehumanization takes, frequently the other-than-human that sets the 
5 
defining limit of humanity is “the animal.” Using dehumanization and humans’ 
debasement of other animals as a starting point, I aim to unveil some of the ontological 
aspects of genocide and suggest new avenues for developing methods of genocide 
prevention that unsettle the metaphysics of genocide.  
Most genocide prevention literature is focused on tackling the immediate 
problems and issues arising in a given situation that has a high probability of leading to 
genocide such as war, famine, religious persecution, or other factors. The suggested 
preventative measures include a range of activities from mediation to military 
intervention depending on how serious the situation has become. Policies and guidelines 
that call for these measures do so based on the perceived political, social, and/or 
economic troubles facing a nation or population that foment discontent and violence. 
Such preventative efforts rarely consider the role of metaphysics in these situations. Nor 
do they tend to reflect on the ways in which particular ontological assumptions underlie 
and are juxtaposed with those political, social, and economic problems, creating the 
conditions for enabling, legitimizing, motivating, and practicing genocidal violence. 
Because the metaphysics of genocide has been largely unexplored, theses preventative 
guidelines are always trapped in the position of having to respond to an immediate crisis 
rather than looking at prevention from a higher-level, longer-term vantage. It is my 
contention, that studying the metaphysics of genocide—that is, the ontological 
assumptions that are held by the communities in which genocide has occurred or is likely 
to occur and by the communities who respond to those genocides—we can gain a better 
understanding of the structure of genocide, paving the way for the possibility of 
dismantling the foundations of genocidal thinking and reasoning rather than treating the 
6 
effects and symptoms of those metaphysics as conventional prevention does. I aim to 
make apparent the structure of genocide through a study of genocidal dehumanization 
and present an alternative set of metaphysical principles upon which an effective 
response to genocide can be built. 
Though the vast majority of research on genocide has treated dehumanization as 
ancillary to more pressing issues regarding the subject, I reject such cavalier dismissals. 
This apparent lack of interest could suggest that dehumanization is too simple or 
straightforward to be worth investigating, but I hold, instead, that this apathy indicates a 
tacit avoidance of tackling the topic because of the metaphysical and ethical reckonings 
that would result. Dehumanization is a risky topic because it will not just clarify how 
violent conflicts like genocide, war, and ethnic cleansing work, but reveal the violence 
that exists in the very notion of the concepts “human” and “animal” and, thus, all the 
institutions, systems of belief, and doctrines that depend on those concepts. In tracking 
dehumanization in what is considered the most heinous of crimes against humanity, we 
can begin to see how dehumanization and genocide are both expressions of a metaphysics 
that needs revision. 
In the final chapters of my dissertation I turn to Native American philosophies 
and stories to critique the current definitions of genocide as being too narrowly focused 
on humans to the determinant of other animals. This critique is not only meant to call 
attention to the regular violence sustained by nonhuman animals, but also to demonstrate 
a blind spot in most contemporary genocide scholarship—that the genocide of Indigenous 
peoples is inextricably bound up with ecocide. Drawing on metaphysical principles 
derived from Native American philosophies, I argue that these principles require a 
7 
different orientation toward nonhuman animals and other beings in the world that is 
antithetical to dehumanization and genocide as we know it. Devising new, productive 
methods for preventing dehumanization and genocide, as I show, requires openness to 
non-Western modes of thinking, doing, and being. Though I am not an indigenous 
person, I argue that Westerners need to take these philosophies seriously if we ever hope 
to get out of the humanist discourses in which we are stuck. 
As a Jewish-American woman I am confronted with two intersecting histories of 
genocide. In 1944, my grandparents Gabriella Schon Eichler and Morris Eichler were 
deported from their homes in Hungary to Auschwitz. After the war, unable or unwilling 
to return to the places where their lives had been upended, they immigrated to North 
America, Gabriella entering through Canada and Morris through Ellis Island in New 
York. For them, these two countries promised an opportunity to start something new, to 
put down roots in a place they would be safe. For that, these countries have my gratitude.  
But the story of immigration is not so simple. The US and Canada are what they 
are today due to the violent dispossession of land from Native Americans and First 
Nations peoples. This history has been buried under cities built by settlers, but has 
haunted the places in the US that I have lived. New London, Connecticut, where I went to 
college, was the site of the Pequot Massacres of 1636 and 1637. In Eugene, Oregon, I 
attend a school that was built on the traditional lands of the Kalapuya peoples. The 
Kalapuya have lived in the Willamette Valley for over 14,000 years. As a result of 
disease, encroachment on their landbase and resources, and conflict with settlers, the 
Kalapuya population was nearly decimated. In 1959 the tribe was terminated by the 
federal government following the Western Oregon Indian Termination Act of 1954. After 
8 
fighting to have their tribal status restored, the tribe was officially re- recognized in 1977 
and is now part of the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde of Oregon. Today, 4000 
people are enrolled in the tribe.  
From one end of the US to the other, destructive acts and policies wiped out 
indigenous peoples and their histories. As someone who carries the weight of my 
grandparents’ history while living in a country that will not even formally recognize the 
violence on which it was built, I feel obligated to think through these two histories 
together. This dissertation is one attempt to do that. Drawing on both Western and Native 
American philosophies, I analyze factors that give continuity to these very diverse 
instances of genocide.  
In chapter two, I lay the groundwork for this analysis by reviewing the 
definitional debates of genocide. The word “genocide,” made of a combination of the 
Greek word genos, which means tribe and the Latin word cide, which means to kill, was 
coined by Jewish legal scholar Raphael Lemkin in 1944. Though his definition covered a 
wide range of acts that could be used to destroy a national group from mass murder to 
prohibiting use of the national language, the definition eventually adopted by the United 
Nations in 1948 was far more limited, focused primarily on acts that destroyed the 
biological foundations of group life. Because of the limited nature of the UN definition, 
scholars of various disciplines have weighed in on the efficacy of the current definition. 
In this chapter I review these definitional debates about genocide to determine which acts 
count as genocide and which acts are technically not included in the definition. 
Ultimately, as I am exploring the metaphysics of genocidal thought at the theoretical 
level rather than the legal repercussions of having a particular definition, I use a broad 
9 
notion of genocide that covers crimes against humanity, like ethnic cleansing, which are 
not covered in the UN definition.  
Chapter three turns to the phenomenon of dehumanization and the role 
dehumanization has in genocide. In this chapter I draw on a wide array of research from 
various disciplines including philosophy, psychology, sociology, literary theory, 
decolonial studies, and feminist theory to make three interlinked arguments. First, I 
define dehumanization as a metaphysical as well as an epistemological problem. 
Dehumanization is not just about the psychology of individual perpetrators, but the fact 
that perpetrators have positions of power over others, and with that power can shape 
reality to fit their beliefs. As such, dehumanization involves doing as much as it involves 
believing. In the next section, I argue that as a set of beliefs about the nature of the world 
and as a doing that make that world a reality, dehumanization is a necessary condition for 
genocide. Dehumanization has three functions in genocide. These include diminishing 
moral restraints against violence, motivating violence, and legitimizing violence. In 
addition to this dehumanization characterizes the process of genocide. As an activity, 
perpetrators perform dehumanization in such a way as to create a reality in which the 
dehumanized other must be exterminated.  
Dehumanization is an effective tool of genocide because it turns on a shared set of 
metaphysical principles within Western culture. In chapter four I examine these 
principles, which include essentialism, purity, and human exceptionalism. 
Dehumanization is only effective if people buy into the notion that beings and groups 
have fixed, unchanging essences, that purity is attainable, and that humans are superior to 
animals and other life forms. The last of these is especially important even though it has 
10 
largely been overlooked in genocide and dehumanization scholarship. If dehumanization 
is necessary for genocide and if dehumanization relies on these metaphysical principles, 
then it follows that genocide also functions according to the same metaphysics. If this is 
the case, then preventing dehumanization and genocide would require a reassessment of 
the validity of these principles and perhaps a reorientation toward reality that would let 
go of the underlying desires for unity and sameness that exist behind these metaphysical 
principles.  
If dehumanization is a necessary condition of and central to the practice of 
genocide, then developing methods of preventing dehumanization should be part of the 
effort to prevent genocide. Developing a method for validating, restoring, enhancing, 
and/or preserving human dignity has been an ongoing goal of ethics from Plato to the 
present. In chapter five I argue that this goal needs to be evaluated in light of the 
metaphysics of dehumanization and dehumanization’s role in genocide. Through a 
feminist critique of four philosophical arguments for rehumanizing the dehumanized, I 
argue that countering dehumanization means developing a nonhumanist ethics that 
respects and values difference and relationships rather than ethics that relies on sameness 
and the purity of the human.  
Though it could be argued that preventing dehumanization is the underlying task 
of all ethics, the works I have selected to analyze were written in response to the 
dehumanizing effects of genocide and colonial oppression. The authors I examine are 
Bartolomé de Las Casas, Immanuel Levinas, and Rhianna Oelefson. Las Casas’ work 
provides a more historical perspective on how genocides early in the modern era were 
responded to. His reliance on Aristotle and Catholic theology presents an approach to 
11 
rehumanization that is not shared by the other authors. In Levinas’ work, which is largely 
a response to the horrors of the Holocaust, we get a picture of rehumanization that builds 
on and deviates from Kant as well as incorporating strains of Jewish philosophy and 
ethics. Finally, Oelefson is a contemporary philosopher whose work engages with recent 
genocide and dehumanization studies, providing a window into how scholars in that field 
are addressing the issue of dehumanization. I conclude the chapter, by turning to the work 
of Ann Cahill and Kelly Oliver and the frameworks they lay out for taking steps towards 
an ethics of difference and relationality. 
Just as rehumanization is often considered the proper ethical response to 
dehumanization, advocating human rights is often the primary political and ideological 
response to the dehumanization wrought by genocide. In chapter six I argue that current 
efforts to prevent genocide do not address the metaphysical and logical problems of 
genocide. In particular, human rights and rehumanization actually reproduce the very 
logics that make genocidal thinking possible. This chapter lays out and critiques the 
dominant paradigm for generating discussions of genocide prevention—human rights. 
Non-foundationalist arguments in favor of human rights typically hold that human rights 
are not based on metaphysical principles, but on history, the needs of the times, and other 
contingent factors. I respond to three such arguments by showing how even in supposedly 
non-foundationalist discourses, the metaphysics of essentialism, purity, and human 
exceptionalism are still at work. This becomes evident when the notion of the “human” in 
human rights is interrogated. In addition to this, I call attention again to the way in which 
nonhuman animals are used in this schema, showing that expanding rights to nonhuman 
animals will also be insufficient for addressing the metaphysical problem and how the 
12 
human rights approach conveniently turns its back on the regular and sustained violence 
directed at billions of nonhuman animals every year by human animals.  
The consequences of the exclusion of animals from the discussion of genocide 
appear clearly when we turn to an examination of ecocide and genocide in the context of 
genocide of Indigenous peoples. In chapter seven I argue that from the perspective of 
Native American metaphysics, ecocide—the destruction of the environment, nonhuman 
animals, and land—and genocide are not separate phenomena but two aspects of the same 
thing. Drawing on three metaphysical principles—diversity, relationality, and 
liveliness—I argue that the extermination of nonhuman animals is genocide not simply 
because it harms the humans who depend on those nonhuman animals for their own 
livelihood, but because nonhuman animals (and other aspects of nonhuman nature like 
land and water) are considered kin and independent nations of their own with their own 
agency and purposiveness. The worldview presented in indigenous cosmologies calls for 
a thorough and meaningful assessment of the viability of Western metaphysics. 
In the concluding chapter of my dissertation I consider the consequences of taking 
seriously Indigenous metaphysics as providing foundations for a world in which modern 
dehumanization and genocide are unthinkable. Through an analysis of two Native 
American creation stories, I argue that if an Indigenous cosmology more accurately 
reflects the state of reality then the consequence is that humans need to radically reorient 
themselves toward different kinds of relationships with nonhuman animals and nature 
than what is called for by the current dominant paradigm. Through Native philosophies 
and stories I cash out the promise of the ethics of difference and relationality sought for 
13 
by philosophers like Cahill and Oliver by drawing on Native American principles of 
recognition, reciprocity, consent, and respect.  
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CHAPTER II 
DEFINING GENOCIDE 
 
The first step to figuring out how genocide works and developing ways to prevent 
it is to define the problem we want to understand and solve. This dissertation does not 
aim to engage in debates about the legal aspects of genocide; rather, given current 
definitions, I want to investigate and unveil some of the philosophical, especially 
metaphysical and logical, mechanisms of genocide as an activity in order to develop a 
theory of genocide and genocidal dehumanization. As Erik Schneiderhan points out, “The 
legal definition of genocide—created for the purposes of criminal prosecution and of 
guiding states considering interventions—does not necessarily provide a good point of 
departure for social scientists” or for philosophers because doing so may mean beginning 
a discussion with certain assumptions about issues like agency and social action already 
in place.
7
 I aim to bracket these assumptions in order to think outside the definitional 
construction of genocide for the purpose of developing awareness about broader and 
more general patterns and principles that ground and enable genocidal violence. 
However, a theory of genocide cannot be constructed without careful consideration of the 
definition of genocide, some of the conversations around that definition, and the 
consequences of these discussions on the development of preventative methods and 
practices. One of my concerns regarding current literature on genocide prevention is that 
by building off the legal definition, scholars and politicians are more likely to focus on 
short-term, “practical” solutions rather than on bigger-picture, long-term solutions that 
would depend on theories that can help identify some of the common principles of 
genocide. In other words, current genocide scholarship takes for granted the assumptions 
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that Schneiderhan worries about without examining those assumptions or tracing where 
they come from, which in turn, artificially limits the ways we can think about genocide 
and prevention and obscures some of the deeper foundations of genocidal thought and 
action. In looking at the history of the definitional debate, I hope to shed light on some of 
these assumptions as a way of directing attention toward the ontological and logical 
principles of genocide. In taking a metaphysical turn, we will be able to more accurately 
assess whether or not current efforts at genocide prevention will actually achieve their 
goals.  
In this chapter I consider the scope and limits of two definitions of genocide, then 
examine some of the current conversations about some of the most commonly debated 
characteristics of genocide: the nature of groups, the nature of intent, types of acts, scope, 
and the nature of modern genocide. Through this review I provide a groundwork for 
explaining genocidal thought from a metaphysical standpoint. 
 
I. Two Definitions of Genocide 
 
Since Raphael Lemkin first coined the term genocide in 1944, the definition has 
been fraught. Scholars have engaged in an ongoing debate about the meaning of 
genocide, its particular characteristics as a crime, and the moral harms it causes that 
distinguish it from other crimes against humanity. In its first iteration, the term genocide 
(genos- meaning race or tribe and -cide meaning killing) was defined by Lemkin as “the 
destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group…Generally speaking, genocide does not 
necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of 
16 
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”8 For 
Lemkin, annihilation of a group does not necessarily mean killing members of the group. 
Annihilation can include the dissolution of political and social institutions, cultures, 
languages, and religions. It can also extend to the destruction of the economic means of a 
group as well as their personal dignity, health, liberty, and security.
9
 Even though 
genocidal acts are directed toward individuals, they are carried out insofar as the 
individuals are members of a particular national or ethnic group. Lemkin takes care to 
specify that genocide involves a biological element to the crime (the physical destruction 
of the victim group), that the oppressor imposes its national pattern on the oppressed 
group, and that the crime involves more than just stripping citizenship and rights from the 
oppressed. According to Lemkin, the particular harm caused by genocide is the loss of a 
nation’s contributions to human civilization, which are necessary for the continued 
development of the world community. Genocide represents the opposite of civilization 
insofar as it demonstrates a lack of respect and appreciation for the contributions made by 
various nations to world culture and “offends our feelings of moral justice.”10   
In 1948 the United Nations recognized and codified genocide as an international 
crime against humanity. According to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the legal definition of genocide states:  
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group 
as such: 
a) killing members of the group 
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group 
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c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part 
d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group 
e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
11
 
 
Notably, the definition settled on by the UN is much narrower than Lemkin’s original 
definition. In Lemkin’s formulation genocidal acts include endangering the health of the 
victims by refusing to provide them with medical care, the destruction of cultural and 
historical artifacts and buildings such as religious centers, the imposition of new political 
parties, and the exclusion of the victims from politics. Unlike Lemkin’s definition, the 
UN emphasizes the intention of the perpetrator as a primary aspect of genocide. It also 
focuses heavily on the biological aspects of genocide with little consideration for how 
acts of cultural destruction like prohibiting members of a national or ethnic group from 
speaking their language might contribute to the destruction of the group as such.   
Lemkin’s definition also provides descriptions of the crimes and, in some cases, 
explanations of how these acts contributed to the destruction of a national or ethnic 
group. Until the drafting of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
and Elements of Crimes, the nature of the acts listed above remained vague. Though the 
text of the Rome Statute has not been added to the UN articles, the descriptions of the 
acts in the “Elements of Crimes” document serve to provide more specific guidance for 
lawyers on how to interpret when an act can or should be considered genocide. For 
example, in regards to (a), the Rome Statute specifies that “[t]he perpetrator killed one or 
more persons. Such person or persons belonged to a specific national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. The conduct took place in the context of a 
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manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that itself 
effects such destruction.”12 In the elaboration on the elements of crimes, the Rome 
Statute establishes scope (one or more persons must be affected), reinforces the 
importance of intent, and contextualizes the violence in relation to a larger pattern of 
activity directed at destroying a group as such.   
Even though the UN definition remains the current legal definition of genocide, 
scholars have continued to debate its efficacy. Four main areas of contention include 
which groups can be victims, the role of perpetrator intent, the types of acts that count as 
genocide, and how thorough or successful those acts must be to constitute genocide. In 
addition to these, there has also been some discussion about the history of genocidal 
violence. While some scholars argue that genocidal violence is “normal” in that examples 
of such episodes can be found throughout the world at many points in human history, 
other researchers contend that genocide as we currently define it is a relatively new 
phenomenon within human history that can be tied to the rise of race-thinking and the 
modern nation-state. I will review some aspects of these debates here as they pertain to an 
analysis of genocidal dehumanization to explain why I adopt an expansive conception of 
genocide that is limited to the “modern era” in developing a theory of genocide. 
 
II. Groups  
 
In order to understand how genocidal dehumanization works and how it is a 
product of particular metaphysical commitments, we must look more closely at how 
genocide perpetrates violence against groups. What distinguishes genocide from other 
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crimes against humanity like persecution is that the victims of genocide are individuals 
qua their membership in a particular group and groups themselves. However, not just any 
group can be the target of genocide. The UN definition states, “Genocide means any of 
the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group as such.” This sentence has provoked a slew of 
questions including whether or not the groups listed in the definition are too narrow or 
too vague, if perpetrator and victim groups exist objectively or subjectively, whether or 
not groups can be harmed or only the individuals who compose them, and how to 
interpret “as such.”    
While Lemkin’s definition of genocide focuses primarily on national groups, the 
UN definition expands this slightly without making a radical break from Lemkin’s 
original idea by including ethnic, racial, and religious groups. Many efforts have been 
made to clarify what these groups mean. One such effort was during the trial of Jean-Paul 
Akayesu by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The court defined 
the four groups in the following ways. A national group is considered “a collection of 
people who are perceived to share a common legal bond based on common citizenship, 
coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.”13 In other words, a national group consists 
of people who have legal membership in a sovereign state. Ethnic groups refer to 
individuals who share common language, ancestry, and culture including values, beliefs, 
and traditions that have developed over time.
14
 Racial groups refer to people who share at 
least some common hereditary physical characteristics that are identifiable enough to 
single out members for persecution. Finally, members of religious groups share religious 
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beliefs, doctrines, and practices. Even though the ICTR provides greater detail about 
whom or what constitutes these groups, scholars have been quick to point out some 
limitations to these definitions. For instance, Ernesto Verdeja argues that ethnic and racial 
groups are particularly difficult to define because they are unstable. He points out that 
“ethnic identity changes over time as members emphasize certain aspects of shared 
identity while downplaying others” and that “core elements are always open to 
contestation.”15 In regard to racial identity, Verdeja notes that race is not an objective 
biological attribute but a “highly socialized identity, interpreted through the particular 
historical and political frames of reference that operate in society.”16 Because all of these 
groups are unstable and subject to change, identifying them and their members always 
involves some element of subjectivity. 
In addition to the problems with defining these groups, for many scholars, this list 
seems arbitrarily limited, leaving out significant groups of people who have or may 
experience harm in the form of the acts listed in the convention. These might include 
economic, social, and political groups. In response, some scholars have coined new terms 
for describing acts of destructive violence against these groups such as Barbara Harff’s 
and Ted Robert Gurr’s term “politicide.” According to Harff and Gurr, politicide occurs 
when governments target victim groups based on “their hierarchical position or political 
opposition to the regime and dominant groups.”17 For these authors, both genocide and 
politicide are acts carried out by the state or agents of the state for the purpose of 
eliminating a threat to the state or dominant group’s power. Other authors like Larry May 
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argue that the definition of genocide should be reworded to include clearer criteria for 
determining how groups are determined and to include any groups that meet those criteria 
beyond the original four. Unlike Harff and Gurr who suggest that the perpetrator defines 
the victim group, for May, groups must have some kind of “objective” existence—groups 
cannot be determined subjectively by the group members or those outside the group 
alone. Rather, both sets of people need to recognize that certain individuals constitute or 
make up a group. May calls this the “publicity condition.” May defines the publicity 
condition as “a test for whether there is consensus of sorts in the society about the naming 
of a collection of individual people as a group.”18 For May, the publicity condition helps 
to establish that the group being harmed is a real group rather than an arbitrary collection 
of persons. Unlike Sartre who argued in Anti-Semite and Jew that anti-Semites make 
Jews, May does not think the perpetrator can be solely responsible for naming or creating 
a group because doing so without some acknowledgment of a common identity between 
group members means that no group exists.
19
 If the people being targeted for membership 
in the group do not recognize their own group identity as significant or meaningful then 
their membership in the group and the violence enacted against them becomes arbitrary 
and does not fit the definition of genocide. On the other hand, if a collection of 
individuals refers to themselves as a group but neither seeks nor receives 
acknowledgment of group membership by the out-group then they also cannot be the 
recipients of genocidal violence because as far as non-members are concerned the group 
does not exist and thus cannot be targeted for genocide. To be a group that can be 
targeted for genocide the following conditions must be met: (1) the group must consist of 
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“individual human persons, (2) related to each other by organizational structure, 
solidarity, or common interests, and (3) [be] identifiable, to the members, and to those 
who observe the members, by characteristic features.”20 Thus, the publicity condition 
ensures that a group exists both subjectively (in the minds of the members) and 
objectively (in the world for non-members).
21
 Consequently, for May, this means that all 
sorts of groups beyond the four listed in the UN definition could potentially be victims of 
genocide.   
However, other authors have contended that expanding the scope of the groups 
covered risks diluting the horror of the crime of genocide. Like May, William A. Schabas 
argues that the victim groups must have some objective existence beyond the subjective 
determination of the perpetrator because legally the offender cannot define the crime.
22
 
However, unlike May, Schabas contends that the four listed groups are sufficient and 
appropriate for the crime of genocide. Furthermore, he argues that these four categories 
were not meant to be read separately from each other; rather, the four terms listed in the 
Convention work together to create a holistic view of which persons and groups can be 
the target of genocide.
23
 Drawing on Lemkin’s definition, Schabas claims that the intent 
of the Convention is to call attention to violence aimed at minority groups within a 
society. For him, even though when taken individually the four group types appear vague, 
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together they exist “in a dynamic and synergistic relationship, each contributing to the 
construction of the other.”24 For Schabas, other types of groups like political parties, 
genders, or people with disabilities do not speak to the national, cultural, or ethnical 
aspects of human life. They are not necessarily minorities, they can cross national and 
cultural identities, and they do not necessarily contribute to a shared sense of cultural or 
national identity among those persons who may be categorized by those labels. This does 
not mean that groups like political parties or people with disabilities could not experience 
oppression, dehumanization, or violence, but that the violence directed toward these 
groups would not be genocidal.   
While these conversations call attention to some important ambiguities in the 
definition of genocide, their narrow focus on dissecting the definition for legal purposes 
has led some scholars to overlook some important theoretical aspects of genocide that 
affect how we should understand which groups should be protected and how those groups 
are determined. The most significant aspect is the “dichotomous social reality of 
genocide.”25 According to Thomas Kühne, there are two sides to genocidal violence: 1) 
hatred of the other and the construction of an alien “them” and 2) love for oneself and 
one’s community, which leads to the construction of a virtuous “us.” Theoretically, 
genocide could be carried out by one individual, but given the various activities, scope, 
and time involved in existing examples of genocide, the crime typically requires groups 
of people acting in various levels of coordination to carry out the goal of destruction. The 
genocides of the Jews, Tutsis, and Bosnians all involved the participation of their former 
community leaders, members, and neighbors. In these cases, especially in Nazi Germany, 
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genocide did not just destroy communities, it also built them. As Kühne explains, “No 
community, no unity exists without the ‘other’: those who do not belong, who really or 
supposedly threaten the community either physically or just by looking different, by 
pursuing different ways of life, by harboring different experiences and visions—thus by 
challenging the identity of those who belong. If there is no enemy, one has to be 
invented.”26 Kühne notes that for complex multicultural societies, achieving unity was 
more difficult and often meant eradicating an “enemy” that already exists within or 
alongside the larger community. In this respect both objective factors (i.e. differences in 
religious customs) and subjective factors (i.e. ideologies of racial purity) can augment 
one another in the determination of which group(s) will be targeted for exclusion and 
which members of a society belong to that group. Take, for example, the delimitation of 
the group called “Jews” by the Nazis. While there were some objective differences such 
as religious customs, traditional foods, and some physical traits that distinguished people 
of Jewish descent from people of German descent, the rules for who belonged in the 
group “Jewish” under the Nazi regime were largely invented, arbitrary, and applied 
regardless of an individual’s own feelings of identity toward that group. New myths, 
stories, and theories were invented by the Nazis to help isolate the Jews and enhance their 
alien-ness. In this respect the perpetrator’s actions honed in on already existing but 
otherwise harmless differences, exacerbating them and turning them into something more 
concrete and “real” than the actual differences signified.   
In genocide, the us/them narrative can only be sustained as long as the victim 
group remains the same. In this respect groups targeted for genocide need to be perceived 
by the perpetrators as ontologically fixed or tied to an inherent, static nature. Unlike some 
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other types of groups such as political or economic groups, the four groups protected by 
the UN convention are groups into which individuals are born. Human agency, from the 
perspective of a liberal society, would suggest that individuals can voluntarily come and 
go from all of these groups, perhaps with the exception of racial groups. However, the 
connection between national, ethnical, religious, and racial groups to birth, ancestry, and 
human origins cannot be dismissed so quickly. Whether there is any biological truth to it 
or not, these groups are frequently associated with myths about human origins. Members 
of the group called Christian, for example, accept that they are created by God, in His 
image. In affirming this story, they also affirm a particular metaphysics for ordering the 
world and a particular notion of human nature. In genocide, the implications of the 
different origin myths that may exist within a given society are taken to a violent extreme 
as the victim group is defined based on some natural, biological, or essential component 
shared by all members that can be traced to the group’s origins. This element remains the 
same through time, space, personal choice, changes in political, economic, and social 
affiliation or status. As philosopher Berel Lang explains, for the targeted individuals, 
“[n]o personal deed, accomplishment, or possession is at issue; the persons who comprise 
the group can do nothing, short of revising their biological history, to alter the genocidal 
intention…Genocide singles them out on the basis of their association with a group quite 
aside from any choices they have made and indeed aside from any individual 
characteristics other than the allegedly biological feature(s) that identifies them with the 
group.”27 In marking the out-group as naturally and biologically other, the perpetrators 
also reify their own genetic uniqueness and superiority. Maintaining and protecting that 
genetic purity can then become a motive for carrying out genocidal policies.  
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Depending on the goals of the oppressors, this natural difference can be defined in 
different ways. For example, according to the Nuremberg Laws, a person was considered 
Jewish if she had three or four Jewish grandparents. Jewish ancestry of a lesser degree 
resulted in the individual being labeled a Mischlinge, a designation that had the potential 
to save a person from losing their German citizenship depending on the local law 
enforcers. Or, to take a related example, in the US white slave owners determined that 
“one drop” of African blood made a person black while the same white settlers 
determined that one drop of non-Indian blood made a person white rather than Native 
American.
28
 In all of these cases, these determinations were made regardless of the 
person’s physical features, nationality, ethnicity, or religious practices. Membership in 
the group was not necessarily something that could be observed by outsiders or felt by 
those grouped into the categories. Rather, in these cases, the oppressors are marking an 
ontological difference, a difference in essences between themselves and the oppressed. 
Because the perpetrators are targeting groups for genocide using perceived innate 
metaphysical differences as markers, the list of groups that can be victims will not 
necessarily include other types of groups like political and economic groups. A political 
group like communists or the Tea Party cannot be targeted for genocide because there is 
nothing biologically inherent or fixed about the qualities that the members of the group 
share. When political groups have been targeted it is generally because, as in the case of 
the communists in Nazi Germany, those political beliefs have been associated with a 
targeted racial, ethnic, national, or religious group.   
As we will see in chapters three and four, the process that delineates differences 
between groups in genocide is the same process that occurs in genocidal dehumanization. 
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In dehumanization, the logic of the us/them dichotomy and the metaphysics of essences 
are mapped onto the concepts of and boundaries between “human” and “animal.” We will 
see how together the us/them dichotomy, essentialism, and the perceived biological and 
ontological inferiority of animals and other nonhumans enables genocidal 
dehumanization, which becomes a core component for carrying out genocide. When it 
comes to genocide prevention, the emphasis should not necessarily be strictly limiting 
which groups can be targeted, but rather should focus more on why and how groups get 
targeted, with an eye to the establishment of an us/them dichotomy, which depends on the 
essentialism of members’ group identity. 
 
III. Intent  
 
The UN definition of genocide consists of two parts: a mens rea (mental element) 
and actus rea (physical element). The former involves the intent of the perpetrator. To 
understand what intent means in the definition of genocide, two distinctions must be 
made. First, there is the distinction between knowledge and intent. According to the 
Rome Statute, the mental element of genocide consists of knowledge and intent.
29
 As 
Schabas explains, to say that the perpetrator has knowledge means that she was aware of 
the circumstances of the crime or the plan to commit the crime.
30
 The emphasis on 
knowledge takes into account the fact that genocide typically takes place through 
collective action, usually organized by the state or some group with significant power 
within the state rather than by individuals. Knowledge also implies the existence of a plan 
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for genocide. Intent implies that the action was not accidental or committed in ignorance. 
However, in the case of genocide, what counts as intent is quite specific. Intending to 
cause harm to someone or some group is not enough; rather the intent must be directed at 
destroying certain types of groups (national, ethnical, racial, and religious) as such.   
This brings us to the second distinction: motive and intent. Put succinctly, a 
motive is one’s reason for doing something while the intent or intention is that at which 
one aims. According to Schabas the writers of the UN Convention included the words “as 
such” as a way of trying to capture the motive of the perpetrators.31 May speculates that 
as motive “‘as such’ would mean that the only reason to intend to destroy the group was 
that the defendant hated the group and wanted the group destroyed.”32 May argues that 
trying to ascribe motive to individuals who participate in genocide will not be particularly 
productive because “motives sometimes compel us and are not necessarily chosen; 
whereas aims are indeed things that people choose.”33 Making these distinctions between 
knowledge, motive, and intent can facilitate prosecution of genocide in a court of law. 
Many scholars agree that intent serves an important role in establishing whether 
or not certain acts constitute genocide. As Alex Alvarez explains, “…perhaps the most 
important element of this definition concerns the component of intent. This means that 
the crime of genocide must evidence purposive behavior. It has to be planned and 
deliberate. This is a basic principle of Western criminal law. For something to constitute 
a crime, behavior must be intended; it cannot be accidental or unwilling.”34 Harff 
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concurs, arguing that establishing intent makes it possible to distinguish genocide from 
similar phenomena, to detect early warning signs, and to develop plans for genocide 
prevention.
35
 For both of these authors, the importance of establishing intent has specific 
practical outcomes like the ability to try someone in court or to determine when 
international intervention might be necessary in a potentially genocidal situation. Yet, 
there are some ambiguities about what counts as genocidal intent. Elaborating on the 
legal definition of genocide, Schabas points out various possibilities for interpreting 
intent and how intent might be followed through. He notes that it is unclear as to whether 
“the destruction that is part of the intent…must correspond to the physical or biological 
destruction defined.”36 For example, in settler colonialism the colonial state may intend to 
destroy the native population by removing aboriginals from their land, limiting their 
ability to practice their cultural traditions, and enforcing economic sanctions against 
them. If, during these processes, members of the victim group were incidentally killed, 
then a case could be made that these deaths constituted genocide even though the state 
did not plan to destroy the group by killing its members. Thus, genocidal intent could be 
determined after the fact based on the particular policies used against a given group. 
Even though intent is one of the distinguishing features of the definition of 
genocide, some scholars argue that when it comes to developing a theory about genocide, 
the notion of intent does not always capture the way in which genocide unfolds. 
Schneiderhan points out that social scientists studying genocide often take a teleological 
approach to intent. In this framing of intent, “the actor (person, group, state) is depicted 
as setting a goal (the end), figuring out the best way to get there (the means), and then 
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doing it (the action).”37 Drawing on the work of pragmatist thinkers like John Dewey, 
Mary Parker Follett, and C. Wright Mills, Schneiderhan advocates that scholars adopt a 
more processual approach to genocidal intent and action that takes into account 
contingency, varying motives, and changing circumstances. This would allow for a more 
nuanced understanding of how actors get involved in genocide, recognizing that intention 
may vary among agents and may be something that develops over time when particular 
situations manifest. In this respect, genocide may not be the original plan or intent of all 
of the actors involved, but may arise as a possibility for solving the perpetrator’s 
perceived problem depending on the context. For example, in nation n the people wish 
for an ethnically pure state. After a series of unsuccessful acts intended to get people of 
other ethnicities to leave or assimilate, the leaders of the nation decide that more extreme 
measures are necessary and implement a program of extermination. While some citizens 
knowingly and intentionally participate, others do so out of fear of repercussions or 
because of the material gains in store for them as a result. In this situation, the intention 
develops over time and arises due to particular circumstances, yet cannot get carried out 
perfectly due the different motives and aims of the individuals involved. Genocide is a 
group effort, but like all groups comprised of individuals, there is rarely clear uniformity 
of motive or intent among those individuals.   
Verdeja points out that while establishing intent may prove necessary for 
prosecuting the crime of genocide, the intent requirement is too strict and narrow because 
it singles out individual intent rather than collective intent. Focusing too much on the 
legal definition of genocidal intent can have negative effects on the development of 
useful genocide prevention policy because policymakers do not have the time or 
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resources to establish intent as they need to “operate and make decisions in the present, 
when killings are ongoing and information on perpetrators’ purposes is difficult to 
decipher.”38 Focusing too much on individual intent can also have the unforeseen impact 
of absolving certain participants of responsibility for their actions, especially if they do 
not directly participate in genocidal acts but stand to benefit significantly from them. For 
example, many white settlers in the United States took advantage of and benefited from 
laws such as the 1887 General Allotment Act, which forced Native Americans to 
privatize their land and sell off remaining plots to settlers. However, few of the settlers 
who moved onto that land would have acknowledged that they were doing violence to the 
Indigenous community whose land they were taking. Problems like these lead Verdeja to 
suggest that outside of a criminal tribunal, genocide scholars and prevention 
policymakers should focus more on the behavior of the perpetrators rather than in trying 
to establish their intention: “Barring clear orders or statements calling for extermination, 
we can infer an intentional plan to destroy a group to the extent that violence becomes 
more lethal, appears coordinated and sustained over time, and targets an increasingly 
wider proportion of the victim group.”39 In other words, genocide prevention policies 
cannot be based solely on intent because establishing genocidal intent can be extremely 
difficult and because destroying a group as such may not be the primary motive of 
genocidal violence. Furthermore, focusing on individual intent makes efforts at restitution 
and repair of relationships after the fact much more difficult.  
In addition to the concerns raised about intent by the above scholars, approaching 
genocide as a metaphysical problem leads to new problems with the notion of intent. 
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While it may be convenient to take the position that acts of genocide emerge from the 
minds of deranged and/or evil individuals who then brainwash, coerce, blackmail, or 
otherwise force others to participate, if there is an underlying metaphysics at work in 
genocidal thought and practice then responsibility for genocide does not rest solely on the 
shoulders of a single mastermind, but also on the principles which ground the particular 
cultural values of the perpetrator group. This suggests that changing individuals will not 
ever truly eliminate the potential for genocide—rather the principles that ground and 
justify behaviors that lead to genocide need to be altered.  
This does not mean that an examination of intent is useless for developing a 
theory of genocide or for thinking about genocide prevention. Examining documented 
intent from past genocides may help us to determine particular patterns in genocidal 
violence that can lead to the development of new prevention methods capable of halting 
even the potential for genocide. Analyzing intent can also make us aware of some of the 
shortcomings of liberal Western ethics, which frequently attempts to pin blame on 
individuals rather than look at the collective, relational aspects of ethics and 
responsibility. This dissertation treats intent as something useful in this capacity with the 
understanding that there may never be clear intent documented by perpetrators. Because 
of this, following Verdeja’s lead, I will give more weight to the actions and behaviors of 
the perpetrators rather than to the mens rea component of the definition. 
 
IV. Acts and Scope 
 
The second part of the UN definition consists of the actus rea, the acts of 
genocide. In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Lemkin describes a much broader range of 
33 
actions than the UN definition. He states that genocide aims at the destruction of the 
“essential foundations of the life of national groups.” This includes mass murder, forced 
assimilation due to the “imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” via the 
dissolution of the occupied peoples’ political parties and the establishment of those 
belonging to the oppressor, the disruption of religious life, and the creation of an 
atmosphere of moral debasement among the targeted group. The UN definition, on the 
other hand, limits the actions of genocide to physical and biological harms, excluding 
acts that disrupt the cultural wellbeing of a community and the members’ quality of life. 
Thus, factors that may indirectly lead to the demise of a group such as forced relocation 
or environmental destruction are not considered crimes of genocide though they may be 
treated as other types of crimes against humanity. Causing mental harm to members of a 
group is the only potentially nonphysical act of violence listed, but the convention leaves 
the meaning of “mental harm” open to interpretation. 
According to Schabas, the UN opted to leave acts of cultural genocide out of the 
official definition because the member nations found that acts of cultural destruction were 
too broadly construed and that without a specific, precise, and restricted list of acts, 
genocide could be interpreted differently by different countries.
40
 Lang states that there is 
good reason to focus on acts of biological and physical destruction over cultural 
destruction: “Where life itself remains, as in cultural genocide or ethnocide, there remains 
always the possibility of individual and then group revival—but this is surely not the case 
with physical extermination.”41 By restricting the acts of genocide to the physical and 
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biological, genocide can be defined in its “least ambiguous form.” 42 Though the list of 
genocidal acts is quite narrow, some scholars like Joseph P. Gone would prefer to limit it 
further still to help bring the legal definition more in line with popular understandings of 
genocide. According to Gone, an act should only be deemed genocide if it involves mass 
killing. By restricting genocide in this way, Gone believes that this will ensure genocide 
is understood as the crime of crimes.
43
 
Gone, however, tends to be an exception among genocide scholars who generally 
argue that the definition is too narrow and should include other acts that could lead to a 
group’s destruction. These acts include ethnic cleansing (the removal of people from their 
homeland or place of residence), cultural genocide or ethnocide (destruction of cultural 
traditions and institutions), gendercide (singling out a sex/gender for destruction), ecocide 
(environmental destruction), urbanicide (destruction of cityscapes and urban life), and 
mass rape. May argues that the above acts should be considered genocide as long as they 
display sufficient evidence of intent to destroy a group. For example, if the purpose of 
removing a population from their homeland or nation is part of a project of destroying a 
group, then ethnic cleansing should be considered an act of genocide. Similarly, Debra 
Bergoffen argues that mass rape should be considered an act of genocide because of the 
way it humiliates members of a group, disrupting family life, potentially leading to the 
public shaming and exile of the victims, thereby destroying communities.
44
 Both May 
and Bergoffen interpret “destroy, in whole or in part” broadly to include nonphysical 
means of destruction. 
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Other scholars like Gary Clayton Anderson advocate adhering to a strict 
interpretation of the UN definition when evaluating whether or not episodes of mass 
violence are genocidal. Anderson argues that the colonization of North America involved 
ethnic cleansing rather than genocide because the US and Canadian governments did not 
make a concerted, organized effort to annihilate the indigenous peoples or engage in 
widespread mass killing. Like Gone, Anderson argues that applying the term genocide to 
the actions of the US government toward Native Americans “does much to demean the 
meaning of the term and obscures rather than clarifies how we should view many 
(probably most) actions toward American Indians.”45 Anderson and others seem to limit 
legitimate acts of genocide to paradigmatic cases of genocide like the Holocaust, arguing 
that without systematic killing and death camps, violence of one group against another 
should not be thought of as genocide. 
As these last examples show, debates about which acts constitute genocide are 
typically bound up with issues of scope. According to the UN definition, genocide 
involves the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part. The Rome Statute elaborates 
further, stating that the elements of each act involve bringing death or harm to one or 
more persons.
46
 Genocide is a rare crime where not succeeding (failing to destroy the 
group) can still result in the perpetrator’s conviction. This has led to confusion over how 
many people in a group need to be killed, sterilized, kidnapped (if children), or suffer 
serious bodily harm; how many people need to carry out these atrocities; and how 
organized and intentional the acts must be. As we saw with Anderson and Gone, some 
scholars argue that the acts must be deliberate, organized and systematic, carried out by a 
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government or other authoritative power, and take the lives of large numbers of people. 
Other authors like May and Verdeja hold that genocide involves patterns of behavior that 
may or may not be systematically organized, but that when taken together reveal a clear 
cohesion around the task of destroying a group. As long as some form of intent to destroy 
a group exists, acts outside the scope of the definition should be included. However, they 
also seem to agree that for an act to be considered genocide more than one person of the 
victim group must be harmed.   
For practical legal purposes the definition of genocide may need to consist 
primarily of physical and biological acts of destruction and may need to distinguish 
between acts that directly destroy a group such as mass killing or sterilization and those 
that indirectly destroy a group like ecocide. It may also need to clearly show, especially 
in the case of individual deaths, that the acts were carried out within the context of other 
similar acts, such that the scope of genocide must be pervasive rather than an isolated 
hate crime. Or, perhaps critics of the definition are right that the definition needs some 
revisions. Many of the debates outlined above take place in relation to the legal efficacy 
or legal application of the UN Convention. For many writers, the definitional debates 
highlight what is at stake in claiming that a crime is genocide insofar as such a crime can 
be brought to court and the perpetrators tried and convicted. However, this dissertation 
leaves legal questions aside, instead focusing on the ontology and of genocide and the 
logic of genocidal thought and activity.   
Thus, from the perspective of this thesis, I will use the term “genocide” in a way 
that more closely aligns with the historical definition presented by Lemkin, so that it 
includes acts like ethnic cleansing, social death, and colonial genocide. Genocide, here, 
37 
will refer to acts done that aim at eliminating a group insofar as the acts are part of a 
pattern of similar acts and behaviors on behalf of one group against another, through 
which the members of the victim group are categorized by an inherent, essential nature. 
In this respect, I recognize the need to give genocide a strict definition while 
acknowledging the ambiguity of intent and that the destruction of groups and their 
members may not always involve direct physical or biological violence. This does not 
mean, however, that I will not at times raise questions about the efficacy of the current 
legal definition of genocide, especially in chapter seven where I deal with the topic of 
ecocide.   
V.  Racism, Biology, and Modern Genocide 
 
Given the consideration of the above characteristics of genocide, one last question 
needs to be addressed: which episodes of mass violence in human history fall under the 
label “genocide?” According to some scholars, genocide has occurred among humans for 
as far back as we have historical records.
47
 Others argue that genocide is a more recent 
development that is characteristic of the twentieth century.
48
 There are definitive 
implications that arise based on where one stands on this point, especially when it comes 
to considering whether or not genocide is a problem that can be prevented and what types 
of factors contribute to genocidal activities. The time period in which genocides started 
occurring might also say something about the ideological and metaphysical commitments 
of the era, or might be indicative of other large social, economic, and political changes 
occurring in the world or, in contrast, suggest that there is something stable about human 
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psychology and behavior that makes humans prone to genocidal violence. Such 
deliberations also raise questions about which episodes of mass violence count as 
genocide and whether or not the countries in which these events took place are 
responsible for reparations or other forms of restitution.  
In this dissertation I am predominantly concerned with the relationship between 
genocide and “modernity.” Though we can identify episodes of mass violence occurring 
thousands of years ago, I argue along with scholars like Rowan Savage, Zygmunt 
Bauman, and Hannah Arendt, that genocide as we know it today is influenced by values 
that are rooted in Europe’s colonial and imperial past, which further developed in the 
context of the European Enlightenment and subsequent eras. In particular, I am 
concerned with the concept of “the human” which was operative during this time and 
since and how it came to be used in genocidal episodes and later in facilitating genocide 
prevention. I argue along with many other scholars, that race-thinking, the racialization of 
human groups, and racism has an important ideological role to play in modern genocides 
that did not factor into instances of mass killing prior to the colonization of the 
Americas.
49
 Racism, humanism, and the natural sciences intersect in modern genocide. I 
argue that what makes race-thinking such an important aspect of colonial and modern 
genocide is that it organizes human groups according to “natural,” biological, and logical 
factors, creating a hierarchical relationship between humans, subhumans, animals, and 
other life forms.  
Most genocide scholars will agree that though episodes of mass, and at times 
exterminatory, violence have occurred throughout human history, in the modern era, 
particularly the twentieth century, there is something distinctive about genocidal violence 
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that sets it apart from earlier examples.
50
 Ben Kiernan and Robert Gellately claim that 
modern genocides are characterized by a change in scope, efficiency, and political power. 
Rather than massacres occurring in specific locations at certain times, modern genocide 
(especially in the twentieth century) often happens in the context of total war, targets 
whole populations, and may be a part of continental military strategy. Mass murder has 
also become more efficient through technological advances in production, heavy 
weaponry, communication, and transit, all of which allow perpetrators to coordinate and 
carry out genocidal violence quickly and systemically. Finally, in the modern era, this 
violence becomes state-sanctioned—a weapon of the state for conquest, territorial 
expansion, economic growth, and the elimination of undesirable or superfluous peoples. 
This is due to a shift in political power to totalitarian and bureaucratic regimes that highly 
control and regulate the trajectory of the nation while diffusing responsibility, action, and 
intent across institutional systems.  
Zygmunt Bauman highlights this last point as integral to the practice of genocide 
in modernity. Following Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s line of argumentation 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Bauman claims that modernity is characterized by hyper-
rationalization, bureaucratization, and instrumentalization, all of which serve modernity’s 
“modality of being”— “it’s endemic unfinishedness; by its orientation toward a state of 
affairs not yet in existence.”51 With the development of the modern sciences, rationality 
becomes the order of the day. As an unfinished project, modernity reflects a belief in 
continuous progress toward transcendence of the current state of affairs and of human 
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nature. This push toward future greatness is accompanied by an emphasis on rational 
thought that obliterates moral feeling. By diverting moral sentiment through rational 
argumentation, heinous acts appear necessary for the good of humankind. They become 
even more acceptable when within bureaucratic and instrumental frameworks that defuse 
responsibility for those actions and create a hierarchy of experts whose decrees are 
passed down the ranks to the people who ultimately carry out the acts of violence. 
Furthermore, the structure of bureaucracy and its expectations for its participants lead to a 
situation in which “moral concerns of the functionary are drawn back from focusing on 
the plight of the objects of action. They are forcefully shifted in another direction—the 
job to be done and the excellence with which it is performed.”52 To succeed in modern 
society, one must not question the morality of one’s actions; one must prove one’s 
capacity to follow orders with proficiency. The bureaucratic structure invites the 
instrumentalization and dehumanization of the group targeted for extermination by 
destroying the possibility of meaningful relationships through the production of social 
distance. Modern society makes it possible for “human action [to] be effective at a 
distance,” and “[w]ith the growth of distance, responsibility for the other shrivels.”53 As 
these forces work in concert, it becomes easier and easier to justify the elimination of 
unwanted, “polluting,” and “degenerate” peoples in an effort to take humanity a step 
closer to its transcendent destiny.   
The justification for dehumanization and instrumentalization of these latter 
categories of people is connected to another factor: race-thinking as the dominant 
ideology of the modern era. According to Ivan Hannaford in Race: The History of an 
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Idea in the West, race-thinking is a relatively new development in Western society that 
coincided with a naturalistic and logical turn in accounting for human difference as well 
as the European encounter with new and unexpected human communities in the Americas 
and Africa. In trying to devise explanations for human difference according to nature, the 
philosophers, scientists, and privateers of the era, set the stage for the emergence of a 
fully-developed concept of race that would establish the “true” relationship between 
different human groups and humans and other animals.
54
 Such concepts and frameworks 
would be put to use in new ways as the natural sciences such as anthropology, biology, 
and natural history developed. Prior to this period, however, the concept of race was 
absent from European thought. For example, Aristotle distinguishes between barbarians 
and non-barbarians in Politics.
 55
 The difference is not based on the race or ethnicity of 
the group, but according to their political life (or lack thereof). Humans could be 
barbarians or civilized—the difference came down to whether or not they lived according 
to nature like nonhuman animals or whether they were able to leave their private lives 
behind and enter the public, political realm. Almost two thousand years later, Bartolome 
de Las Casas would use Aristotle’s barbarian/civilized distinction to argue that the 
Indians in South America were not animals, but barbarians—humans who spoke a 
foreign tongue and did not participate in the best form of civilization (in this case, a 
Christian one).
 56
 In the latter years of the Roman Empire through the Middle Ages, race 
was still absent from European thought. From a Judeo-Christian perspective (and later an 
Islamic one), different groups of humans were believers, heretics, or infidels. Humans, 
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regardless of how they looked or where they came from, were all believed to be 
descended from the same original ancestors, Adam and Eve. As Augustine states, “But 
whoever is anywhere born a man, that is, a rational mortal animal, no matter what 
unusual appearance he presents in color, movement, sound, not how particular he is in 
some power, part or quality of his nature, no Christian can doubt that he springs from one 
protoplast.”57 Early Medieval scholars rationalized that the differences in human 
appearance and culture could be explained by tracing the history of those groups to the 
different sons of Noah and the fall of the Tower of Babel, which caused the variety of 
languages.  
The concept of races and the notion that humans were perhaps not all of the same 
species began to emerge in the sixteenth century with the colonization of the Americas. 
Hannaford identifies several scholars as progenitors of race-thinking including Jean 
Bodin, François Hotman, and George Best, all of whom attempted to explain human 
difference and the origins of different groups of humans based on natural causes or 
natural laws. As a result, non-white peoples were “marked, not with an artificial badge 
and hideous raiment like the Jew, but with a natural badge of pigmentation understood to 
be caused by a natural infection brought about by an unnatural act…”58 In other words, 
phenotypical differences were used to indicate supposedly congenital traits that visibly 
showed the inferiority of certain groups compared to others. In The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt traces the development of race thinking and racism to 
the genocides of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries—but especially with the appearance of Darwinism—the concept of race 
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becomes linked to both biology and the notion of progress, leading to the “convincing 
conclusion that man is related not only to man but to animal life, that the existence of 
lower races shows clearly that gradual differences alone separate man and beast and that 
a powerful struggle for existence dominates all living things.”59 Not only were physical 
differences posited, but race thinking and biology were used to justify social differences. 
The shift toward using nature and biology to explain differences between humans 
allowed racists to ground their hierarchical vision of humanity in what appeared to be the 
objective laws of nature and fact. Humans were no longer made in the image of God, but 
were just another form of animal species. For Arendt, the danger of this obsession with 
group origins is that “no matter how exalted the claim for one’s own people, peoples are 
transformed into animal species so that a Russian appears as different from a German as a 
wolf is from a fox. A ‘divine people’ lives in a world in which it is the born persecutor of 
all other weaker species, or the born victim of all other stronger species. Only the rules of 
the animal kingdom can possibly apply to its political destinies.”60  
 Though many of the characteristics discussed above are attributable to genocides 
of the nineteenth century and later, in this dissertation, I follow other scholars like A. 
Dirk Moses, Patrick Wolfe, and Lorenzo Veracini, in arguing that the genocides that 
accompanied the early stages of the conquest of the Americas exhibit a certain continuity 
with more contemporary genocides insofar as they share in the same archive of tropes, 
stereotypes, and imagery that appeared in Germany, Bosnia, and Cambodia.
61
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Furthermore, it is during the early stages of the conquest that race-thinking began to 
emerge in Western thought. According to Anibal Quijano, modernity is characterized by 
the intersection of race and capital. Like Hannaford, Quijano argues that race-thinking 
and racism were inventions of the sixteenth century, spurred on by the encounters the 
colonially-enterprising Spanish had with the strange indigenous peoples of South 
America who defied their expectations in comportment, appearance, and social and 
political life to such an extent that they were deemed sub- or nonhuman species.
62
 In 
adopting a biological justification for who deserves moral consideration and who has the 
right to live, the relationship between human groups as well as the relationship between 
humans and other animals changed. Nature now dictated who was superior to whom, who 
had rights over whom, and who deserved to live and to die. The biological turn helped to 
explain human differences in terms of differences between species so that 
dehumanization, the belief that some humans are subhuman or nonhuman animals, 
became a biological “fact” and effective tool for demonstrating ontological and moral 
inferiority. In this respect modern genocides are characterized by an interest in the natural 
and biological differences between human groups and humans and other animals. 
Advances in technology, communication, and transportation were not the only changes 
that characterize modern genocide; racism and the application of the biological and 
natural sciences to political life made dehumanization a part of genocidal violence like 
never before.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
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Though the United Nations defines genocide narrowly as a set of physical acts 
directed intentionally toward an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group, I use the term 
genocide to refer to a wider range of eliminatory acts including ethnic cleansing, ecocide, 
and social death, which fall outside the purview of the UN’s definition. In this way, I 
acknowledge the legal ambitions of the UN’s definition, while also acknowledging the 
debates and concerns raised by other scholars regarding the limitations of that definition. 
In the following chapters, the metaphysics of genocide that I identify applies to this 
broader spectrum of violence.  
Hints of this metaphysics already appear in the debates above. In the discussion of 
groups we can see how essentialism and purity inform the interpretation of the concept 
“group” and how these notions are used in the context of genocidal violence. Likewise, 
the role of racism and biology in modern genocide highlights the way in which 
dehumanization is bound up with practices of genocide. In seeing humans as one pole on 
a spectrum of animals, groups deemed unworthy of the name “human,” were relegated to 
an inferior, less evolved position—the subhuman. Race-thinking made it possible for 
dehumanization to be more than metaphorical. From the standpoint of the dehumanizer, 
dehumanization was not taking place at all—the inferiority of non-white, non-European 
peoples was just a biological fact. In the next chapter I will explore in more depth the 
metaphysical principles that ground genocidal thinking through an analysis of the role of 
dehumanization in genocide. In all of the definitional debates of genocide outlined above, 
dehumanization has rarely been a factor. The next chapter explores how this neglect has 
been taken for granted even though it gives important clues to how modern genocide 
works and how we might prevent it. 
46 
CHAPTER III 
DEHUMANIZATION AND ITS ROLE IN GENOCIDE 
 
In most genocide scholarship, dehumanization receives passing attention, as if 
merely noting its presence sufficiently addresses the subject. Dehumanization is 
frequently treated as an effect, byproduct, or description of the circumstances leading up 
to and occurring during genocide. This attitude toward dehumanization persists even 
though the phenomenon appears in every modern genocide in various ways. Sometimes 
dehumanization is given voice by perpetrators as in the Bosnian genocide where signs 
stating “No Muslims or Dogs Allowed” were posted in Sarajevo.63 Other times the 
victims describe themselves as dehumanized like Jean Améry does in At the Mind’s 
Limits as he tells about the Muselmann, the prisoner who had become just “a staggering 
corpse, a bundle of physical functions in its last convulsions.”64  
Dehumanization is considered so ubiquitous to genocide and the notion of an 
autonomous, dignified human subject is considered so normal, that most genocide 
scholars take the presence of dehumanization for granted and rarely analyze its role in the 
practice of genocidal violence. In fact, the problem of dehumanization more generally 
speaking has only recently begun to gain sustained attention. Currently social scientists 
including sociologists like Albert Bandura, Daniel Bar-Tal, and Rowan Savage and social 
psychologists like Nick Haslam have been producing the most research on the topic. 
Philosophers have been even later to the conversation, but books like David Livingstone 
Smith’s Less Than Human and Kate Mann’s Down, Girl are starting to take the topic 
more seriously. Yet, no matter how dehumanization is addressed, it is always considered, 
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first and foremost, a problem for humans. The animal Other that represents the lack of 
humanity remains largely in the shadows. 
As yet the role of dehumanization in genocide has not received enough attention. I 
argue that dehumanization is a necessary condition of genocide and that through an 
analysis of genocidal dehumanization, we can discern patterns in modern genocidal 
practice that reveal a metaphysics of genocide. In what follows I argue that 
dehumanization and genocide share a logic that can be traced to three key metaphysical 
principles: essentialism, purity, and human exceptionalism. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, according to the UN’s definition of genocide, genocide requires intent to destroy 
a group as such—that is someone who deliberately chooses to carry out a project of 
elimination. This suggests that genocidal practice emerges from the mind of an evil 
individual or small group of individuals who then brainwash or coerce others to 
participate. As a result, for the most part, current literature on genocide and genocide 
prevention has focused on patterns of behavior in individuals and at state levels that 
might indicate immanent genocide or genocidal violence. But if there is an underlying 
metaphysics at work in genocidal thought and practice, then responsibility for genocide 
does not rest solely on the shoulders of a single mastermind, but also on the principles 
which ground the particular values of the perpetrator group. This suggests that changing 
individuals or their economic, political, or material circumstances will not ever truly 
eliminate the potential for genocide. Rather, the principles that ground and justify 
behaviors that lead to genocide need to be altered. As such, I argue that preventing 
dehumanization, which appears in every modern genocide, needs to be part of the effort 
to prevent genocide.  
48 
I. Defining Dehumanization 
 
The adjective “dehumanizing” is used in all sorts of media to describe acts, 
behaviors, or language that are degrading to human life or dignity. Though the word 
“dehumanization” is frequently associated with genocide, slavery, sexism, capitalism, 
and other forms of oppression and violence, there are no consistently agreed upon 
definitions. Generally speaking to dehumanize means to treat another as less than human, 
but this definition comes with a surprising amount of conceptual cloudiness due in part to 
the fact that the term dehumanization often gets conflated with a number of other related 
concepts including objectification, instrumentalization, and derivatization. In addition to 
this, what is human or properly human so-called is not always immediately evident.  
Social psychologist Nick Haslam attempts to clarify the concept of 
dehumanization by addressing that which dehumanization denigrates: humanness.
65
 
According to Haslam dehumanization involves either the denial of uniquely human 
characteristics or the denial of characteristics attributed to human nature. Uniquely 
human characteristics refer to properties that distinguish humans from other creatures.
66
 
They include refined emotions, higher-order cognition, imagination, moral sensibilities, 
and prosocial values. These characteristics reflect sociability and culture. When these 
characteristics are denied, dehumanization typically takes the form of animalization as 
these qualities are often perceived as absent in all other animal life.
67
 Human nature 
characteristics are non-comparative properties that typically appear in humans and are 
                                                 
65
 Haslam, “Dehumanization.” 
 
66
 Ibid., 256. 
 
67
 Ibid., 258. 
49 
associated with human nature but are not necessarily unique to humans.
68
 When human 
nature characteristics, which reflect the continuity between humans and the natural world, 
like agency, soul, biological attributes, and normative characteristics are denied, the 
primary form that dehumanization takes is mechanization.
69
 In other words, machines are 
seen as artificial and unnatural, so when other humans are perceived as behaving in 
unnatural ways, they are compared to machines. Though dehumanization involves 
comparisons with various types of other-than-human beings, Haslam notes sometimes the 
context affects the form dehumanization takes. For example, mechanization is most 
common in work or medical settings while animalization appears most frequently in 
religious, social, and cultural conflicts including ethnic cleansing, genocide, and slavery.  
Though Haslam argues that there are two forms of humanness and two 
corresponding forms of dehumanization, these are not as different as they first appear 
because the distinction between animal and machine in the history of Western thought is 
fuzzy. Descartes, for example, believed that animals were sophisticated automatons.
70
 
Other philosophers like Aristotle, Kant, and Heidegger portrayed animals as limited 
agents, lacking rational intelligence, free will, and morals, trapped in the “disinhibiting 
ring” of their biological mechanisms and instincts.71 Western society in general has taken 
the view that most animals, like machines, are instruments for human productivity and 
products for consumption. Machines and animals also share the unfortunate position of 
being the defining Other to the human One. Kelly Oliver points out that this type of 
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relational definition is constantly occurring as humankind struggles to understand and 
define the boundaries of its own identity, going as far as to say that “the concepts of 
subjectivity, humanity, politics, and ethics continue to be defined by the double 
movement of assimilating and then disavowing the animal, animality, and animals.”72 
Just as the animal has been a constant presence against which the human abuts and butts 
heads, the machine has also played an ambivalent Other in the human quest for self-
understanding. Machines have been understood as artifice, as signs of human mastery, 
creativity, and uniqueness, but they have also been the site of fear and feelings of the 
uncanny. As Donna Haraway notes, machines have often been regarded as caricatures 
and mockeries of human autonomy and creativity.
73
 Both animal and machine have been 
used to mark the sacred limits of the human, resulting in a tense ambivalence or outright 
hostility toward them. The similarity between our disregard for many animals (especially 
food producers) and machines surfaces in dehumanization where both are relegated as 
nonhuman, inferior to humans, and unworthy of many of the moral considerations 
granted to other humans. As such, mechanization and animalization are continuous with 
one another. From this it follows that the distinction between uniquely human and human 
nature characteristics is meaningless.  
In “Paradoxes of Dehumanization,” philosopher David Livingstone Smith 
organizes the wide range of usages of the term dehumanization into eight “loosely 
connected meanings,” which include: 
1. Subjecting others to indignities, or, in a more Kantian, vein treating 
them merely as means 
2. Verbally likening others to nonhuman animals or inanimate objects 
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3. Denying the subjectivity, individuality, agency, or distinctively human 
attributes of others 
4. Denying that others undergo mental states 
5. Treating others in such a way as to erode, obstruct, or extinguish some 
of their distinctively human attributes 
6. Conceiving of others as inanimate objects 
7. Conceiving of others as less human than members of one’s ingroup 
8. Conceiving of others as subhuman creatures
74
  
 
Though dehumanization has many different meanings, for Smith, not just any form of 
violence or derogatory speech directed at one person by another can be considered 
dehumanization. Smith argues that in order to avoid conflating these different meanings, 
we need to emphasize that there is only one form of dehumanization properly speaking: 
conceiving of others as subhuman creatures. For Smith, the other concepts of 
dehumanization are often consequences of the last form, and that “any of these 
consequences might be indicative of dehumanization…but none of them is constitutive of 
it. So the fact that one person refers to another as an animal or treats another in a manner 
normally reserved for nonhuman animals does not on its own show that she dehumanizes 
a person.”75 In fact, cruel or violent treatment cannot properly be considered 
dehumanization either because “this puts the cart before the horse. Doing violence to 
people doesn’t make them subhuman, but conceiving of people as subhuman often makes 
them objects of violence and victims of degradation.”76  
Smith makes this distinction because he believes certain forms of violence require 
the perpetrator to recognize the humanity of the other and because depersonalizing 
another or using another as a means to an end might not always be wrong or harmful. For 
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example, he argues that sexual objectification is not dehumanization even though it 
involves the depersonalization and commodification of another human being and the 
treatment of the other as a mere means to another’s end. Rather, “treating someone as 
only a means to a sexual end is not the same as regarding them as subhuman, for one can 
fail to acknowledge a person’s subjectivity without denying the existence of that 
subjectivity, just as one might not believe that it is raining without believing that it is not 
raining.”77 Likewise, a surgeon might fail to acknowledge a patient’s subjectivity while 
that surgeon is the middle of an operation, perhaps viewing the patient’s body like a 
machine. In both cases, failure to acknowledge another’s personhood does not entail 
believing that the other is not human. Thus, dehumanization, for Smith, requires that the 
Other be thought of as something like another species, another kind of being entirely. For 
Smith, dehumanization is an epistemological problem. It entails misrecognition, 
misunderstanding, or mistaken beliefs—that is, faulty knowledge or knowledge-gathering 
processes. In other words, dehumanization is not doing but thinking. It is about regarding 
another as a subhuman creature, making it, for Smith, a predominantly psychological 
problem rather than a metaphysical problem.  
Smith, Haslam, and other social psychologists have largely overlooked the 
contributions that decolonial and feminist scholars have brought to bear on the discussion 
of dehumanization.
78
 Though Smith acknowledges that feminist philosophers have led 
the way in contemporary discussions of dehumanization, he quickly dismisses their 
contributions, saying the objectification of women is “fundamentally different from the 
form of dehumanization that I explore in this book,” is “produced by a different 
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concatenation of forces,” and, thus, requires a “somewhat different set of conceptual 
tools” for analysis.79 If Smith had read these authors more carefully, however, he would 
have realized that the same epistemological and metaphysical forces are also at work in 
the dehumanization of women and that there is a long history of equating women with 
animals and nonhuman nature as well as objects. In addition to this oversight, Smith 
misses another important contribution provided by decolonial and feminist scholars. 
Whereas Smith argues that dehumanization is a purely epistemological problem that 
involves a failure to recognize that the other is human, decolonial and feminist scholars 
have realized that misrecognition is only one aspect of the problem. The real issue with 
dehumanization is its transformative power—its power to create a reality in which some 
groups of humans are actually less than. This applies to all eight of the types of 
dehumanization that he identifies.  
In The Wretched of the Earth, Franz Fanon describes the colonial world as one 
divided into two: the colonists and the native people. This divide represents not only two 
different ways of living or two different classes of people; it represents the coexistence of 
different species that, at first glance, look like one. Colonialism is characterized by a 
division of the world that begins “with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a 
given race, a given species.”80 Fanon explicitly connects this attitude within the colonial 
context to dehumanization, stating, “At times this Manicheism goes to its logical 
conclusion and dehumanizes the native, or to speak plainly, it turns him into an 
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animal.”81 For Fanon, to dehumanize is to turn another into an animal. This involves 
consistently referring to and thinking of Natives in zoological and bestial terms while 
frequently alluding to the animal or vegetable worlds. Aimé Césaire makes a similar 
claim in Discourse on Colonialism. Like Fanon, he argues that colonization is ultimately 
a project of dehumanization, but unlike Fanon, Césaire argues that colonization 
ultimately dehumanizes both colonizer and colonized: “colonial activity, colonial 
enterprise, colonial conquest, which is based on contempt for the native and justified by 
that contempt, inevitably tends to change him who undertakes it; that the colonizer, who 
in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal, 
accustoms himself to treating him like an animal, and tends objectively to transform 
himself into an animal.”82 Once again, dehumanization involves treating another human 
like an animal. It is an activity that has real effects on both colonizer and colonized. In 
The Colonizer and the Colonized, Albert Memmi argues that in the colonial context the 
colonizer rejects the humanity of the colonized. This dehumanization is accomplished in 
several ways. First, the natives are depersonalized, treated as an anonymous collectivity 
rather than as a group of individuals. Second, they are deprived of freedom and the right 
to choose who they wish to be. Through these denials, the colonized native is objectified, 
turned into a thing to be used, discarded, or ignored as the colonizer sees fit. Like Fanon 
and Césaire, Memmi also connects dehumanization to treating humans like animals, 
stating that “[o]ne does not have a serious obligation to an animal or an object.”83  
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One of the most thorough accounts of dehumanization provided within decolonial 
literature appears within Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Freire argues that 
oppression (within and outside of the colonial context) is marked by dehumanization. 
According to Freire, dehumanization is the “distortion of the vocation of becoming more 
fully human.”84 According to Freire, human life is distinguished from other forms of life 
by its propensity for freedom and its ontologically processual and unfixed nature. 
Humans are in a constant state of becoming and are not confined by their relation to 
nature as other animal life is. Thus, colonization and other forms of oppression, which try 
to silo humans into categories, which deny their freedom, and which prevent them from 
communicating, thinking, and making meaning ultimately dehumanize the people 
involved. Like Césaire, Freire argues that colonization and oppression dehumanize both 
oppressor and oppressed by turning humans into things and animals, thereby limiting 
human potential.  
What characterizes the discussions of dehumanization by each of these authors is 
the emphasis on the transformative power of dehumanization. Dehumanization may 
involve the use of animalizing language or tropes as Fanon describes or it may involve 
the denial of the colonized person’s individuality as Memmi describes, but in each case 
the affect is ontological. The colonized or the oppressed are not just treated like or talked 
about as if they are another species, they become another species.
85
 Freire is explicit 
when he argues that denying education to the oppressed or using a banking method of 
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education that stifles thought imposes limits on how aware humans can be of their 
activity and the world in which they are situated. When denied the freedom to think and 
change, they become animals, who “live out their lives on an atemporal, flat, uniform 
‘prop.’”86 Thus, according to these authors, dehumanization is not just a denial of 
humanity, but a transformation of human beings into nonhuman animals and things.  
The notion that what distinguishes humans from other animals is their capacity to 
transcend “animal” life and find new forms of meaning and value in life beyond the 
biological is a theme that emerges in feminist approaches to dehumanization as well. In 
The Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir argues that what distinguishes women’s condition 
from men’s is that they lack the freedom and autonomy to escape their biological 
functions and participate in the meaning-making of the world in the way that men do. 
Men have consistently presented barriers to women’s freedom and denied their capacity 
to transcend their biological functions. As such, “the female, more than the male, is prey 
to the species…motherhood [has] left woman riveted to her body like the animal.”87 
Given this, for de Beauvior, dehumanization involves limiting human freedom and the 
continued treatment of certain groups of humans—especially women—as mere animals.  
Other feminist scholars like Linda LeMoncheck, Andrea Dworkin, Martha 
Nussbaum, and Rae Langton have also explored the issue of dehumanization as it 
pertains to women. In Dehumanizing Women, LeMoncheck argues that sexual 
objectification occurs “when women are regarded as inanimate objects, bodies, or 
animals, where their status as the moral equals of persons has been demeaned or 
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degraded.”88 To treat a person like an object or nonhuman animal involves disregarding 
the feelings, desires, or interests that a person has. According to LeMoncheck, humans 
have distinctive capacities that they do not share with objects or are unlikely to share with 
other animals including the capacity for sentient life, self-consciousness, abstract thought, 
imagination, and deliberation.  
For other feminist scholars, the problem with dehumanization is less that women 
are treated like nonhuman animals, but just that they are not granted full “human” status. 
They use the term “objectification” to describe the treatment of women by men. In 
“Against the Male Flood,” Andrea Dworkin discusses women’s dehumanization in terms 
of objectification. Objectification involves treating a human as if she were an object, 
commodity, or thing without personality, individuality, or integrity. Objectification 
happens as a result of subordination, which involves the implementation of a hierarchy 
between subordinator and subordinated, submission, and violence.
89
 According to 
Dworkin, the objectification of women is justified based on their perceived biological 
inferiority. Ultimately, objectified persons are seen as nonhuman or less-evolved humans 
while the subordinator or objectifier is seen as human. Thus, to be objectified, is to be 
dehumanized—treated as less than human.  
Martha Nussbaum and Rae Langton build on this concept of objectification, 
arguing that objectification involves treating a non-object like a human person as if it 
were an object. For Nussbaum there are seven different ways in which objectification can 
occur including treating a person like an instrument, denying the autonomy of the other, 
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claiming ownership of the other, and denying the other’s subjectivity.90 Nussbaum 
complicates the discussion of dehumanization because she argues that not all forms of 
objectification are necessarily morally wrong. Working from a Kantian notion of the 
adult human person in mind, Nussbaum argues that perhaps with the exception of treating 
others as a means to an end, denying autonomy, and denying subjectivity, there might be 
morally acceptable reasons, depending on the context, for objectification in the other 
senses of word to be allowed to stand. For example, we treat other people as a means to 
an end when we ask them to complete tasks for us or satisfy one of our desires. The 
problem arises when a person is treated solely as a tool without recognition of their 
agency, autonomy, and subjectivity. Nussbaum acknowledges that we often use other 
animals in such a way, which could be an issue, but that generally speaking treating 
objects as merely tools does no moral harm, whereas treating humans in such a way is 
morally problematic.
91
 
Langton amends Nussbaum’s list of ways to objectify a person with the following 
additions: reduction to body, reduction to appearance, and silence. Her approach to 
objectification differs from Nussbaum’s insofar as she argues that objectification involves 
an epistemological and ontological component in addition to the ethical issues which 
Nussbaum addresses. According to Langton, women are excluded epistemically in two 
main ways. First, they are not considered knowers because they are deprived of the same 
epistemological resources as men. They are also subjects of knowledge, treated as 
inherently mysterious by men. Other ways that women experience epistemic exclusion 
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include lack of credibility, application of “spurious universality,” and discrediting of their 
knowledge.
92
 Drawing on Catherine McKinnon’s work, Langton agrees that men, in their 
place of power over women, claim to be knowers and, as knowers, see themselves in the 
neutral, objective position. This, in turn, creates the conditions for the validation of their 
objectification of women and other forms of knowledge.
93
  
By delving into men’s assumed “aperpsectivity” in greater detail, Langton argues 
that claims to such positions lead to cases where belief does not conform to the world, but 
the world conforms to belief.
94
 For Langton, objectification is about how the world 
conforms to the mind. It is a process or a doing in which the social world is shaped by the 
desires, beliefs, and perceptions of the objectifiers. Objectification is a means by which 
those in power create the world to fit their desires and beliefs. Objectification is a 
projection of those beliefs and desires accompanied by the force to make them reality. In 
this way, for Langton, dehumanization once again involves a transformative component. 
It is not just that dehumanizers passively perceive others as objects or less than human; 
rather, because dehumanizers are in positions of political, material, and epistemic power, 
they can alter reality to fit their perceptions. This leads Langton to propose a list of 
epistemic attitudes of objectification. These include treating someone as an object for the 
satisfaction of a desire, forcing someone to have a property one desires, and believing 
that someone has that property, and behaving as if someone has that property by nature.
95
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Following Langton’s insights regarding the connection between epistemic power 
and the experience of reality, if we accept that dehumanizing claims are not just 
epistemological (that is, about what some person or group of persons believes about 
another person or group of persons) but that these claims are also ontological insofar as 
the claim reflects the actual state of reality or has the force to create a reality, then 
Smith’s argument that only the last of the eight definitions above is the actual meaning of 
dehumanization does not hold up. In each of the eight definitions, the person(s) who 
holds that belief is making a corresponding assertion about reality that will ultimately 
become the basis for action—such as denying rights, privileges, access, etc. to the 
dehumanized. Regardless of how severe the form dehumanization takes, any act taken on 
the basis of any of those definitions leads to the creation of a state in which that reality 
comes into existence. Thus, it would be more accurate to say that dehumanization, 
broadly speaking, is any belief, statement, or act that renders one group of people inferior 
to another on the basis of the belief that the group deemed inferior is lacking a 
characteristic(s) regarded as essential to being human.  
 
II. The Role of Dehumanization in Genocide 
 
According to Gregory Stanton, president of the non-profit organization Genocide 
Watch, dehumanization is one of the ten stages of genocide. At this stage, “One group 
denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it [the other group] are equated with 
animals, vermin, insects, or diseases.”96 This stage of genocide is closely connected to 
two other stages: classification and symbolization. In classification, societies and the 
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groups within them are separated into “us” and “them” whereas in symbolization groups 
that have been classified as Other are associated with particular symbols or names to 
mark their differences. For Stanton, none of these three stages alone or together 
guarantees that genocide will occur; nevertheless, genocide does not happen without 
them.
97
 In this section, I will consider four roles dehumanization takes in genocide—
overcoming moral resistance, motivation, legitimization, and performance—arguing 
along with Stanton that dehumanization is a necessary though not sufficient condition for 
genocide. 
 
a. Overcoming Moral Resistance 
One prominent explanation for the role of dehumanization in genocide is that 
dehumanization helps overcome normal moral resistance toward the violence required for 
genocide or other mass atrocities. In “Violence without Moral Restraint,” social 
psychologist Herbert C. Kelman argues that dehumanization is a factor in “reducing the 
strength of restraining forces against violence” in “normal” people.98 According to 
Kelman, genocidal violence is different from other forms of violence because it occurs 
outside of the conditions with which violence is normally accepted or morally justified 
such as in self-defense. In this respect dehumanization contributes to genocidal violence 
because it weakens the moral restraints average people have against violence, allowing 
them to legitimately participate in sanctioned massacres. Building off Kelman’s work, 
social psychologist Albert Bandura argues that dehumanization is a set of 
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“disengagement practices” that allows perpetrators of mass violence to justify their 
actions and make the violence morally acceptable. As Bandura explains, “It is easier to 
brutalize people when they are viewed as low animal forms.”99 Not only does 
dehumanization weaken moral restraints and justify actions, it also enables perpetrators to 
conduct genocidal violence without distress, guilt, or shame. Accordingly, “[t]he process 
of dehumanization is an essential ingredient in the perpetration of inhumanities.”100 
Scholars Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley argue in their book Why Not Kill 
Them All? that dehumanization helps people overcome their horror when they engage in 
or witness mass slaughter firsthand. Drawing on the notion of essentialism, Chirot and 
McCauley state that in dehumanization, a group of people attributes an essence that is 
different from their own to another group. As a result, the out-group appears to the in-
group as homogeneous; that is, all members of the out-group possess the same (negative) 
attribute(s). When this occurs, the logic of essences dictates that the in-group and out-
group are inherently different. Thus, if the in-group identifies themselves as human, the 
other group, who “is seen as having a different essence from ourselves is not quite 
human, and such a group can be used, abused, and eliminated as if it were another species 
of animal.”101 As Chirot and McCauley conclude, because genocide is, by definition, 
killing based on membership within a group, essentialism and dehumanization are 
necessary and crucial for genocidal acts to be carried out.  
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Other authors like Smith, James Waller, and Helen Fein share similar sentiments 
regarding the role of dehumanization in genocide.
102
 According to Smith, dehumanizing 
thinking taps into the biological structure of the human mind and our in-born tendencies 
to conceptualize the world in terms of categories. Dehumanization plays on the typical 
ways humans organize groups according to “us” and “them” so that humans see the 
relationship between those two groups as threatening, impure, and dangerous.
103
 As with 
Chirot and McCauley, Smith says these sentiments can be attributed to a belief in 
essential differences between the in- and out-groups. Through dehumanization, the out-
group loses its moral standing. As Smith explains, “Demoting a population to subhuman 
status excludes them from the universe of moral obligation. Whatever responsibilities we 
have toward nonhuman animals, they are not the same as those we have toward members 
of our own species. So, if human-looking creatures are not really people, then we don’t 
have to treat them as people.”104 Likewise, Waller holds that dehumanization creates 
psychological and moral distance between groups in order to make extreme violence 
more acceptable.
105
 However, Waller adds that essentializing and dehumanizing 
discourse and actions imply that the “victims deserve or even require their 
victimization.”106 In this respect, in addition to overcoming usual moral sentiments 
against violence, dehumanization provides justification for genocidal violence by 
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claiming that the victims brought such violence onto themselves due to their inherent 
inferiority and subhumanity. This sentiment is echoed by Fein, who also claims that 
excluding others from one’s circle of moral responsibility is a necessary condition for 
carrying out acts of genocide. Dehumanization accomplishes this because when people 
are assumed to belong to a different species there are “no limits inhibiting the magnitude 
of permissible crime.”107 
In sum, according to these writers, ordinary humans do not seek out violence, but 
they are more likely to extend moral consideration to those whom they perceive to be like 
them. Sameness is seen as a positive quality, while difference becomes a reason to 
mistrust, hate, or fear another. Dehumanization helps to overcome internal and normative 
prohibitions against extreme violence by exaggerating perceived differences between 
groups of people. If those differences are perceived as fundamental to the nature of a 
group, then dehumanization can assist in fostering a change in normal moral attitudes that 
can eventually lead people to participate in genocide. 
 
b. Legitimization 
A second role that dehumanization takes in genocide is legitimization. 
Dehumanization provides reasons or justifications for why genocidal actions are 
acceptable for resolving problems between groups. This reasoning may be used to 
convince a range of audiences including outsiders, bystanders, and the perpetrators that 
this was a morally acceptable course of action. Sociologist Rowan Savage argues that this 
is one of the main purposes of genocidal dehumanization.  
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Savage agrees that dehumanization functions to demarcate those who will be 
morally included and those who will be morally excluded. However, unlike many of the 
authors above, he does not believe that dehumanization helps to overcome innate 
resistances to violence. Rather, Savage holds individuals and societies have a shifting 
relationship to violence based on their particular circumstances, ideologies, and goals. 
This distinction is important because, even though dehumanizing language and acts can 
be traced far back into the history of many cultures, the relationship between 
dehumanization and genocide is tied to the rise of the modern era, specifically modern 
nation states.
108
 In “modernity,” the emergence of the nation-state and the emergence of 
human rights coincide. The ideologies accompanying these social and political changes 
eventually intermingle with the rise of the biological sciences, such as the theory of 
evolution, creating the conditions for biological notions of race, supported by the 
homogeneity of national identity. According to Savage, in the context of modernity, the 
nation-state made it easier for individuals and groups to think in terms of an us/them 
dichotomy because the identity of the group was tied to a particular territory. At the same 
time, rules around legitimate violence were also changing. First, there arose a distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants.
109
 Legitimate mass killings could only be 
conducted against enemy soldiers for military purposes. Yet, the nation-state model made 
it possible to draw and maintain borders beyond which undesirable people could be 
expelled. Advances in technology also made it possible for those expulsions to be 
successfully carried out either through forced removal or liquidation. The expectation that 
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killing be done for legitimate military purposes often ran counter to the desire to protect 
and privilege citizens of the nation-state. This meant that “the newly conceivable desire 
to carry out genocidal actions as a solution to a perceived problem was frustrated by the 
fact that violent action of this kind was now defined as illegitimate.”110 Thus, in order to 
carry out genocidal agendas, a justification for the violence was needed.  
According to Savage, dehumanization is a necessary component of modern 
genocide insofar as it strategically resolves problems that genocide poses for perpetrators. 
Legitimizing dehumanization always occurs during genocide.
111
 It alters the meaning of 
violence so that it is already considered legitimate by redefining the identity of the out-
group so that they are no longer human.
112
 In this respect, dehumanization legitimizes 
killing that would otherwise be unacceptable “through the creation of systems of meaning 
that re-label both victims themselves, and actions taken toward them.”113 With the help of 
pseudo-biological reasoning, groups are relabeled based on their relation to the dominant 
population of the nation-state to be categorically Other and other-than-human. Once they 
are seen as nonhuman animals, diseases, or units, the moral restrictions that limit violence 
against other humans no longer apply.  
For example, in his facetiously titled essay “The Noble Red Man,” Mark Twain 
characterizes Native Americans as dirty pests—leeches on the good will of white 
settlers—who live little better than nonhuman animals. He writes, “All history and honest 
observation will show that the Red Man is a skulking coward and a windy braggart, who 
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strikes without warning--usually from an ambush or under cover of night, and nearly 
always bringing a force of about five or six to one against his enemy; kills helpless 
women and little children, and massacres the men in their beds; and then brags about it as 
long as he lives.”114 By portraying Native Americans as evil, uncivilized, and harmful to 
the society that settlers are trying to establish, Twain provides legitimization to those who 
already have other reasons to kill Native Americans (such as for their land) with 
seemingly legitimate moral reasons for killing them. Thus, Twain is able to make the 
claim that a Native American is “nothing but a poor, filthy, naked scurvy vagabond, 
whom to exterminate were a charity to the Creator’s worthier insects and reptiles which 
he oppresses.”115 Such propaganda, which involves likening people to vermin, diseases, 
and parasites (which are all viewed as unclean and dangerous to human life) validates the 
hatred, disgust, or fear that one group feels toward another while acting as a device for 
fear-mongering.  
 
c. Motivation 
In addition to legitimization, Savage argues that dehumanization also, at times, 
functions as a form of motivation. Whereas legitimization is concerned with the moral 
acceptability of certain acts, motivation helps to explain why certain acts needed to take 
place. In motivational dehumanization, the out-group is portrayed as a threat that needs to 
be exterminated for the purposes of self-defense. This is precisely the type of argument 
that Adolf Hitler uses against the Jews in Mein Kampf. For example, he writes that the 
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Jew “is and remains the typical parasite, a sponger who like a noxious bacillus keeps 
spreading as soon as a favorable medium invites him. And the effect of his existence is 
also like that of spongers: wherever he appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or 
longer period.”116 A few pages later, he likens Jews to vampires or leeches, saying, that 
the Jew is “[a ] true blood-sucker that attaches himself to the body of the unhappy people 
and cannot be picked off until the princes themselves again need money and with their 
own exalted hand tap off the blood he has sucked from them.”117 With reasoning like this, 
Hitler argues that the Jews take over whichever society they enter, slowly killing off that 
society through their financial control. By using dehumanizing imagery and portraying 
the Jews as a threat to the lives of their neighbors, Hitler’s words can tap into visceral and 
easily comprehensible ideas and fears that could compel people to participate in actions 
that could culminate in genocide.  
Dehumanization can also motivate genocidal violence by priming groups to treat 
other groups as morally or ontologically inferior. In a series of studies social 
psychologists Kimberly Costello, Gordon Hodson, Cara MacInnis, Brock Bastian, and 
Steve Loughnan found that manipulating people’s perception of the distinction between 
humans and other animals can either exacerbate dehumanization or decrease it.
118
 In one 
study Costello and Hodson record the results of testing whether or not educating people 
about animal-human similarity could reduce prejudice towards immigrants in Canada.
119
 
They created four scenarios in which participants were asked a series of questions about 
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immigrants after watching a short video on animals. In one scenario, the movie depicted 
ways that animals were like humans. In another, humans were shown to be like animals. 
In the final two videos, the differences between humans and animals were emphasized, 
but in one of them human superiority was emphasized. They found that showing how 
animals were like humans increased moral concern for immigrants while showing how 
humans were like animals exacerbated prejudice. Simply showing that humans and 
animals were different had little effect on the participants’ prejudices. In this study and 
the others conducted by these researchers, they found that priming the participants—that 
is, presenting them with information—affected their responses. Comparing humans to 
animals, a common method of dehumanization, resulted in increased levels of prejudice 
toward those perceived as outsiders. According to these researchers, this sort of priming 
is effective because it relies on already established myths about human-animal difference: 
“One such myth concerns the largely universal view that humans are superior to animals, 
making animal needs subservient to human needs…Put simply, the importance of 
humans over animals lays the foundation for the perception that human outgroups are 
themselves less human.”120 
When it comes to genocidal violence, priming through propaganda and other 
media, can help motivate violence by playing up these tropes and myths about human-
animal difference that most people assume are true. Such priming motivates violence by 
feeding misinformation, playing up fears, and highlighting threats. For example, the Nazi 
propaganda film Jud Süß, spliced shots of rats running through dirty gutters with Jewish 
men, who were frail, weak, and dirty, praying in the ghettos. In this respect, viewers were 
primed to dehumanize Jews by associating them with vermin, evoking in viewers 
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emotions like disgust and horror. Because exterminating rats was already permissible, 
showing that Jews and rats were equivalent made exterminating Jews an intuitive 
extension of that thought. 
 
d. Performance 
In addition to the roles of genocidal dehumanization described above, 
dehumanization is also fundamental to modern genocide because it characterizes the 
activity of genocide. In “Modern Genocidal Dehumanization,” Savage repeatedly talks 
about dehumanization as a “discursive strategy,” that is, a way of manipulating language, 
meanings, and symbols in order to construct a coherent narrative that legitimizes 
genocidal action.
121
 As Savage explains, “With the right narrative, what was once 
unthinkable becomes first thinkable and then acceptable; what was once ‘empty’ rhetoric 
becomes a specific blueprint for action.”122  
Though I agree with Savage that altering the meaning of violence through 
construction of a coherent narrative and through deployment of language is needed if 
dehumanization is going to take root enough for it to motivate or legitimize genocidal 
behavior, I would add that dehumanization does not just create a narrative, but a reality. It 
is not simply a language game, a set of utterances or beliefs, but an activity that produces 
the state of affairs that the perpetrators wish to find. In this respect dehumanization is a 
performance. By performance, I mean something akin to philosopher Thomas Norton-
Smith’s notion of performativity in his book The Dance of Person and Place. Though 
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Norton-Smith is drawing on a Native American theory of performativity with the 
objective of explaining how Native American worlds are created, his description of 
performativity provides an accurate and useful theory for thinking about how 
relationships and reality become constituted in other contexts as well. Norton-Smith 
claims that “performing with a symbol empowers the symbol, transforms the participants, 
[and] categorizes and order experiences.”123 This performance helps to construct a world. 
According to Norton-Smith, “performances have the power to categorize and order, or 
recategorize and reorder—in short create and recreate…the action, procedure, or 
performance is the principle vehicle of meaning and the way by which the world is 
made.”124 In other words, the act of doing sets up a particular relationship that organizes 
the world or reinforces an already established way of organizing the world. This, in turn, 
creates and recreates a reality in which the system of categorization is real. One of the 
key aspects of performativity is that it (re)establishes social and moral relationships. In 
the Native context, “the performance is the vehicle for traditional knowledge and moral 
values…[it] strengthens tribal bonds and ties to other human and nonhuman persons in 
the world.”125 This is similar to Thomas Kühne’s point in Belonging and Genocide that 
engaging in exclusive practices toward certain groups helped to strengthen communal 
bonds within a group. Performance, whether for good or harm, leads to the creation of a 
world in which certain relationships are developed or severed. 
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This is not entirely unlike Judith Butler’s notion of performativity. In 
“Performative Acts and Gender Constitution” she makes a similar claim about gender 
reality: “Gender reality is performative, which means, quite simply, that it is only real 
insofar as it is performed.”126 Like Norton-Smith, she claims that such performances 
organize and order the world—in this case into binary genders and particular modes of 
expressing those genders. Performance, for Butler, involves repetition, “which is at once 
a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially established; it is 
the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimation.”127 And also like Norton-Smith’s 
account of performativity, Butler implies that performances establish social and moral 
relationships. This is because performances are not private, but public. As public, they 
appear in the world and change and are changed by the world in their on-going activity. 
Performing according to expected pre-established gender norms may have the effect of 
putting others at ease while deviating from those norms may result in fraught, tense, or 
punitive relationships. For both Norton-Smith and Butler, performance is creative action; 
it institutes a reality that did not necessarily pre-exist the performance.  
It is my contention that something similar is happening with genocidal 
dehumanization. Dehumanization is not just a matter of conceiving another as less than 
human (as Smith puts it) or word-play like name-calling. It is an imposition of a 
particular metaphysical understanding of the world and the beings that inhabit it. 
Dehumanization involves (re)creating and (re)establishing relationships of a particular 
kind as well as altering conditions in such a way that those relationships appear normal 
and natural. When dehumanization is carried out successfully, it makes a world or reality, 
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which in turn confirms for the perpetrators the belief or justifications for dehumanization 
in the first place. For the most part, this involves creating situations in which the world 
becomes such that some types of beings are ontologically and morally superior to others.  
Dehumanizing practices cover a wide range of activities, some subtle and some 
overt. An overt example is the transportation of Jewish deportees and prisoners in cattle 
cars. Treating them as animal freight was not merely symbolic; it also put them in 
conditions in which they were forced to violate European social norms. During 
transportation, which sometimes took days at a time, prisoners were rarely allowed to 
leave the trains. On most occasions they were not provided with bathroom stops or even 
buckets for waste, compelling people to defecate and urinate where they stood or in 
public. As Olga Lengyel reports regarding her experiences, there were times when the 
prisoners were let off the cars and forced to empty their bowels on the train tracks in front 
of onlookers.
128
 Such acts served to humiliate the prisoners as well as confirm to the 
bystanders that the Jews were actually nonhuman animals because they were behaving 
the way they would expect of nonhuman animals. During the Bosnian genocide, Serbs 
forced Muslim men to expose themselves, engage in sexual intercourse with one another 
before an audience, and even bite off one another’s genitalia. Even though the Serbs were 
forcing the Muslim men into these acts, the fact that the men did them confirmed to the 
Serbs that the Muslims were no better than dogs.
129
 Other practices like name calling, 
hunting, and dogging are all performative acts meant to put the targeted group into its 
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ontological and moral place.
130
 Such activities do not just change narratives or 
discourses; they create a reality and set of relationships that fits the dehumanizer’s 
beliefs.  
Dehumanization has four functions within modern genocide, though only two of 
those functions—legitimization and performance—are universal occurrences in modern 
genocide. Legitimization and performance provide the necessary justification, grounding, 
relationships, and world needed in order for genocide to be carried out. In this respect, 
dehumanization is a necessary condition for genocide.  
 
III. Possible Counter-Arguments 
 
Before I move on, I want to briefly address some counter-arguments to the claim 
that dehumanization is necessary for genocide. One of the most frequently cited reasons 
for claiming that dehumanization is not necessary for genocide is that there are numerous 
examples in which perpetrators do not literally believe that their victims are not 
human.
131
 Not only is the humanity of the victim inescapable, but the acknowledgment of 
it is part of what makes the violence being done so heinous and so effective. Many of the 
critiques of theories of dehumanization stem from authors who are not discussing 
genocide. Of the ones who do, psychologist Johannes Lang and sociologists E.N. 
Anderson and Barbara A. Anderson offer the strongest lines of reasoning.  
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In “Questioning Dehumanization,” Lang argues that dehumanization implies the 
denial of the victim’s subjectivity and, thus, the disintegration of the social connection 
between perpetrators and victims.
132
 Lang posits that when dehumanization occurs, the 
only thing remaining between the two groups is a void.
133
 However, various cases point 
to perpetrators struggling with their feelings for and towards the victims as in the case of 
Rudolph Höss, commandant of Auschwitz, who was moved by the courage shown by 
some of the Jewish victims before they were gassed. Most importantly, for Lang, too 
much emphasis on the role of dehumanization in genocide interferes with a clear 
understanding of the dynamics of power at work in genocide and how these dynamics are 
reflected in behavior. Though dehumanization can and does occur some of the time, it 
cannot occur all of the time because sometimes the subjectivity of the victim imbues the 
violence with particular meaning. As Lang explains, “The desire to humiliate, the desire 
to exercise power, and the desire to have sex [rape] all depend on the acknowledgment of 
a subjectivity—a thinking, feeling presence—in the other person.”134 In addition, as an 
exercise of power, genocidal violence can be used to help personalize the identity of the 
perpetrator. This would also require a relationship between the two groups so that “[w]hat 
might look like the dehumanization of the other is instead a way to exert power over 
another human being without ending the social relationship: is an opportunity to sustain 
domination over the victims before (or even without) killing them.”135 
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E.N. Anderson and Barbara A. Anderson share some of these views, though they 
offer a less compelling argument. In their book Warning Signs of Genocide, they use 
Smith’s definition of dehumanization, which involves conceiving of others as subhuman 
creatures. This form of dehumanization entails thinking of other humans as animals and 
diseases. Anderson and Anderson claim that dehumanization cannot be necessary in 
genocide because dehumanizing rhetoric is just a “pretext to torture and abuse of a sort 
that no one ever wastes on rats, cockroaches, or pigs.”136 In order to carry out torture and 
abuse, one must be able to empathize with the victim, to know what will hurt and 
humiliate the Other the most. Consequently, the victims of genocide are not dehumanized 
because they are not actually believed to be nonhuman animals. Rather animalizing 
language incites fear, disgust, and hatred, creating distance between groups and 
solidifying barriers between them. Though Anderson and Anderson admit that 
dehumanization can occur in genocide, they do not believe it is necessary. 
Both Lang and Anderson and Anderson fail to recognize several important 
aspects of dehumanization. First, Lang argues that torture of other humans involves 
sustaining social relationships. This suggests that social relationships cannot and do not 
exist between humans and other animals, which, as will be made clear in later chapters, is 
a distinctively Western outlook. Second, they suggest that torture, rape, and humiliation 
cannot be used against nonhuman animals. However, various studies show that there is a 
strong link between animal abuse and violence toward other humans. Abusing nonhuman 
animals can provide some humans with a sense of power.
137
 Third, their understanding of 
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dehumanization suggests that dehumanization occurs at the level of individual 
cognition—that it is a matter of psychology rather than cultural norms and metaphysical 
presuppositions. As mentioned earlier, aside from the leaders of the perpetrators (i.e. 
Adolf Hitler, Ratko Mladic, or Jean-Paul Akayesu) who perhaps left written or spoken 
statements that give insight into their beliefs, it is impossible to know what the majority 
of people who commit genocide (soldiers, neighbors, bystanders) actually think about 
their victims. In the testimony by Rudolph Höss that Lang cites above, Höss claimed that 
Nazi soldiers would often talk to him about their anxiety around the killing, looking for 
reassurance.
138
 Such actions suggested to Lang that whatever dehumanizing rhetoric 
might be going around, the soldiers themselves did not necessarily think that their victims 
were not human. However, studies have shown that workers in meat processing factories 
and factory farms also exhibit high levels of depression and anxiety.
139
 This suggests that 
the problem is not necessarily that humans were being killed, but that the regular 
proximity to ongoing violence might have a negative impact on human emotional and 
mental well-being.  
Furthermore, the testimony of survivors who regard themselves as victims of 
dehumanization suggests that something else is going on besides mind-games for 
lowering moral inhibitions against violence against other humans. One survivor of the 
Bosnian genocide related the following about her experience: “Until yesterday, you had 
been a person. You had your life and family. All of a sudden you walk around a city in 
which you feel strange, reading signs with messages like ‘Muslims and dogs cannot go 
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into busses.’ It really makes you believe that you are not an individual human being. You 
feel like an animal.”140 One famous example of the experience of becoming a nonhuman 
animal is related by Primo Levi on his experience in Auschwitz:  
Then for the first miserable time we become aware that our language lacks 
words to express this offence [sic], the demolition of a man…It is not 
possible to sink lower than this; no human condition is more miserable 
than this, nor could it conceivably be so. Nothing belongs to us anymore; 
they have taken away our clothes, our shoes, even our hair; if we speak, 
they will not listen to us, and if they listen, they will not understand. They 
will even take away our name.
141
  
 
Levi describes how the Nazis stripped away the things that make one a member of a 
human community. The acts to which the victims have been subjected make it the case 
that the prisoners are no longer human for all social, political, and ethical purposes. In 
these ways they are given the same ontological and moral standing as nonhuman animals 
have in Western cultures. These examples suggest that what the perpetrator actually 
thinks about what their victims are does not matter. What matters is the way in which 
language and action construct through performance a social space that delineates who has 
moral worth and who does not, who can be killed and who can be allowed to live.  
Lang argues that too much emphasis on dehumanization in genocide interferes 
with understanding the particular power dynamics occurring. In this, Lang misses the 
point that dehumanization is enactment of power and also an enactment of a particular set 
of ideological and metaphysical beliefs that impose on the world and the beings in it a 
particular set of relationships. In HumAnimal: Race, Law, Language, Kalpana Sheshadri 
rebuts an argument similar to Lang’s about slavery in the American south. She argues 
that there are consequences for understanding racist beliefs and practices when the 
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premise that perpetrators make a distinction between their victims and animals is 
deployed. She explains,  
First of all, such a premise leads one to lament the ascription of impurity 
to the slave, while necessarily leaving intact the association of humanness 
with a certain purity/propriety as well as the general structure of 
hierarchical thinking. The moral implication is that the analogy with the 
animal, as an inferior life form, is always to be abhorred. Second, to 
establish as a logical premise the social fact that the slaveowner tacitly 
acknowledges the humanness of his slaves is necessarily to avoid or 
ignore as problematic all those ways in which the slave is treated and 
regarded exactly as the slaveowner and slave trader regard and treat 
livestock. What remains untouched here in the examination of belief is the 
practice and production of inhumanity.
142
 
 
In other words, dismissing the importance of dehumanization from genocide by saying 
that perpetrators do not literally believe that their victims are nonhuman animals is to 
ascribe to and promote concepts of purity, humanness, and moral reasoning that make 
dehumanization and genocide possible in the first place. Lang and Anderson and 
Anderson arrive at their positions from the assumption that “the human” is real and that it 
is indeed superior to “the animal.” Apparently, the human is so superior that a special 
kind of violence is reserved for other humans. This bias toward humans will become 
clearer in the next chapter as I examine those principles, particularly the principle of 
human exceptionalism, which holds that the ontological and moral difference between 
humans and nonhuman animals is real.  
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CHAPTER IV   
THE METAPHYSICS OF DEHUMANIZATION AND GENOCIDE 
 
If we accept that dehumanization provides legitimization for genocide and that it 
is an activity that creates a reality and not merely a set of discursive practices or beliefs, 
then this necessitates answering the questions: what kind of reality does it create? What 
sorts of assumptions at work in genocidal dehumanization lead to a reality where this 
violence is legitimate? According to David Livingstone Smith, dehumanization involves 
conceiving of others who appear to be human on the outside as less than human on the 
inside. Such beliefs are grounded on set of five metaphysical commitments.
143
 These 
metaphysical commitments reveal precisely the kind of world (re)created by 
dehumanization. The list below is adapted from Smith’s article “Paradoxes of 
Dehumanization” with some minor modifications.  
The first of these metaphysical commitments is that there is a distinction between 
appearance and reality. In other words, what our senses tell us about the world may not 
reflect the actual state of things. This is tied to the second metaphysical commitment 
which posits that beings can be separated into natural kinds based on their essential 
natures. For example, “[t]o be human, one must possess a human essence. A human-
looking being that lacks this essence is not human.”144 The third metaphysical assumption 
entails that there is a hierarchy of natural kinds in which humans occupy a higher rank 
than nonhuman animals and other organic beings. Following from the first three 
principles, we arrive at the remaining two metaphysical commitments: fourth, humans 
have human essences while subhumans have subhuman essences and, fifth, the hierarchy 
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of natural kinds is also a moral hierarchy.
145
 These five principles form the basis of 
dehumanizing thought and action. They make it possible to justify dehumanization to 
one’s self and others while giving insight into the understanding of reality that legitimizes 
genocide. As metaphysical principles, they do not merely reflect an individual’s beliefs; 
they reflect a foundational cultural worldview.  
If dehumanization is necessary for the practice of genocide insofar as it provides 
the justification for genocidal action while creating a reality in which dehumanization and 
genocide are acceptable, then it is reasonable to deduce that genocidal thinking is 
characterized by a similar set of metaphysical principles. These principles are 
essentialism, purity, and human exceptionalism. Essentialism and purity have been 
frequently recognized as problems connected to genocidal thought. Most genocide 
scholars recognize that genocidal thinking involves the creation of us/them relationships, 
which exacerbate differences and become justifications for exclusion and 
extermination.
146
 Human exceptionalism, on the other hand, has received very little 
attention even when dehumanization is part of the conversation. In this chapter I will 
review these three principles and show how they enable dehumanizing and genocidal 
logics.  
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I. Essentialism 
 
Essentialism: A commitment to a rendering of reality and the beings and states 
that constitute it such that those beings can be separated into natural kinds according to 
fixed, unchanging essences. 
 
When it comes to dehumanizing and genocidal logic, essentialist thinking entails 
believing that the nature of a thing is determined by a fixed, unalterable core property that 
it shares only with others of its own kind. An essence, according to Aristotle, “is what 
something is.”147 In other words, an essence defines one type of being from another. It is 
a being’s primary substance. Members of the same kind are perceived as having the same 
essence.
148
 Essences are considered to be simple and unchanging. They adhere to the 
principle of identity, which states that each thing is identical with itself. In other words, 
essences are what they are. As simple, unchanging, and defining characteristics, essences 
delineate sharp boundaries between natural kinds, which means beings that possess 
different essences are fundamentally different. Beings cannot have more than one 
essence. All other characteristics attributed to a being are considered accidental.
149
 
Essences also provide grounds for making inductive inferences about members of 
natural kinds.
150
 Essences are presumed to cause the attribute typically displayed by 
individual members of a given natural kind.
151
 If essences cause attributes, then it is 
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possible to infer certain behaviors or characteristics based on what type of essence a 
being has (stereotyping). This means that members of natural kinds are inherently 
predictable insofar as they share an essence with other members of the kind. However, if 
a distinction between appearance and reality is presupposed (as is often the case in 
essentialist thinking), “a thing possessing the essence of a certain kind does not 
necessitate its displaying of the attributes that are typical of that kind.”152 This might 
even be the case for many members of a kind.  
For example, the one-drop rule asserted that even if a person displayed many of 
the physiological, behavioral, and cultural characteristics of a European person, that 
person would still be considered Black if they had a single Black ancestor several 
generations removed. In other words, even if an individual only exhibits a limited number 
of traits associated with that natural kind, it still possesses the essence of that kind in full 
rather than in part. The one-drop rule example also speaks to another assumption about 
essences. For living beings, essences are passed down from parent to offspring. Essences 
are inherited and innate; one cannot choose one’s essence.153 This meant, for example, 
that even when Jews had assimilated completely into German culture and had even 
converted to Christianity and given up the identity of Jew for themselves, they could still 
be considered Jews by the Nazis.  
When dehumanization occurs, beings that appear to be human are considered to 
be nonhuman or subhuman creatures. This is possible when differences between groups 
of humans are not attributed to cultural or social influences but to innate essences. 
Because essentialism entails that beings are defined by their possession of a single 
                                                 
152
 Ibid. 
 
153
 Ibid. 
84 
primary essence, which is either there or not and does not exist in degrees, one group of 
humanoids can take another to be inherently Other. For example, even if Jews display 
characteristics typically associated with humanness, according to Nazi propaganda these 
behaviors are accidental to their underlying essence, which is something subhuman. 
Germans, on the other hand, possess the essence of humanness; it is accidental if they 
share traits with Jews.
154
 In justifying an essential, radical separation between themselves 
and the Other, one group of humans can claim a human essence for themselves while 
arguing that the Other lacks that essence and is, therefore, not human. In this respect, the 
logic of dehumanization parallels the logic that governs the delineation of groups in 
genocide. Similarly, genocide is a crime directed at groups as such that consists 
establishing and holding onto one’s identity by excluding others that might compromise 
that identity.
155
 In genocide, members of groups are perceived as unable to transcend, 
transform, or distance themselves from their group because no matter how they appear or 
behave, they will always have an inhering essence that determines their true nature.  
 
II. Purity 
 
Purity: Adherence to a naturalized logic that either excludes the possibility of 
middle terms and interstitial beings or treats such terms and beings as monstrous, deviant, 
or polluting. 
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The notion of purity builds upon the concept of essences. In addition to adhering 
to the law of identity, the principle of purity also relies on the logical principle of the 
excluded middle. The law of the excluded middle states that everything is or it is not. 
There can be no third or middle terms. In genocidal dehumanization, the essence of one 
group is taken to be the negation of the essence of another group. The two terms are 
treated as a binaries or opposites. One cannot exist in the time and space of one without 
supplanting the other. As such, purity construes the us/them relationship as one of radical 
difference and mutual exclusion. The / in this relationship is taken to be a literal dividing 
line that separates the two groups. Mixing them would violate the law of the excluded 
middle, leading to impurity, to a corruption of essence. This is particularly frightening 
and threatening to the in-group, whose identity rests upon having a distinct and intact 
essence (identity). Should beings be perceived as possessing more than one primary 
essence at once or possessing a mixture of two or more essences, they are regarded as 
monsters, deviants, and pollutants.
156
 Such beings are dangerous to the in-group because 
they could corrupt the purity of that group’s identity. Likewise, they may invoke greater 
fear because their place in the cosmic and moral hierarchy is uncertain.
157
 
For example, in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge regime referred to its victims as 
microbes, “pests buried within,” and “traitors ‘boring in.’”158 These terms spoke of a 
threat that would eat away at and corrupt the identity of the group that controlled the 
regime. The campaign of ethnic cleansing that characterized the Bosnian genocide was 
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spurred by similar motivations—removing Muslims from Serbian territory would ensure 
that the Serbian population would remain pure and uncorrupted.
159
 As Norman A. 
Naimark notes, in the genocidal context “‘cleansing’ has a dual meaning; one purges the 
native community of foreign bodies, and one purges one’s own people of alien 
elements.”160  
While the desire for purity and the fear of corruption often spur removal and 
extermination of unwanted peoples during genocide, the imposition of binary thinking 
can lead one group to believe that if their essence is pure, the Other’s is inherently dirty. 
Such claims add support to the view that the victims deserved what they got and that 
violating them did not count because it was in their nature to be violated. For example, 
Andrea Smith argues that sexual violence against Native Americans was used as a 
colonial tool of conquest in the United States for the “the constant purification and 
elimination of racialized enemies within the state [to ensure] the growth of the national 
body.”161 Sexual violence was justified through propaganda that depicted the native 
peoples as sexually perverse, polluted with sin, dirty, violent, and thus, already inherently 
“rapable.”162  
 
III. Human Exceptionalism 
 
Human Exceptionalism: A commitment to a strict moral and ontological hierarchy 
in which humans outrank other beings, especially animals. 
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According to the principle of purity, two groups that contain different essences 
are separate and should remain separate. Their relationship is one of dichotomy. A 
dichotomy refers to a simple difference or distinction between two things. However, the 
principle of human exceptionalism reconfigures this relationship from a simple 
dichotomy into a dualism. A dualism is, according to feminist logician Val Plumwood, “a 
particular way of dividing the world which results from a certain kind of denied 
dependency on a subordinated other…dualism can be seen as an alienated form of 
differentiation, in which power construes and constructs difference in terms of an inferior 
and alien realm.”163 Whereas dichotomy is simply making a division or distinction, 
dualism treats the division as absolute and as part of the natural order of things. It uses 
the patterns of difference rendered by dichotomies to establish hierarchies in which the 
dualized other is systematically constructed as Other. In dualistic thinking each term of a 
relationship (p and not-p or the in-group and out-group) is treated as a self-identical entity 
that possesses an essential, unchanging nature. The two terms are then related to one 
another not just in terms of being different, but so that one side of the relation always 
represents a lack or absence of some positive quality that exists in the other. In other 
words, dualisms like culture/nature, male/female, savage/civilized, and human/animal 
treat differences as inherent and fixed where the second term in the relationship is the 
representation of the absence of the essence of the first term. The relation of hierarchy 
between the two terms is key, constructing a logic of domination. As Plumwood explains, 
A dualism is an intense, established and developed cultural expression of 
such a hierarchical relationship, constructing central cultural concepts and 
identities so as to make equality and mutuality literally unthinkable. 
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Dualism is a relation of separation and domination inscribed and 
naturalized in culture and characterized by radical exclusion, distancing 
and opposition between orders construed as systematically higher and 
lower, as inferior and superior, ruler and ruled, center and periphery. It 
treats the division as part of the natures of beings construed as not merely 
different but as belonging to radically different orders or kinds, and hence 
as not open to change.
164
 
 
Though dualisms reflect constructed cultural concepts, they are so embedded within 
culture that they are mistakenly taken to be natural. The “naturalness” of the terms of the 
relation is then used to justify and explain domination, oppression, and violence. 
Plumwood identifies five characteristics of dualism that contribute to this function: 
backgrounding, radical exclusion, relational definition, objectification, and 
homogenization. Through backgrounding, the Other is deemed inessential, their 
contributions and reality treated as unimportant and not worth noticing. The view of the 
positive value, the “master,” is considered universal, and alternative perspectives are not 
considered or even imagined.
165
 Despite this, the master requires the Other to be the 
boundary against which the identity of the master is defined. In this relational definition, 
the Other is perceived as a lack or negativity.
166
 Yet, because the master does not want to 
admit any kind of dependency on the Other, the master polarizes the relationship by 
downplaying similarities while maximizing and magnifying differences, resulting in 
radical exclusion.
167
 Radical exclusion, in turn, reinforces essentialist approaches to the 
Other, specifically via objectification (treating the Other as an object or instrument for 
one’s use rather than as an independent agent with its own goals and purposes) and 
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homogenization (ignoring differences that exist within those relegated to a lesser 
status).
168
 
Though dualism is the structure of the logic of the principle of human 
exceptionalism, the content of that structure is equally important. According to the 
principle of human exceptionalism, the particular dualism at work is human/animal. The 
human essence is seen as superior to essences associated with animals and other natural 
beings. In the history of Western thought “the animal” has been used to define and denote 
the limits of “the human.” But the relationship is not one simply of radical exclusion. As 
Kelly Oliver points out, “It is not just that the animal and animality remain the 
constitutive outside of the concepts human and humanity or that the animal and animality 
are the abjected other against which what is properly human and humanity are defined 
and maintained…despite the explicit message of [many philosophical] texts—that 
humans are radically distinct from animals—animals function to teach man how to be 
human.”169 In other words, the concept of the human depends on the concept of the 
animal for its coherence. This is precisely what happens in dehumanization.  
As we have seen in the discussion of dehumanization in the previous chapter, for 
the most part scholars doing research on dehumanization and genocide take for granted 
that dehumanization involves treating humans the way humans frequently treat other 
animals, and that treating humans in this manner is a moral wrong. As noted earlier, 
Kalpana Sheshadri sees this as a way of maintaining the purity of the human and its place 
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in higher up in the a hierarchy.
170
 Texts on genocide and dehumanization abound with 
examples of one group of humans insulting another group of humans by referring to them 
according to various animal names like cockroaches, vermin, rats, dogs, apes, and pigs. 
Why is it assumed that readers of these texts will share the understanding that calling 
someone a snake is a violation of a person’s dignity? For example, Smith explains that 
the function of dehumanization is to make it morally acceptable to kill. If one group is 
not recognized as human then they are no longer within the realm of moral obligation. As 
he puts it: “It’s wrong to kill a person, but permissible to exterminate a rat.”171 Though 
examples of nonhuman animals being used to justify human extermination abound within 
their studies of dehumanization and genocide, authors like Smith, Helen Fein, James 
Waller, Ben Kiernan, and Nick Haslam never seriously consider why this pattern exists 
and what the abundance of nonhuman animal metaphors and actual violence towards 
nonhuman animals might be able to tell us about the nature of dehumanization and 
genocidal violence.  
Here, I would like to take a moment to consider the role of nonhuman animals in 
dehumanization and genocide. Broadly speaking, in dehumanization the inferiority of the 
out-group is tied to the (supposed) inherent biological, cognitive, moral, and spiritual 
deficiencies of nonhuman animals. Various qualities including rationality, language, 
higher-order emotions, laughter, tool use, the ability to make moral judgments, 
recognition of one’s own mortality, and free will (among others) have been used to define 
                                                 
170
 Sheshadri, HumAnimal.  
 
171
 Smith, Less Than Human, 15. 
 
91 
human life over and against the lives of other animals.
172
 The Great Chain of Being, for 
example, is a cosmological ordering of the world that places God at the principle, humans 
after angels, and nonhuman animals and demons on the rungs below.
173
 Contemporary 
Western society continues to take human and animal difference for granted despite new 
scientific studies that call into question our traditional assumptions about the differences 
in human and nonhuman animal nature. For example, elephants mourn their dead, rats 
can laugh, great apes can use sign language to communicate with humans, and many 
nonhuman animals experience a wide range of emotions and emotional relationships.
174
 
Though the traditional lines that have been used to separate human life from animal life 
seem more like suggestions or figments of our imagination, invoking animal inferiority 
still remains a powerful tool of dehumanization. In a recent example, on Wednesday May 
16, 2018 US President Donald Trump said of undocumented immigrants, “These aren’t 
people, these are animals, and we’re taking them out of the country at a level and at a rate 
that’s never happened before.”175 The claim, which provoked anger and outrage for some 
while fueling fear and a desire for purity for others, did not garner attention for how the 
concept of “animals” was once again deployed for this effect.  
In genocidal dehumanization four types of nonhuman animal metaphors are 
frequently deployed to characterize the out-group: pests, predators, prey, and companion 
animals. The animals selected for comparison are chosen based on cultural narratives 
about which nonhuman animals deserve respect and which do not, often illustrating 
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humans’ general ambivalence about who or what deserves moral consideration. Pests 
include bacteria, parasites, and creatures considered to be vermin such as rats or 
cockroaches. Pests and other “unclean” animals invoke disgust and fear of contamination, 
violating a moral sense of cleanliness and purity.
176
 For example, during WWII, Jews 
were frequently compared to rats, parasites, and disease. In Rwanda, Tutsis were 
compared to cockroaches. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge claimed that “Buddhist monks 
do nothing but eat and sleep and have exploited the population for more than 2,000 years. 
They are leeches sucking the people’s blood.”177 
Predator animals invoke feelings of dread, fear, and danger. Since predators evoke 
existential horror, people animalized in this way are frequently associated with evil, 
cannibalism, and demons. Such characterizations incite desires to preempt possible harm 
by enacting self-defensive violence.
178
 Such sentiments were transmitted via the 
designation of Indigenous peoples as “bloodthirsty savages” and cannibals who had no 
control over their actions or respect for fellow humans. As Gustav Jahoda explains, at 
times Europeans who encountered aboriginal peoples in Australia and the Americas 
would attribute to them animal-like senses, believing that “American Indians are as 
sensitive as bloodhounds; savages, like dogs, live in a world of smells, and their dislike of 
another person depends on their odour.”179 The comparison with predatory animals also 
accompanied beliefs about sexual promiscuity and deviance. As anthropologist Anthony 
Pagden illustrates, the Conquistadors believed that Indians “could not clearly distinguish 
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between the rigid and self-defining categories into which the natural world was divided. 
The Indian could not see that the other human beings were not, for him, a natural food 
any more than he could see that animals or creatures of the same sex were not his natural 
mates.”180 
When dehumanized peoples are compared to prey animals, they may be treated by 
the dehumanizers as objects of conquest, trophies, and sources of recreation.
181
 The 
forced marches Native Americans endured in the southeastern and western parts of US 
involved European settlers herding Native people like cattle to new lands. Massacres, like 
the one at Wounded Knee, were often accompanied by scalping, skinning, and the 
removal of genitalia and other appendages as trophies as if the troops carrying out the 
massacre were on a hunting expedition.
182
 Survivors and victims of genocide also tend to 
describe their experience of dehumanization as though they were prey. One survivor of 
the Bosnian genocide who had been trapped in Sarajevo during the three year siege 
against it reported that she “felt like a bird in a cage” while another survivor reported that 
“they [the Chetniks] want to destroy our identity. They treated us like cattle.”183 
The ambivalence toward nonhuman animals is most evident when 
dehumanization involves comparisons to companion animals. Companion animals, which 
are often cared for and treated like family, will, in most circumstances, fall within the 
bounds of moral consideration. However, while loving a pet dog may be deemed socially 
acceptable in some cultures, calling someone a dog is almost always considered an insult. 
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Sawela Sulimann, a survivor of the Darfur genocide reported that before being gang 
raped her attackers said to her, “Black girl, you are too dark. You are like a dog. We want 
to make a light baby.”184 Similarly, another Darfur survivor stated that before she was 
raped by militiamen they said, “Dog, you have sex with me…The government gave me 
permission to rape you. This is not your land anymore, abid, go.”185 
While specific comparisons to nonhuman animals abound, genocidal 
dehumanization often involves comparing the targeted group to a generic animal-being or 
beast. These metaphors most strikingly illustrate the dualistic relationship between “the 
human” and the “the animal” as they homogenize a broad and varied category of 
creatures into a single indistinguishable block for the sole purpose of defining what the 
human is and is not. For example, during the colonization of the Americas, historian 
Francis Parkman commented in regards to the Oglala Sioux that “an impassible gulf lies 
between the white man and his red brethren…[A]fter breathing the prairie air for a few 
months or weeks, he begins to look upon them as a troublesome and dangerous species of 
wild beast.”186 Similarly, during Stalin’s reign in the Soviet Union, the peasant class 
(known as the kulaks) was slated for ethnic cleansing. One propaganda slogan declared, 
“We will exile the kulak by the thousands and when necessary—shoot the kulak 
breed.”187 The writer Maxim Gorky called the kulaks “half-animals.”188 
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As these examples attest, the distinction between human and nonhuman animals 
has an important role to play within genocide. As noted above, various scholars believe 
that seeing another as a member of a different species provides grounds for moral 
exclusions. Daniel Goldhagen explains that when a group is dehumanized they are 
believed to “inherently lack qualities fundamental to being human in the sense of 
deserving moral respect, rights, and protection. Such beings are said to lack human 
capacities or powers, and as a definitional matter, do not need to be treated as 
humans.”189 According to Smith, “Thinking of a person as a member of the same species 
as yourself, as sharing the same essence, automatically evokes a sense of oneness with 
them. You perceive them as a fellow member of the human community. By conceiving of 
a person in this way, you conceive of them as a member of your in-group, and this 
triggers inhibitions against harming them.”190 In other words, if an individual or group is 
conceived of as (or is put in a situation in which it becomes that they are) lacking a 
human essence, human capacities, human characteristics, and instead are conceived of as 
having a nonhuman animal essence, then that individual or group is rendered killable.  
A clear example of these three metaphysical principles at work in the context of 
genocide appears in Heinrich Himmler’s 1935 pamphlet Die Untermenschen, a piece of 
anti-Jewish propaganda. Himmler writes,  
Just as the night rises against the day, the light and dark are in eternal 
conflict. So too, is the subhuman the greatest enemy of the dominant 
species on earth, mankind. The subhuman is a biological creature, crafted 
by nature, which has hands, legs, eyes and mouth, even the semblance of a 
brain. Nevertheless, this terrible creature is only a partial human being.  
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Although it has features similar to a human, the subhuman is lower on the 
spiritual and psychological scale than any animal. Inside of this creature 
lies wild and unrestrained passions: an incessant need to destroy, filled 
with the most primitive desires, chaos and coldhearted villainy…191 
 
Not all of those, who appear human are in fact so. Woe to him who forgets 
it!  
 
In this passage, Himmler embraces the concept of essentialism. Differences between 
categories cannot be determined by purely visual clues alone—the underlying essence of 
the being is what ultimately determines its group and ontological and moral status. 
Second, the adulteration of human and nonhuman is considered terrible and impure, 
characterizing its inferiority. Finally, there exists a “natural” biological hierarchy in 
which humans are at the top followed by nonhuman animals, and then, in this schema, 
subhumans, who presumably lack even the positive characteristics of other animals. The 
naturalness and biological nature of the subhuman is not denied; rather, it is organized in 
relation to other known categories with established meanings (humans>animals). This 
hierarchy is correlated with moral status so that the lower on the hierarchy one is situated, 
the more villainous, destructive, and terrible one becomes. The establishment of these 
categories and their moral characteristics help create a particular rational framework and 
then function within it, making certain actions and beliefs reasonable and morally 
acceptable because they echo a logic that has been normalized and naturalized. In other 
words, in this narrative, the logic of dehumanization leads to the conclusion that 
extermination is necessary. Genocide becomes the only rational solution given the 
metaphysics and logic at work. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
To summarize, I have argued that dehumanization is a necessary condition for 
genocide insofar as it fulfills multiple functions within genocide including reducing 
resistance to violence, motivating violence, legitimizing violence, and characterizing the 
performance of genocidal violence. Dehumanization, broadly speaking, is any belief, 
statement, or act that renders one group of people inferior to another on the basis of the 
belief that the group deemed inferior is lacking a characteristic(s) essential to being 
human. It is the way in which genocide is performed.  
I have argued that dehumanization is not simply an epistemological issue in which 
one conceives or believes another to be a subhuman creature. Rather, dehumanization is 
also a metaphysical issue. The ability to conceive of someone as nonhuman is predicated 
on the understanding that the world is a particular way and that it is governed by 
particular principles. These principles, which appear in dehumanization, are essentialism, 
purity, and human exceptionalism. As practice and performance, dehumanization 
instantiates a reality that fits the laws of this metaphysics. Furthermore, if genocidal 
dehumanization is a performance— “a stylized act of repetitions—” rather than a set of 
beliefs, it would undermine the notion that essences pre-exist.
 192
 
Essentialism entails a commitment to a rendering of reality and the beings and 
states that constitute it such that those beings can be separated into natural kinds 
according to fixed, unchanging essences. In genocide, individuals are classified according 
to their group membership. Membership in that group is taken to be necessary rather than 
accidental. In other words, members of the group cannot choose to be members or not; 
they are born into it. Purity involves adherence to a naturalized logic that either excludes 
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the possibility of middle terms and interstitial beings or treats such terms and beings as 
monstrous, deviant, or polluting. In genocide acts like ethnic cleansing, extermination, 
and forced assimilation are frequently accompanied by the belief that one’s group identity 
is at stake if the two groups and the essences are allowed to mingle.
193
 Maintaining purity 
of biology, ideology, culture, etc. becomes a strong motivating factor behind genocide. 
Finally, human exceptionalism holds that there is a strict moral and ontological hierarchy 
in which humans outrank other beings, especially animals. If the human is defined as that 
which is not animal, then the axis that supports dehumanizing logic is the belief that 
nonhuman animals are ontologically and morally other. This otherness, when taken as 
negation, threatens the purity and integrity of the human essence. If, as I claim, 
dehumanization is a necessary condition for genocide, then human exceptionalism is also 
a ground for justifying and rationalizing genocide.  
As we saw, genocide is defined as an act that targets groups as such and that these 
groups are determined by an inhering and unchangeable essence. The logic of genocide 
operates in accordance with this belief in essential differences, making it possible for 
perpetrators to rationalize and justify the claim that the Other is radically unlike 
themselves, outside the parameters of normal moral obligation, and hence killable. 
Dehumanization functions the same way. Just as group-think or racialism does not 
necessarily lead to extreme forms of exclusion, dehumanization also does not necessarily 
lead to extreme forms of violence. But when it does, dehumanizing rhetoric, actions, 
narratives, and ideologies also depend on an essentialist metaphysics. Dehumanization 
adds shape and rationalization to genocidal violence by taking presupposed ontological 
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assumptions about the differences between humans and animals and mapping them onto 
the differences in human populations. According to Berel Lang, it is through this 
essentializing dehumanization “that the uniqueness of genocide is located.”194 Lang 
argues that physical destruction of the out-group is a way of asserting the principle that 
nonhumans should not be treated as humans are, “leav[ing] no doubt either about the 
principle or about its application in a particular context.”195 Furthermore, dehumanization 
is a conscious act, a deliberate decision made on the part of the perpetrating community 
that affirms that they know their actions are wrong. Lang explains, “There is one step of 
deliberation required in order to view apparent individuals, persons, only in terms of a 
generic essence; there is a second step of deliberation presupposed in the claim that the 
generic essence constitutes an imminent danger; there is a third step of deliberation in the 
claim that a warrant for extermination is implied by the generic essence and as the 
desirable one among possible preferences.”196 In this respect, in dehumanization the 
assumptions people have about who counts as a person, who deserves moral 
consideration, and who is guaranteed rights are used to justify violence and the particular 
methods used for carrying it out. Because dehumanization is integral to the structure of 
genocide, preventing genocide necessarily entails that we address the problem of 
dehumanization and the metaphysical principles that enable it. 
In the following chapters I will explore what the implications this metaphysics, 
especially the principle of human exceptionalism, has on thinking about methods for 
preventing dehumanization and genocide. In chapter five I consider “rehumanization” as 
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a response to dehumanization, arguing that rehumanization continues to traffic in a 
problematic notion of “the human” and “the animal,” reinforcing the metaphysics of 
dehumanization and genocide rather than challenging them. In chapter six, I make a 
parallel argument regarding human rights, which has been the primary form of discourse 
in regards to genocide prevention. Human rights, which also rely on a human/animal 
dualism, may address certain political, economic, and ethical inequalities experienced 
between humans, but as long as they leave violence toward nonhuman animals 
unconsidered, the danger of an ethics and politics based on purity continues to remain. In 
chapter seven, I draw on Native American philosophy to argue that until violence against 
animals and other nonhuman beings is taken seriously as genocide rather than as 
something separate such as ecocide, responses to genocide will remain colonial and will 
continue to function within the parameters of the metaphysical principles of essentialism, 
purity, and human exceptionalism. Ultimately, if we want to prevent genocide and 
dehumanization, these metaphysical principles must be abandoned in favor of ones that 
actually reflect the reality that there are no essential natures, there is no purity, and that 
“humans” and “animals” are not fundamentally different. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESPONDING TO DEHUMANIZATION THROUGH RE-HUMANIZATION 
 
If dehumanization is a necessary condition for genocide, then preventing 
dehumanization should be part of an effort to prevent genocide. However, because 
dehumanization has been largely treated as ancillary to the practice of genocide and has 
been a generally neglected topic in philosophy on the whole, discussions of how to limit 
or respond to dehumanization are scarce. Most of these discussions are occurring in 
social psychology where, as we have seen, dehumanization is considered to be a problem 
that has roots in the cognitive structure of the human brain. This approach to thinking 
about dehumanization suggests that until the brain itself changes dehumanization might 
always be a problem for human beings. However, humans may be prone to categorizing 
things in the world according to kinds, but the methods and ways of categorization can 
vary greatly between different cultures and groups. This suggests that dividing beings 
according to fixed essences, emphasizing purity, and positing fundamental differences 
between human animals and other animals is just one way of organizing the world. If 
there are other ways, then perhaps altering the principles by which we organize the world 
can help overcome dehumanization.
 197
   
One of the most common ways of responding to dehumanization is to rehumanize 
the other. Rehumanization involves restoring what has supposedly been lost through the 
process of dehumanization. In this chapter I address three different philosophies of 
rehumanization that are responses to mass violence and mass oppression. The first is an 
argument made by Bartolomé de Las Casas, a Spanish explorer of the Dominican Order 
who advocated for the rights of the Indigenous peoples of South America. Following Las 
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Casas, I turn to the work of Emmanuel Levinas, a Jewish philosopher and survivor of 
World War II. Finally, I engage with the work of a contemporary philosopher, Rianna 
Oelefson, whose work responds directly to current dehumanization literature in 
sociology, psychology, and philosophy. Through my analysis of these approaches, I show 
how these philosophies, each of which advocates rehumanization as a response to 
dehumanization, remain trapped within the logic of genocidal dehumanization.
198
 Though 
these philosophers try to resist essentialism and purity in their responses to 
dehumanization, they each fall back on the human/animal dualism and human 
exceptionalism. This compromises their philosophical positions and their ability to 
successfully demonstrate that philosophies of rehumanization can resolve the problems of 
dehumanization. Rather than using rehumanization as the response to dehumanization, in 
the final section I argue along with philosophers Ann Cahill and Kelly Oliver that we 
need an ethics based in difference and relationality which ultimately requires the rejection 
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of the three metaphysical principles on which de- and rehumanization relies: essentialism, 
purity, and human exceptionalism.   
 
I. Indians, Barbarians, and Animals 
 
The European encounter with the Indigenous peoples of the Americas precipitated 
a centuries-long series of deadly events that culminated in the destruction and murder of 
ninety-eight percent of the 147 million people living in the “new world” prior to the 
arrival of the Europeans.
199
 Though some of this death could be attributed to disease and 
traditional warfare, thanks to the records and writings of colonizers, merchants, explorers, 
and other travelers we also know that many of these deaths were due to the settlers’ 
wholesale slaughter and enslavement of the peoples they encountered. While it is likely 
the case that as individuals many of the privateers, mercenaries, soldiers, and explorers 
who made the journey to the Americas (particularly Central and South America) needed 
little justification beyond their own greed to kill and enslave the native peoples they met, 
the complicity of their leadership and the failure of the Spanish crown to hold their 
representatives accountable or to protect the indigenous inhabitants speaks to a deeper 
philosophical justification—that the native peoples might look human, but were actually 
some other type of creature.  
This view was given voice by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, a chaplain for King 
Charles V of Spain and his official chronicler. In his work The Second Democrates; Or, 
the Just Causes of the War against the Indians, Sepúlveda argues that the Indians are 
natural slaves and the Spaniards their natural masters. The Indians, he argues, are 
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“hommunculi in whom hardly a vestige of humanity remains. They were ‘like pigs with 
their eyes always fixed on the ground.’ Their brutish behavior, absence of any 
recognizable culture, their cowardice…their supposed cannibalism and their paganism, 
all clearly indicated that God had intended them to be slaves…”200 As natural slaves the 
Indians did not deserve the same moral or political consideration granted to proper 
humans. Thus, their slaughter and enslavement was justified. 
In contrast to Sepúlveda’s views were those of the Catholic priest Bartolomé de 
Las Casas. Unlike Sepúlveda, Las Casas had traveled to South America on multiple 
occasions. The first of his trips was in 1502. He lived in South America for a time as a 
cleric, monk, and eventually priest of the Dominican Order. During his early years in the 
Americas he owned slaves and participated in the encomienda system, a form of 
indentured servitude that was imposed upon the native peoples. In 1522 he had a 
“conversion” experience that sparked him to become one of the most vociferous 
advocates for the lives, rights, and well-being of Indigenous peoples. Not only did Las 
Casas write multiple histories detailing the destruction that he witnessed the Spanish 
bring to indigenous communities, he wrote treatises that defended their dignity and called 
for the Spanish government to provide protections for them. One of his most famous 
arguments is a rebuttal to Sepúlveda’s attacks on the Indians’ humanity. In In Defense of 
the Indians, Las Casas engages in a thorough refutation of Sepúlveda’s argument. This 
treatise, as well as his other works, was written for the rulers and people of Spain and 
Europe in addition to an ecclesiastic audience. One of the primary aims of his works was 
to convey to his readers that the Indians are human, civilized in their own way, 
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undeserving of the violence brought to bear upon them, and capable of being brought into 
the “sheepfold” of Christ. Generally speaking, Las Casas aims to (re)humanize the 
indigenous peoples of South America as a means of convincing the Spanish and Catholic 
authorities to intervene on behalf of the Indians against the Conquistadors. 
Las Casas’ defense rests on a metaphysics that is based on Catholic theology. This 
metaphysic holds that a single god created the universe and everything in it. This god, as 
a good, all-powerful and perfect being, created nature such that it emulates that 
perfection. This perfection is most readily apparent in the world through the use of reason 
in creatures capable of rationality. As part of this cosmology, Las Casas believes in a 
hierarchy of creatures in which god is at the pinnacle and those with reason are closer to 
god. According to Las Casas, this means that after god come the angels “because they are 
all entirely intellectual beings” then the humans who have the capacity for reason but can 
stray from it due to the distraction of the body and sense, and finally the nonhuman 
animals, which lack reason and are controlled by their passions and baser natures.
201
 Las 
Casas claims that war against the Indians is unjust on four grounds. First, the Indians are 
humans, not barbarians or natural slaves. Second, the Indians have not deliberately 
committed crimes against natural or divine law, but have done so only accidentally. 
Third, despite reports of human sacrifice and cannibalism among the native peoples, the 
majority of Indians are innocent and do not deserve to die to save a few. Finally, using 
war as a means of spreading the word of Christ goes against the gospel and will more 
likely drive people away from Christianity rather than toward it. The foundational 
premise of his argument that the war against the Indians is unjust is his argument that the 
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native peoples are human and, thus, are capable of becoming Christians. As such, the 
mission of the Spanish is not to conquer but to convert. 
To begin his defense, Las Casas makes the case that the indigenous peoples of the 
Americas are indeed rational human beings, not nonhuman animals or natural slaves. 
Drawing on Aristotle’s Politics and Ethics, Las Casas distinguishes between four types of 
barbarians. The first kind of barbarian behaves without reason, is wild, uncontrolled, and 
compelled by the passions. Because they let their passions dictate their actions rather than 
using reasons, such barbarians behave like animals. As Las Casas explains, “…barbarian 
in the loose and broad sense of the word means any cruel, inhuman, and merciless man 
acting against human reason out of anger or native disposition, so that, putting aside 
decency, meekness, and human moderation, he becomes hard, severe, quarrelsome, 
unbearable, cruel, and plunges blindly into crimes that only the wildest beasts of the 
forest would commit.”202 The first type of barbarian is one who is “completely forgetful 
of reason and virtue.”203 The second type of barbarians is so-called because they lack 
culture, written language, and learning. Such people are not barbarians in the strict literal 
sense, but are made to be barbarians by circumstance. Unlike the previous type, these 
barbarians do not fail to act according to reason nor are they driven solely by the 
passions. Their barbarism stems out of ignorance. According to Las Casas, “a people can 
be called barbarians and still be wise, courageous, prudent, and lead a settled life.”204 
What characterizes barbarians of this kind is a more imperfect form of culture, language, 
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and political life. The proper and strict meaning of “barbarian” can be applied to the third 
type. These barbarians lack more than culture and control over their passions. They are 
“those who, either because of their evil and wicked character or the barrenness of the 
region in which they live, are cruel, savage, sottish, stupid, and strangers to reason. They 
are not governed by law or right, do not cultivate friendships, and have no state or 
politically organized community. Rather, they are without ruler, laws, and 
institutions.”205 In addition to these failures, barbarians of the third type do not make 
contracts or engage in commerce. To an even greater extent than the first kind of 
barbarian, people of this type live like nonhuman animals. The final kind of barbarian is 
the one who does not acknowledge Christ. Such barbarians suffer from vice, which over 
time makes them more animal-like and effeminate. Initiation into the Christian mysteries 
is the proposed remedy for this form of barbarism. 
Each of these types of barbarian can only be understood in the context of what 
they are not and what they are like. Las Casas does not devote much space to describing 
the characteristics of angels and nonhuman animals, but he discusses at length the 
qualities that belong to humans, typically in opposition to nonhuman animal life. In 
addition to the capacity for reason these traits include having culture and community, 
mastery of language and the language arts, docility, the capacity for friendship, the ability 
to learn, and engagement in politics and economics. When humans fail to exhibit these 
traits they become barbarians. None of the barbarians is properly human in the strictest 
sense for each strays from right reason, which, when followed, leads to belief in the 
Christian god. The first type of barbarian is controlled by the passions; the second 
reasons poorly, which leads to tyranny and imperfection in human society; the third 
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seems to lack reason entirely, making it antithetical to human nature entirely; and the 
fourth is prone to vice until reason leads to the acceptance of Christ. In each case failure 
to live according to reason is a form of corruption that turns humans into other animals.  
The problem of corruption speaks to the first two metaphysical principles 
associated with dehumanization: essentialism and purity. One way of reading Las Casas’ 
defense is to see its overarching purpose to be the purification of the souls of the Indians. 
The vast majority of Defense is directed toward convincing his readers that the Indians 
can and should be converted not just for their sakes but for the sakes of the Spanish as 
well. The notion of salvation rests on the premise that accepting Christ will cleanse 
people of their sins and draw them away from the pollution caused by their vices. The 
confluence of faith and reason leads to purity of the soul. However, this purity is put at 
risk by the corrupting influence of the body. As Las Casas explains, “spiritual things, the 
goods of reason, and things intellectual” are “far removed from the senses.”206 But 
because humans “are reared in the midst of goods of the body and sense, the source of 
corrupt behavior,” they “are plunged into sinful conduct.”207 In this way Las Casas sets 
up a mind/body dualism in which the mind is superior to the body. The mind should 
control the passions which come from our relation to material goods and the senses.  
There are two effects of this belief that I would like to note. First, the notion that 
there can be purity through the right use of reason (divinely given) speaks to a kind of 
essentialism. Second, what makes humans different from other animals is a particular 
capacity that was implanted into them by God. All humans, no matter how barbaric they 
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are, have, in some measure, this capacity. Even the third type of barbarian who is in every 
other way a nonhuman animal might still be saved. Las Casas differs from Aristotle on 
this point, stating, “The Philosopher [Aristotle] adds that it is lawful to catch or hunt 
barbarians of this type like wild beasts so that they might be led to the right way of 
life…but…barbarians must not be compelled harshly in the manner described by the 
Philosopher, but are to be gently persuaded and lovingly drawn to accept the best way of 
life” for “though these peoples may be completely barbaric, they are nevertheless created 
in God’s image.”208 As God’s creatures, endowed with a rational nature, humans possess 
an essence different from other creatures that allows them to “stand above all other 
animals.”209 It should be noted that Las Casas is not as clear as he could be about this 
point because elsewhere he argues that there are some barbarians of the third type that are 
so depraved that they are “mistakes of nature or freaks in a rational nature.” 210 Las Casas 
reasons that if such freaks of nature appeared more than rarely it would belie God’s 
goodness, perfection, and power. Thus, even should such creatures appear in the world, 
whole populations of native peoples cannot be said to be of this sort.  
Once human life is properly defined in contrast to nonhuman animal life, Las 
Casas can make the case that the Indians are not animals, barbarians in the strict sense of 
the word, or natural salves any more than other groups of people. His argument sets out 
to humanize the Indians by pointing out all the ways that they are cultured, civilized, and 
capable of reason and learning. Humanness is measured by how like the Indians are to 
Europeans. Las Casas’ method of humanization relies on a denial of the value of the 
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human body and human animality. Bodily differences, physical needs, material 
considerations, and bodily expression have no place in this cosmology. The only thing 
that matters is that which is universal to human life: the capacity for reason and belief in 
god. As such, Las Casas’ goals end up subsuming difference under the same rather than 
accepting the breadth of human diversity.  
This is not to say that Las Casas was not in many ways ahead of his time on the 
issue of Indigenous rights. For one, the fact that he does not care about the body means 
that appearances such as skin color and gender do not determine one’s membership in the 
human species.
211
 Second, in Defense he offer numerous arguments that could be 
interpreted as defense of native sovereignty in which he claims that the indigenous 
peoples have a right to practice their own cultures and govern themselves as they see fit. 
In fact, war cannot even be justified in order to prevent people from worshipping idols. 
Even these practices must be tolerated by Christians until the Indians can be taught gently 
about the errors of their ways. Even so, Las Casas’ open-minded attitude toward the lives 
of American Indians and his argument that they are just as human (if not more so!) than 
the Spanish, is belied by his reliance on the principles of essentialism, purity, and human 
exceptionalism. His critical attitude toward the body and animality means that his 
philosophy continues to function within the metaphysics of dehumanization and 
genocide. 
In fact, according to Raphael Lemkin’s definition of genocide (and to a lesser 
extent the UN definition), a conversion campaign, which Las Casas advocates as part of 
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the process of making barbarians into proper humans, can be a weapon wielded in the 
destruction of a group. Though killing may not be involved in his approach, he still 
intentionally aims toward the destruction of other religious groups as such. And as for 
those people who are taught the Gospel but refuse its teaching—they are dogs, and just 
war may be made against them.
212
 
 
II. A Limit to Infinity 
 
In Modernity and the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman argues that one of the side 
effects of the development of bureaucratic and modern society is the growth of social 
distance between people. This increased social distance turns morality, especially 
responsibility for others, into an abstract concept that is a step removed from moral 
actors. At times Bauman describes this increase in social distance and erosion of 
responsibility for one’s neighbors as a kind of depersonalization and dehumanization. Not 
only does the modern social system turn individuals into stereotypes, but it also turns 
them into “mere agents of knowledge,” valued for their technical know-how and 
expertise rather than their personality, moral integrity, or humanity.
213
 As the social 
production of distance increases and moral responsibility is substituted more and more 
for technical expertise, there is a corresponding increase in “indifference to the plight of 
the Other.”214 For Bauman, this form of social organization is symptomatic of the pre-
Holocaust era and contributed to the breakdown of relationships that bound people 
together and made them feel responsible for one another. In “effacing the face” of the 
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other, the hyper-rational, bureaucratic, techno-centric aspects of modernity dehumanized 
and depersonalized the individuals who made up society, making it easier for them to 
follow morally questionable orders and to carry out directly or indirectly projects of 
extermination. 
As a solution to this social distance, Bauman invokes the ethical philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas. According to Bauman, Levinas’ philosophy of moral 
responsibility—of responsibility as the primary relation between two people—restores 
the face of the Other. It is a philosophy that relies on recognizing the other not as an 
abstract stereotype, but as an individual who limits the self and calls the self to an 
awareness of the self’s responsibility. Bauman sees in Levinas’ ethics a solution to the 
problem of depersonalization and dehumanization. Where modernity seeks to turn 
individuals into faceless masses, Levinas seeks to bring the face of the other into focus 
before us. As we will see below, this appears to be a compelling way of thinking about 
rehumanization. It seems to recognize the particularity of the Other, respecting and 
building on the difference that exists between self and Other. But both Bauman and 
Levinas take a questionable stance toward nonhuman animals and animality, which 
undermines the project. To illustrate this, I draw on the work of Jacques Derrida and 
Giorgio Agamben, who, though they are working through different kinds of philosophical 
projects, at times take a similar interest in the limits between the human and the animal, 
especially in regards to ethics after genocide.  
In response to an interview on whether or not one can disobey or misrecognize the 
commandment of the face— “thou shalt not kill”—Levinas said, “The essential problem 
is: can we speak of an absolute commandment after Auschwitz? Can we speak of 
113 
morality after the failure of morality?”215 As a Jewish scholar and prisoner of war who 
survived a two year detainment by the Germans during WWII, we can read Levinas’ 
body of philosophical work as an ongoing effort to respond to these questions. 
Ultimately, he rejects traditional approaches to ethics based on unity, common ideals, and 
sameness in favor of an ethics that emphasizes alterity, discourse, and difference. For 
Levinas, philosophy’s idealization of oneness is part of the logic behind the failure of 
ethics. We can see this in his narratives of the self-centered, solipsistic consciousness that 
awakens to the social and ethical worth through an encounter with another human being. 
In Time and the Other, Levinas uses the metaphor of light to represent the traditional 
pursuit of knowledge in philosophy which aims to master the world. He says, 
“[K]nowledge does not surmount solitude. By themselves, reason and light consummate 
the solitude of a being as a being, and accomplish its destiny to be the sole and unique 
point of reference for everything. By encompassing everything within its universality, 
reason finds itself once again in solitude…its element—light—renders us master of the 
exterior world.”216 In other words, reason is an expression of solitude insofar as it 
attempts to universalize, encompass, and master. Levinas calls the result a totality. In the 
preface to Totality and Infinity Levinas describes one of the problems with the concept of 
totality: “Individuals are reduced to bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to 
themselves. The meaning of individuals…is derived from the totality.”217 A totality might 
be understood as a form of objectification or essentialism that fixes the identity of an 
                                                 
215
 Wright, “Paradox of Morality,” 176. 
 
216
 Levinas, Totality, 65. 
 
217
 Ibid., 21. 
 
114 
individual or group based on certain forces, relations, or characteristics that can 
supposedly be classified according to certain logical principles. Levinas’ concerns stem 
from his own experiences and the experiences of the Jewish people during WWII and are 
especially clear in his description of violence, which he says “does not consist so much in 
injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play 
roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only 
commitments but their own substance, making them carry out actions that will destroy 
every possibility for action.”218 Traditional ethics, which posits a stable, unchanging 
center, calls for care on the basis of likeness, which means violence emerges when the 
stable, unchanging center of a different group is rendered unlike and also unfit for care. 
To move away from this dialectic of like and unlike, Levinas introduces the 
concept of infinity as a counter to the totalities of Western philosophy. The experience of 
infinity comes from the realization that one cannot master the future or death. These two 
experiences of the unknown always escape our grasp and always contain an element of 
mystery no matter how much we prepare for them. For Levinas, this alterity within 
ourselves only becomes manifest to us through our relation with another human being, 
for it is through human history that we understand time. It is also through our relation 
with another human being that the solipsistic consciousness becomes social and ethical. 
In Time and the Other and Totality and Infinity this relationship develops first between 
two lovers, then between the father and son, and finally through the face-to-face 
encounter with “the weak, the poor, the widow, and the orphan.” Infinity refers to “a 
surplus always exterior to the totality” and is produced through the relation with the face 
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of the Other.
219
 The face helps us break with and transcend totality in several ways. First, 
the spatial relation of the face-to-face encounter is preferred to the side-by-side encounter 
because it defies the social ideal of fusion and collectivity in which each individual faces 
a common ideal to become a “we.” Instead we remove the middle term for an I-you 
relationship. Second, the face speaks and through speech can resist me and call me to 
respond. Through language the Other resists “what is necessarily plastic in 
manifestation…above and beyond the manifested and purely phenomenal form.”220 
Through speech I am invited into a relation with the Other. Third, the vulnerability and 
nudity of the Other is revealed through the eyes of the Other. It is through this 
defenselessness that I receive the commandment “thou shall not kill.” Through these 
movements Levinas imagines the opening for a new heteronomous approach to ethics. 
Despite the call for recognition and respect for the alterity of the Other that cannot 
be grasped or known in its entirety, Levinas still falls into the trap of one of the key 
assumptions and totalities constituted within Western philosophy: humanism. Levinas 
frequently uses the term “human” in his writing, explicitly stating that “a human being is 
the sole being which I am unable to encounter without expressing this very encounter to 
him”221 or that “the other thus presents itself as human Other.”222 In the same interview 
that he remarks on the difficulty of speaking of morality after Auschwitz, Levinas says 
that even though we do not want an animal to suffer needlessly, the human face is 
completely different from that of the animal. It is only by transposing human suffering on 
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the animal that we recognize its face. Only as humans do we have the ability to choose to 
act irrationally and against our own vital interests in order to help the Other.
223
 We might 
excuse this exclusion of “the animal” due to the fact that Levinas’ ethics are a response to 
the atrocities committed by humans against other humans. However, this humanism 
prompts several questions: Who or what belongs in this category? How do we determine 
who the members of the category are? Do we have any ethical obligation to anything or 
anyone that does not fit within it? As in the other philosophies of rehumanization that we 
have seen so far, as long as a these projects are reliant upon a human/animal dualism, 
they cannot break out of the metaphysics of dehumanization and genocide. 
In Humanism of the Other, Levinas defends humanism on the grounds that it is 
the best method for preventing humans from becoming mere objects or instruments. For 
Levinas, meaning is given to us in the moral transcendence of the other person. However, 
by supporting humanism, Levinas also ends up supporting a totality. By examining the 
ways in which he excludes nonhuman animals, we can see what constitutes this totality, 
in which ways this totality ignores the complexity of other animal lives by relying on 
certain philosophical presuppositions, and how it can trouble his ethical project as a 
whole by potentially excluding certain groups of people who cannot meet the criteria of 
what it means to be a human being. In making claims about how humans and other 
animals differ, Levinas does not just exclude nonhuman animals from his ethical project, 
but creates the potential for the exclusion of certain human groups as well. 
I will focus on three aspects of Levinas’ exclusion of nonhuman animals. First, 
“the animal” has no relation to death, which means that it cannot choose to defy its own 
vital instincts for the sake of another. Second, the animal has no face and thus cannot 
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gaze at me in order to beseech me through eyes that reveal its suffering, vulnerability, 
and nudity. Third, the animal cannot speak and cannot respond even though language is 
the way in which Levinas claims the Other can defy me and rupture the plastic image and 
totality imposed by my gaze. Levinas is able to make the first of these claims by 
differentiating between the way in which nonhuman animals and humans exist in the 
world. In Time and the Other, Levinas describes how the mystery of the future and death 
leads us to our first experience of alterity that only becomes fully realized in an encounter 
with another person. Time only has meaning in relation to human history. By specifying 
that this history is “human,” Levinas implies that nonhuman animals do not have a 
history, live immediately in the present, and have no anticipation of the future. Living 
solely in the present, “the animal” remains in the solipsistic stage of consciousness from 
which the human being eventually emerges and, thus, never becomes ethical. This means 
that the animal remains bound to vital necessity whereas the human can act against the 
good of its own survival for the sake of the other. Levinas explains, “To be in the world is 
precisely to be freed from the last implications of the instinct to exist.”224 Humans do not 
eat and breathe for the sake of living but through a primordial enjoyment of the earth and 
elements. Not so for animals: “A being is something that is attached to being, to its own 
being…the being of animals is a struggle for life. A struggle for life without ethics. With 
the appearance of the human…there is something more important than my life, and that is 
the life of the other.”225 Because the animal cares only for its own preservation and the 
fulfillment of its own vital necessities without any sense of the future or the inability that 
accompanies death, it cannot live ethically. Though we only need to consider how 
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elephants mourn their dead, how dolphins can commit suicide, and how some cats and 
dogs risk their lives to travel great distances to return to their human families to see how 
this oversimplifies animal life, this argument also implies that to be truly human one must 
be able and willing to sacrifice one’s own needs for the sake of others. However, in 
extreme situations like genocide, this difference seems insufficient. 
In Survival in Auschwitz, Primo Levi writes of his experience in the labor camps 
of Auschwitz. He describes the camps as great machines designed to reduce humans to 
beasts by turning people into hopeless, mindless creatures that labor until they are too 
tired to labor any longer and are finally put to death. Though many prisoners did lose 
their will to survive in the camps, even those who did not could not spare the energy or 
resources to think beyond their own vital necessities. These needs were met by stealing 
anything and everything as soon as someone let one’s guard down, by planning where 
and when to get in line for food to get the choicest selection, by scraping the bottom of 
every bowl, and by looking for every opportunity to conserve energy. Levi says, “Here 
the struggle to survive is without respite, because everyone is desperately and ferociously 
alone. If [someone] vacillates, someone will knock him aside…and if someone, by a 
miracle of savage patience and cunning, finds a new method of avoiding the hardest 
work, a new art which yields him an ounce of bread, he will try to keep his method 
secret.”226 As the prisoners are reduced to these “animal” states, they lose track of time 
and also their relation toward death, the future, and history. The prisoners do not mourn 
one another, nor do they plan for their futures. Future and past have ceased to exist; only 
survival in the present remains. Based on the description of the prisoners here, one could 
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argue that according to Levinas’ philosophy, they are not truly human, but it would still 
be difficult to imagine excluding them from an ethical framework. However, things get 
more complicated and less certain for his ethics when we turn to his second and third 
modes of exclusion. 
The second way Levinas excludes the animal is by claiming that it lacks a 
complete face. According to Levinas, it is by looking the Other in the eye and seeing her 
nudity and vulnerability that the self encounters the “infinite resistance to murder.”227 But 
in the case of the animal, “the phenomena of the face is not in its purest form” and “the 
human face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover the face of the 
animal.”228 In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida argues that Levinas’ 
refusal to admit that nonhuman animals have faces also means that there is no 
commandment that stops me from taking animal lives. If we claim that it is through the 
face that we recognize our ethical obligations, then by denying nonhuman animals a face, 
we also deny them all of the “traits, rights, duties, affections, or possibilities recognized 
in the face of the other.”229 Derrida notes that Levinas specifically uses the language of 
nudity to describe the defenselessness of the other’s gaze as well as the self’s relation to 
and responsibility for the other without applying it to the animal, despite the fact that we 
often think of nonhuman animals as naked. Nor does Levinas seriously consider the 
possibility of the animal gaze or differences among animals. All nonhuman animals are 
lumped into one broad category. As Derrida points out through his description of feeling 
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shame before the gaze of his cat, this argument does not capture the complexity of human 
relationships with other animals. According to Derrida, if we claim that the animal does 
not recognize its own nakedness, are we not also saying that the animal is not naked, yet 
the being that clothes itself is? And if that is the case, what is it that he feels when the cat 
looks at him—shame for forgetting his nudity like an animal or shame at being looked at 
while naked like a human? In either case, Derrida concludes that through this gaze 
“nothing can ever rob me of the certainty that what we have here is an existence that 
refuses to be conceptualized. And a mortal existence, for from the moment that it has a 
name, its name survives it. It signs its potential disappearance.”230 In other words, 
through this experience of shame, Derrida not only feels the gaze of the cat, but 
recognizes it as something that is not an “exemplar of a species called ‘cat,’” but a 
particular being. Though Derrida demonstrates how Levinas seems to fall back on 
Cartesian notions of animality, we also cannot ignore the implications this has for our 
conception of the human. When Levinas claims that the animal has no face, it also means 
that when we look into the face of another human being, we should encounter that 
commandment “thou shalt not kill” and feel an obligation to respond to that 
commandment. In disobeying this commandment, one commits murder. As Levinas says, 
“The being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so by precisely appealing to me 
with its destitution and nudity—its hunger—without my being able to defy that 
appeal…The face opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation, which 
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no ‘interiority’ permits  avoiding.”231 To mis-recognize or refuse to respond to this 
commandment and obligation would be tantamount to saying that one is not truly human. 
Yet, how does one account for this when faced with the situation in the death 
camp? In Remnants of Auschwitz, Giorgio Agamben examines one of the most horrifying 
aspects of life in the Nazi camps—the Muselmann. Named for the slow, stooped, and 
swaying gaits that were reminiscent of a praying Muslim, the term Muselmann was used 
to designate a certain category of people in the camps who had been so crushed by the 
hardships of camp life that they had all but ceased living. Piecing together various 
accounts of first-hand experiences of the camps, Agamben describes the Muselmänner, 
using the words of the survivors, as no longer truly living beings, but “walking corpses,” 
“living dead,” “mummy-men,” “immobile skeletons,” “shadows,” and “faceless 
presences.” As this last description suggests, the members of this group had ceased to 
have a face for both the German officers of the camp, but for the other prisoners as well. 
As Levi puts it in his account of them, they are “an anonymous mass, continually 
renewed and always identical, of non-men who march and labor in silence, the divine 
spark dead within them, already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them 
living: one hesitates to call their death death.”232 Their facelessness and their anonymity 
contribute to the meaninglessness of both their short lives in the camp and the abrupt 
deaths that follow. Or, as Agamben describes, men do not die in the camps, but are 
produced as corpses.
233
 Agamben takes the analysis of facelessness even further by 
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examining the shame of the survivors and their refusal to look into the faces of the 
Muselmänner. Just as Derrida describes the conundrum of feeling shame before the gaze 
of his cat and not knowing if it is because he is a beast who has accepted his nakedness or 
because he is a human who recognizes his own nudity, the camp survivor feels a similar 
conflict. Agamben focuses on the shame that Levi feels when the Russians liberate 
Auschwitz—though Levi cannot come to terms with his shame in his writing, we are left 
with the impression that his shame is not so different from Derrida’s. Is he a beast for 
seeing only the lost cause and the animal in the Muselmann, or is he human because he is 
aware of his own nudity and vulnerability before the eyes of the liberators and those who 
did not survive? But it is not only the camp survivors who cannot seem to look into the 
face of the Muselmänner, but the liberators as well. Agamben briefly describes a short 
film made during the liberation of the camps that blatantly shows piles of corpses, but 
then, as if by accident, alights on a group of Muselmänner, and realizing where it is 
pointing, quickly turns away. Brought face-to-face with the Muselmann, Levinas’ ethics 
seem inadequate for “the Muselmann is not only or not so much a limit between life and 
death; rather, he marks the threshold between the human and the inhuman.”234 By 
Levinas’ account, these “walking corpses” may have even sunk below the level of the 
animal insofar as they barely make an effort to meet the needs of their own survival. 
Furthermore, the prisoners around them who still struggle to survive would also fail to 
exhibit the characteristics of a human due to their deliberate mis-recognition of and 
refusal to look into the eyes and face of the other. From a Levinasian standpoint, the 
Muselmänner are, par excellence, the beings whose deaths are no longer murder. 
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Finally, Levinas excludes the animal by emphasizing the importance of speech 
and the ability to respond. As mentioned above, through speech the Other “surmount[s] 
what is necessarily plastic in manifestation” and “can sovereignly say no to me.”235 
Speech and language both emerge through difference but also accomplish the task of 
breaking up unities. Levinas opposes speech to vision insofar as speech interrupts 
vision’s attempts to possess, group, and master. He says, “In discourse the divergence 
that inevitably opens between the Other as my theme and the Other as my interlocutor, 
emancipated from the theme that seemed a moment to hold him, forthwith contest the 
meaning I ascribe to my interlocutor. The formal structure of language thereby announces 
the ethical inviolability of the Other.”236 Because of the animal’s inability to speak and 
thus break out of the totality which humans have created for it, it remains a “for-me” of 
the consciousness that enjoys the elements and labors in the world. This mode of 
exclusion relies heavily on certain commonly held opinions about the animal in Western 
philosophy such as the Cartesian belief that animals are mere automatons programmed to 
reflexively respond to certain stimuli in particular ways, the Hobbesian claim that what 
distinguishes humans from animals is the ability to speak, and many other configurations 
of this argument. According to Derrida, it is this very lack of speech and the ability to 
respond that legitimizes the killing of nonhuman animals. If the animal has no face, no 
eyes with which to express itself, and no words with which to resist then it loses all 
possibility of saying “Here I am,” which is the condition for responsibility. He says,  
Because “Here I am” as responsibility implies this self-presentation, this 
autotelic, autodiectic, autobiographical movement, exposing oneself 
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before the law; and second, because “Here I am” as responsibility implies 
the possibility of “responding,” of answering for oneself in the response to 
the appeal or command of the other…the animal according to Levinas 
seems deprived of all possibility, in fact, of all power of saying, “Here I 
am” and of responding, hence of all responsibility.237 
 
Derrida goes on to compare the animal’s inability to respond with the unresponsiveness 
of a corpse for just as the corpse cannot respond in death, the animal, though alive cannot 
respond and thus in some sense is already dead or is no different from being dead. So 
while an animal should not suffer needlessly, in Levinas’ words, an animal can still die 
without it being called murder. What then might we say about humans who cannot 
respond? Derrida points out the irony of this when Levinas is unable to respond to the 
question of whether or not animals have faces. Yet, this also holds human beings to a 
certain standard regarding language, speech, and responsibility as well.
238
  
Returning to Levi’s account of the Holocaust, once again we must consider the 
limitations of Levinas’ ethics. Throughout Survival in Auschwitz, Levi presents us with 
various ways in which language fails in the camps. At the start of the book, Levi first 
calls our attention to the inadequacy of language for describing the “offence [sic], the 
demolition of man” that the Nazis imposed on the prisoners.239 Then, as a newcomer to 
Auschwitz, he describes the obstacle of not knowing the German language, of the 
confusion of languages spoken by the prisoners so that one seems surrounded by a 
perpetual Babel that makes communication nearly impossible, and the reticence and 
silence of the other prisoners. What would Levinas make of this place where “no one 
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speaks willingly,” where “where have to learn…never to ask questions, always to pretend 
to understand,” and where “if we speak, they will not listen to us, and if they listen, they 
will not understand?”240 In the concentration camps, the power of speech was rendered 
impotent. Though the prisoners were thwarted from communicating with the German 
officers and had trouble speaking amongst themselves, the true victims of language’s 
failure were the Muselmänner. In one striking passage, Levi tells us, “But with the 
musselmans, [sic] the men in decay, it is not even worth speaking, because one knows 
already that they will complain and will speak about what they used to eat at home.”241 
One does not speak with the Muselmann because the Muselmann does not listen and 
always replies the same. In The Animal, Derrida discusses how the animal’s perceived 
lack of response or repetitiveness of response has allowed us to dismiss the question of 
how a nonhuman animal can look us in the face and allow us to ignore the vulnerability, 
dignity, and nudity of the animal. From Descartes to Levinas, “You can speak to an 
animal…but it doesn’t reply, not really, not ever.”242 In reiterating the same answers over 
and over, in lacking the ability to respond, and in responding but not being heard, the 
Muselmann and the prisoner are unable to resist and rupture the totalities to which they 
have been sentenced. Through their loss of speech they have been pushed out of the 
human realm and into the animal and beyond. Once again, it is unclear as to who is the 
least human in this situation. Is it the Nazis who have rendered all language but their own 
meaningless, the prisoners who still retain a spark of determination but who refuse to 
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speak and listen to one another, or is it the Muselmänner who lack both speech and the 
ability to respond meaningfully? And if none of these groups can be heard or respond to 
the other, then how can an ethics that relies on the differences expressed through 
discourse function in this situation? Agamben expresses a similar concern: 
Simply to deny the Muselmann’s humanity would be to accept the verdict 
of the SS and to repeat their gesture. The Muselmann has, instead, moved 
to a zone of the human where not only help but also dignity and self-
respect have become useless. But if there is a zone of the human in which 
these concepts make no sense, then they are not genuine ethical concepts, 
for no ethics can claim to exclude a part of humanity, no matter how 
unpleasant or difficult that humanity is to see.
243
 
 
For Agamben, the Muselmann represents the limit between the human and the nonhuman. 
It is a being for whom the concepts of dignity and respect lose their meaning and at 
whom we reach the limits of traditional ethics. 
In all three of these modes of animal exclusion, Levinas does not just make claims 
about where animals belong in our ethical relations, but also provides a framework for 
how we can define and recognize other human beings (that is, humanize and 
rehumanize). In doing so, he makes use of and reiterates two totalities that have long 
histories in the Western tradition and which have been used to justify discrimination, 
oppression, exploitation, and genocide. As we have seen in Levi’s firsthand account and 
Agamben’s analysis of the Muselmann, when faced with these extreme situations, 
Levinas’ ethics of difference remains too fixed and too narrow to account for the range of 
human and nonhuman animal experiences. For if we claim that there is a category called 
human and this category is sacred insofar as it has a face that carries with it the 
commandment “thou shalt not kill,” then by denying certain groups access to this form of 
categorization through processes of dehumanization, they lose their inviolability. As 
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noted above, because the animal supposedly has no face and no speech with which to tell 
us it suffers and demand a response from us, the animal can be killed. As long as this 
distinction remains, the possibility of dehumanization remains as well.  
 
III. The Human as a Normative Concept 
 
In her article “De- and Rehumanization in the Wake of Atrocities” philosopher 
Rianna Oelefson argues that the proper response to the dehumanization that occurs during 
atrocities like genocide is rehumanization. According to Oelefson atrocities dehumanize 
both the perpetrators and victims by eroding the perception that others are worthy of the 
same moral consideration as one’s self. Dehumanization involves perceiving and treating 
others as lacking autonomy, freedom, and the capacity for change.
244
 Dehumanization 
treats the other as “one-dimensional,” with fixed immutable features and traits. During 
episodes of mass atrocity or conflict, these characteristics and perceived differences are 
projected onto groups of people, creating deeper and more lasting rifts between them. 
According to Oelefson, rehumanization can heal these social rifts. She explains, “The 
rehumanization process enables the self to realize that all these categories—victims, 
perpetrators, bystanders, and beneficiaries—are flawed human beings and that one group 
does not map onto any of these categories.”245 For Oelefson, rehumanization involves 
activating the imaginative capacities of human beings in order to appreciate the 
perspectives of others. As a form of epistemic “world-traveling,” rehumanization can 
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“make people realize that the other ‘is just like me in many respects,’ even if there are 
many differences.”246  
Philosophies like this one only address one of the metaphysical aspects of 
dehumanization—essentialism. Oelefson calls out stereotyping as one of the key harms of 
dehumanization because stereotypes treat the other as a member of a fixed block or 
group, denying the possibility of variability and change. The issue of purity gets dealt 
with indirectly as well. In recognizing that others are not static, one must implicitly 
recognize that the lack of fixed categories leads to messiness, overlap, change, and 
adulteration. But philosophies of rehumanization like this one often fail to address the 
third metaphysical principle of dehumanization—human exceptionalism. In fact, 
human/animal difference is held up as a key element of what makes rehumanization an 
effective response to dehumanization. 
Oelefson attempts to skirt this issue by avoiding the question of “the animal” and 
human/animal difference. In making her case for rehumanization she claims, like David 
Livingstone Smith and many of the other scholars addressed in the previous chapters, that 
dehumanization is an epistemological problem. Dehumanization involves perceiving that 
the other is less worthy of moral consideration, not that people who experience 
dehumanization are made to become nonhuman beings.
247
 She does not uphold the 
position I take in the previous chapters that dehumanization actually creates a reality and 
types of beings. “Human,” she says, is not a descriptive term, it is a normative term. In 
other words, human does not describe species-membership; it “prescribes standards in 
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terms of how one ought to act towards one designated as human.”248 In calling “the 
human” normative, Oelefson claims that there is no pre-given content to the category 
called human. As an empty category it can be filled with any content and that content 
could perhaps change over time depending on context. At first this way of defining the 
human seems to evade the problem of human exceptionalism because the concept human 
does not refer to a natural kind. So according to this definition, to be human is to receive 
treatment worthy of the kind of creature we call human. But this is a tautology. How does 
one know if one is treating someone like a human—that is, worthy of the respect she 
deserves—if one does not already know which characteristics distinguish the human from 
other beings? If human is a normative term, then this suggests that “the human” is a 
constructed concept. If it is a constructed concept then the problem with dehumanization 
is not just that it involves the perception of certain people as human—it is part of a 
process of creating human and nonhuman beings. The normative notion of the human just 
underlines its arbitrary nature. Oelefson overlooks the fact that those in power can wield 
the human as a normative concept in order to define which beings belong and which do 
not.  
Oelefson’s approach to de- and rehumanization has another problem. Like other 
scholars who have written on dehumanization and objectification including Catherine 
McKinnon, Martha Nussbaum, and Rae Langton, Oelefson adheres to a modern, 
Enlightenment notion of personhood that values the disembodied, autonomous subject 
without consideration for the inter-subjective aspects of life and identity. Like Nussbaum 
and Langton, Oelefson states that autonomy, freedom, and the capacity for change are the 
characteristics that get denied during dehumanization. Not only have these traits been 
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largely denied of nonhuman animals in the history of Western thought (for example, 
Descartes’ claim that a cat’s cry is no different from the squeak of a carriage wheel), her 
focus on autonomy and freedom relies on characteristics that have been taken to be 
universal to human life, essential for being human despite the fact that all humans lack 
true autonomy and freedom and some like small children or the severely disabled may 
depend entirely on the care of others. However, these characteristics can be attributed to 
other creatures and perhaps even non-living beings such as rivers, land, and even 
inanimate objects.
249
  
Giving Oelefson’s argument the benefit of the doubt, perhaps she would be 
willing to concede that when these characteristics are denied in other animals and beings, 
they are also dehumanized. “Dehumanization” would then be decoupled from the human 
and would generically mean to treat a being with less moral consideration than it 
deserves. As such, any being treated in this way would be dehumanized. For example, 
claiming a swath of forest as a form of property or resource could be considered a 
violation of the autonomy and freedom of the forest. It would certainly disrespect the 
lives of the trees, other plants, land, and animals that live there and show a lack of moral 
consideration for their well-being, thriving, and agency. But what Oelefson means is that 
dehumanization involves denying treatment that befits the type of creature that it is.
250
 In 
this case, if humans have determined that certain creatures deserve different treatment 
that befits the type of creature that they are, then we run into the problem of how to 
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determine what type of treatment is befitting of those creatures without doing so in an 
anthropocentric way that privileges human perceptions of moral good and imposes them 
on other beings. Thus, instead of avoiding the problem of the human, Oelefson’s notion 
of rehumanization still assumes that we can tell when a being is a human and also know 
that humans are inherently worthy of a special moral consideration. Oelefson’s work 
betrays an anthropocentric bias in another way: the types of atrocity she considers in her 
article are only considered to affect human lives. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, slavery, and 
apartheid are framed as evil given their impact on human autonomy and dignity. The 
lives and treatment of other animals receives no consideration. If they did, perhaps 
Oelefson would claim that practices like factory farming “dehumanize” cows, pigs, and 
chickens, but if Oelefson ascribes to the view that other animals lack or have less 
autonomy, freedom, and personality (as many philosophers do), then her philosophy of 
rehumanization continues to operate according to the metaphysical principle that humans 
are essentially different from and superior to other animal life. To effectively avoid an 
implicit assumption of this metaphysical difference, Oelefson and other philosophers who 
call for rehumanization should stop using the concept of the human entirely in favor of 
more inclusive terminology that does not refer back to a category that is associated with a 
biological kind. For example, rather than discussing dehumanization and rehumanization, 
the issue could be reframed using terms like depersonalization and repersonalization, 
which are a step removed from the history of human exceptionalism (even though 
personhood has long been considered within the Western canon to belong to human 
beings alone). As we will see in chapter seven, this is the way that Native American 
132 
scholars talk about our ethical obligations to various beings both human and other-than-
human. 
 
IV. Embodiment, Inter-subjectivity, and an Ethics of Difference 
 
As we saw in the previous chapters, David Livingstone Smith quickly dismisses 
conversations about objectification in feminist literature as describing a different kind of 
phenomenon than dehumanization, which involves perceiving the other to be a subhuman 
creature. In his haste to talk about dehumanization properly speaking he ignores the 
history in Western thought that has equated women with animals and nature.
251
 While 
women have been inconsistently treated as subhuman, philosophers as far back as the 
pre-Socratics, have argued that women lack rationality, emotional stability, and purpose 
outside of their function as mothers and caregivers.
252
 Many of the qualities attributed to 
women have also been attributed to other animals and nature. Primary among these is 
dependence, passivity, and irrationality. In her book Dehumanizing Women, Linda 
LeMoncheck argues that sexual objectification—treating a woman as an object of sexual 
desire and use without regard for her sexual autonomy—and dehumanization go hand-in-
hand. Not only are women treated as instruments for the sexual gratification of men, their 
status as object is correlated to their lack of characteristics that have long been considered 
properly human.
253
 Even when women are recognized as members of the same species, 
their perceived diminished versions of so-called properly human qualities render them 
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less than fully human. Women are thus not just objects, but subhuman. Thus, 
objectification is continuous with dehumanization, not a different kind of phenomenon.  
In Overcoming Objectification, Ann Cahill critiques feminist theories about and 
responses to objectification on the grounds that objectification does not capture the 
complexity of what happens in sexual encounters and the sexual gaze. Philosophers who 
have dealt with the issue of objectification, including LeMoncheck, Nussbaum, Langton, 
and McKinnon, have always begun their arguments about the harm of objectification 
with the assumption that treating a person like an object is inherently a moral wrong. 
Cahill questions this assumption on the grounds that humans are not just disembodied 
minds, but material beings. We are both subject and object. She asks, “If materiality is 
central to identity, then how can being treated as a ‘thing’ be necessarily degrading? If 
intersubjectivity is similarly central to identity, then why is being the passive recipient of 
an active gaze necessarily dehumanizing?”254 In asking these questions Cahill calls 
attention to the multiplicitous aspects of human (and all) life, and that these different 
aspects of being lead to different types of interactions which can, depending on the 
situation, be harmful, neutral, or beneficial. The concerns she raises here can also be 
applied to concerns about dehumanization, which involve treating the Other not just as an 
object but as subhuman or animal. 
Just as humans are objects insofar as they are bodies, humans are also animals 
insofar as they are living, embodied beings. Most dehumanization scholars, Smith 
included, assume that treating humans like nonhuman animals is a moral wrong. Yet, 
being animal is also central to human identity. Like other animals, humans engage in and 
center their lives on activities of nourishment, reproduction, and survival. And as often as 
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they may wish to deny it, they rely on the land, water, air, and other life (human and 
otherwise) for sustenance. Denying that animality, deeming it as secondary to human life 
could be seen as itself a form of degradation in that it delegitimizes the very condition of 
human existence. 
A second critique that Cahill levels against philosophies of objectification is that 
they are overly concerned with an interior worth and dignity that privileges the 
autonomy, independence, and freedom of the subject. In concentrating on these qualities 
as central to human dignity, they sideline the intersubjective aspects of life. Too often, 
these qualities are seen as add-ons to life that distinguish persons from non-persons. For 
example, humans and animals are the same except that humans have added features that 
make them persons of a certain kind. However, humans do not exist in complete 
autonomy from one another; they are shaped and constituted by their interactions with 
others, which is part of both being a body and an animal. In fact, agency, autonomy, and 
personhood have meaning only insofar as they are matters of relations. As Cahill 
explains,  
For embodied subjects (unlike the independent being defined by the 
capacity for reason, exemplified perhaps most evocatively by the solitary 
Descartes) always bear the marks of interactions with other bodies. 
Human bodies cannot come into existence without being cared for by 
other bodies; human language cannot develop without interactions; bodily 
comportment and gestures, without which human subjects cannot act, are 
absorbed from exchanges of all sorts. And so the embodied subject is 
more properly termed an ‘intersubject,’ a term that, while not constructing 
persons as wholly determined by their environs or other persons, 
nevertheless notes that personhood and subjectivity cannot arise except 
within the context of relations.
255
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For Cahill, recognizing the embodied and intersubjective elements of human life is the 
first step toward rejecting a universalizing and solipsistic concept of the human that tries 
to absorb everything into the realm of the same. Recognizing embodiment as central to 
human experience simultaneously creates a common ground for human experience (all 
humans have bodies) and also brings to the fore the inherent difference between human 
individuals—we all experience our bodies differently.256 I would also add that 
recognizing the animality of human life serves a similar function in that it helps to bridge 
the ontological divide in Western thought that suggests that human life is opposed to and 
superior to animal life due to its unique qualities. Recognizing human animality not only 
serves as a commonality between human beings but can also form a basis for connections 
between human life and other-than-human lives. As Cahill explains,  
To claim that the human subject is necessarily embodied is to reject a 
metaphysics that consistently privileges the non-material over the 
material, the universal over the particular, the eternal over the temporal. It 
is to recognize that all human experiences are situated by flesh, and that 
the desire to deny, marginalize, or dismiss that fact has been a crucial 
element in many systems of inequality. It is also to recognize that the ways 
in which materiality has been constructed—as passive, inert, waiting for 
the animating force of a soul or a mind to give it shape and meaning—is 
itself problematic.
257
 
 
Likewise, to claim that the human subject is necessarily animal is to reject a metaphysics 
that consistently privileges the human over the animal. And efforts to dismiss human 
animality have also led to many systems of inequality, the least of which subjects other 
animals to regular and cavalier violence that is treated as necessary for the good of 
human life.  
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For Cahill, the failure to recognize human embodiment leads to a vilification of 
the body and sexuality. The same can be said of our failure to recognize human 
animality. By rejecting that part of human life as inferior and something to overcome 
rather than something to embrace, we set up a situation in which all of nonhuman animal 
life is similarly degraded. Cahill argues that the term “objectification” is problematic 
because the philosophers who use it to critique sexual encounters between women and 
men implicitly accept that being reduced to a body is morally wrong, thus vilifying the 
body itself. Scholars who write about dehumanization behave similarly. Nick Haslam, 
Bauman, and Leo Kuper all imply within their critiques that the lives of other animals 
really are inferior to the lives of human beings (and if not inferior, fundamentally 
different and unrelatable). Even Smith, who engages in a comparison between humans 
and chimpanzees does little to counter the notion that human life is characterized by 
something additional to and unique from other animal lives. Humans and chimps might 
be related, but humans are, for Smith, still the more evolved group with more developed 
mental, emotional, and social capacities.  
To rectify some of these problems, Cahill proposes that instead of talking about 
sexual objectification, we use the term “derivatization.”  
To derivatize is to portray, render, understand, or approach a being solely 
or primarily as the reflection, projection, or expression of another being’s 
identity, desires, fears, etc. The derivatized subject becomes reducible in 
all relevant ways to the derivatizing subject’s existence—other elements 
of her…being or subjectivity are disregarded, ignored, or undervalued. 
Should the derivatized subject dare to demonstrate aspects of her 
subjectivity that fall outside of the derivatizer’s being—assuming such a 
demonstration can even be perceived…she will be perceived as arrogant, 
treasonous, and dangerously rebellious.
258
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Though Cahill uses derivatization to describe certain types of human interactions, this 
concept can be extended to interactions between humans and other-than-human beings. 
Just as the sex worker becomes an extension and fulfillment of the desires of the person 
who uses her, wolves come to embody, represent, and fulfill human fears. Both sex 
workers and wolves are treated without regard for their particularity, intersubjectivity, 
and independence from the other; instead, they are receptacles of another’s passions and 
needs. Derivatization can occur in different ways. In some cases it may involve 
depersonalizing the other, but in other situations the Other might still be allowed to or be 
expected to demonstrate certain qualities associated with personhood. Ultimately, 
derivatization is characterized by a reduction of difference to the same, an absorption of 
the other into the self that fails to recognize the other as an Other.  
The antidote to derivatization for Cahill is the development of an ethics that puts 
difference at the center. Cahill turns to Luce Irigaray’s notion of sexual difference as a 
model for thinking about an ethics of difference that could resist the totalizing tendencies 
of derivatization. Irigaray, Cahill explains, treats sexual difference as an “ontological 
fact…a factor that underlies and suffuses our being.”259 While Irigaray’s philosophy faces 
critiques that it is essentialist, Cahill believes Irigaray homes in on a key element of 
human experience—that humanness is not singular. This is in marked contrast to a liberal 
perspective (a la Kant), which “wrongly consider[s] women to be less than human.”260 
The notion that some groups of people are less human than others can be traced back to 
an idealization of the same, a desire for purity and similarity instead of difference and 
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diversity. Cahill, following Irigaray, asserts that “difference is fundamental to human 
existence,” which means recognizing “that no one person, nor even one group of persons, 
can represent the whole of humanity.”261 By analogy, we can say that this insight might 
extend not just to human life but to life (and non-life) generally speaking. Difference is 
fundamental to being in the world. When humans assert their own superiority, whether 
through evolution or divine right, they imply their own singularity in the face of animal 
difference. But just as no one sex, race, or group can represent all of humanity, neither 
can humanity represent the “best” that life or existence has to offer. Dehumanization, like 
derivatization, functions according to the assumption that categories are singular and can 
be divided according to fixed essences. As long as these ontological notions persist, then 
one group can assert itself as the “real” human while everything else is relegated to the 
equally totalizing category of the subhuman.  
An ethics of difference entails recognizing this fundamental ontological 
difference that pervades the life of our species and existence itself. This does not mean 
that individuals have nothing in common. For Cahill, our shared experience as embodied 
beings can perhaps serve to level the hierarchy and create a deeper appreciation and 
respect for difference. Though all humans and other animals are embodied they all 
experience their bodies differently. Thus embodiment becomes both a source of 
commonality as well as a source of difference. The encounter with the other makes one 
aware of one’s own limits, and this recognition is the first step toward resisting 
derivatization and dehumanization. In Animal Lessons and “Animal Ethics,” Kelly Oliver 
also calls for a “true” ethics of difference that moves beyond the human/animal, 
male/female binaries to an ethics that relies on multiplicity. According to Oliver, the 
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binary is prone to becoming an opposition “because it easily leads to giving priority to 
one pole of the binary over the other…insofar as dualism and binaries of all sorts have 
become hierarchies that privilege one over the other.”262 In the history of philosophy, 
humanity has defined itself in opposition to the animal other and has used this opposition 
to justify the oppression of certain groups of people. As long as humans are made the 
measure of all things, humanism leaves traditional concepts of “human” and “animal” 
and the values associated with them intact. In many ways, Oliver’s ethics echoes that of 
Levinas. She writes, “Rather than consider the ways in which animals are like us…we 
need to develop an ethics that can extend our obligations even to those who are not like 
us…an ethics of sameness is not enough.”263 Oliver calls for an explosion of the 
categories human, animal, male, and female, arguing that such categories do not account 
for the wide variety and vast variations of human, animal, and sexual difference even 
among members of the these groups. Instead, we need to focus on the relationships 
between humans and other animals. Oliver does not offer a clear plan on how we are to 
go about exploding these categories, but she does offer us a brief description of what the 
ensuing ethics of difference and relationality might look like. She says,  
Perhaps difference ‘worthy of its name’ would designate differences that 
multiply themselves through innumerable means so that they cannot 
devolve into opposition or fixity or calculation of any kind. This 
incalculable multiplicity would not be the simple addition of new types to 
the old in a series of one-plus-one-plus-one; they would be neither 
interchangeable nor equivalent. Rather, they would require a new lexicon 
that would mark and remark their differences without degenerating into 
calculable systems of hierarchy and domination.
264
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Thus, Oliver claims we need a non-mathematical ethics, an ethics that is not based on 
sameness and discrete substitutable units, an ethics that rejects hierarchies between 
humans and between humans and nonhumans, and an ethics that employs a new way of 
speaking about and structuring the world. Yet this account leaves open two significant 
questions. First, what would it take–what needs to change–to make such an ethics 
possible? Second, what would an ethics like this look like in action? In chapter eight, I 
will explore the idea of an ethics that is rooted in the recognition of ontological difference 
in greater depth, imagining, through the work of Native American scholars, how 
normative principles might be derived from such an ontological commitment.  
Though derivatization and dehumanization are not entirely the same—
dehumanization involves treating or perceiving another as subhuman whereas 
derivatization leaves room to recognize the humanity of the other while denying that 
person’s subjectivity—the term “dehumanization” remains caught up in the language and 
history of human exceptionalism. It presumes by its own designation that humanity is a 
unitary concept and that being treated like a nonhuman is evidently a moral wrong. This 
means that “dehumanization” is not a useful concept because in order to secure that 
which is properly human it must deny animality. But animality, like embodiment, can be 
a source of both commonality and difference not just within the human species but across 
species. Ultimately, we should stop using the word “dehumanization” to describe 
immoral treatment of other humans or infringements on their dignity. First of all, as we 
saw in chapter three, “dehumanization” is vague and functions as an umbrella term for a 
variety of related, but different concepts. Second, it implies in its very name human 
exceptionalism. Adopting words like derivatization or depersonalization not only provide 
141 
more conceptual clarity, but they can be extended to the treatment of other animals, 
objects, and nonhuman nature.  
It is tempting to respond to the problem of dehumanization with rehumanization 
by saying that we just need to be more inclusive with the concept of “the human.” As 
long as we overcome sexual, racial, and other superficial and phenotypical biological 
differences, we will recognize that we are all essentially the same beneath the skin. 
However, the concept of rehumanization only works if we rely on an ontological 
taxonomy that separates the mind from the body and the human from the animal, placing 
the mind and the human above the body and the animal. Rehumanization entails restoring 
humans to their rightful ontological and moral status. As we have seen, each of the 
approaches above, no matter how they try to account for human difference, ultimately fail 
to carry out their projects because they continue to rely on a human/animal dualism that 
pits a universal notion of the human against a universal notion of the animal. These 
universal categories do not leave room for ontological difference; instead they rely on the 
idea that human existence transcends natural life, and that recognizing and restoring this 
transcendence is paramount to any ethical response to dehumanization. In the next 
chapter, we will see that these same problems can be applied to the issue of human rights, 
which is the primary framework currently in use for responding to genocide.  
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CHAPTER VI  
HUMAN RIGHTS, ANIMAL RIGHTS, AND DEHUMANIZATION 
 
It is a fact that, at least since the seventeenth century what is called 
humanism has always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of man 
borrowed from religion, science, or politics. Humanism serves to color 
and to justify the conceptions of man to which it is, after all, obliged to 
take recourse. 
Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” 265 
 
Political scholar and activist Michael Ignatieff opens his book Human Rights as 
Politics and Idolatry with a scene from Primo Levi’s Survival in Auschwitz in which Levi 
is being interviewed by Dr. Pannwitz, the head of the chemical department at Auschwitz, 
for a position at the chemical labs that would spare him from the hard labor to which 
many of the other prisoners were subjected. Reflecting on the interview, Levi recounts 
the encounter between him and Pannwitz: 
That look was not one between two men; and if I had known how 
completely to explain the nature of that look, which came as if across the 
glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live in different 
worlds, I would also have explained the essence of the great insanity of the 
third Germany.
266
 
  
Three elements in this scene stand out. First, Levi is describing a scene of what is 
recognizably dehumanization occurring within the context of the most paradigmatic case 
of genocide: the Holocaust. The relationship Levi describes between the two of them is 
one in which a human, the Nazi doctor, is regarding a curious animal specimen, the 
Jewish prisoner. Levi’s wording indicates that he feels or perceives himself to be treated 
as a non-equal, as less than the Nazi scientist sitting across from him. He perceives 
himself as being animalized.  
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Second, in his interpretation of this vignette, Ignatieff recognizes that this 
dehumanization is occurring, saying, “Here was a scientist, trained in the traditions of 
European rational inquiry, turning a meeting between two human beings into an 
encounter between different species.”267 But then Ignatieff goes on, revealing that he 
interprets this instance of dehumanization as an epistemological problem: “Progress may 
be a contested concept, but we make progress to the degree that we act on the moral 
intuition that Dr. Pannwitz was wrong: our species is one, and each of the individuals 
who compose it is entitled to equal moral consideration.”268 Ignatieff and Levi both 
interpret this moment of dehumanization as a moment of insanity, of a failure to 
rationalize properly. The “rational” scientist fails to see what is right in front of his 
face—another human being—and this failure to see is a moral failure because it 
compromises the dignity and agency of the person before him. But there is another way 
to interpret this story. Instead of reading Levi as saying that the insanity of the Third 
Reich is epistemological, we could instead interpret “the essence of the great insanity of 
third German [reich]” as an ontological claim. In other words, the failure to know or 
understand the truth of the situation—that Levi is human—is not the moral failure; 
rather, the moral failure, the insanity, is the moral distinction made between “the human” 
and “the animal.” This binary, which is at the crux of dehumanization, is “the essence” of 
what was wrong with the Third Reich and it is also the “essence” of what is wrong with 
genocide. In this respect, dehumanization is not just an epistemological problem; it is a 
metaphysical or ontological problem. 
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Third, neither Ignatieff nor Levi acknowledge the imaginary animal other to 
whom Levi is compared though the implication that being an animal other than human is 
denigrating and that being a member of a specific species (homo sapiens) entails a certain 
amount of moral consideration. This raises certain questions that neither writer seriously 
answers. Assuming that Pannwitz thought of Levi as akin to a talking rat, exotic fish, or 
other nonhuman animal, what would rehumanizing Levi actually change? What makes 
being a member of the same species morally significant? And what becomes of the 
imaginary animal upon whose degradation this dehumanizing experience is made 
possible?  
This scene and Ignatieff’s response to it is indicative of a common theme in 
dehumanization and genocide prevention literature: genocide and dehumanization are 
crimes against humanity and/or violations of human dignity and, as such, can be solved 
by appealing to common humanity and human rights and using those principles to 
develop effective preventive measures. This assumption is so ubiquitous that almost no 
genocide or dehumanization literature wonders how the animal fairs in this 
relationship.
269
 But, as the previous chapter and other research shows, “the exploitation 
and denigration of people traditionally involve viewing them as animals, treating them 
like animals, and justifying their ‘inferior’ status on the basis of their supposed animality 
or proximity to the animal.”270 The coincidence of oppression and animality is not a banal 
metaphor or analogy, “but a central part of Western conceptions of man, human, and 
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animal.”271 Because genocide always involves dehumanization and dehumanization 
entails a human/animal dualism that gives moral and ontological precedence and status to 
humans over animals, efforts to prevent genocide cannot concern themselves solely with 
humans but must also account for the ways in which other animals are exploited for the 
purpose of either denigrating or elevating human life. This has a two-fold effect on 
genocide prevention. First, it means that humanist responses to genocide like Ignatieff’s, 
which invoke human rights, will not be sufficient. Human rights discourse, no matter how 
secular, broad, or minimalist it appears, relies on a notion of human dignity that is built 
on violence toward other animals and other nonhuman life. This violence is frequently 
excused away without considering how it is used to justify violence perpetuated between 
human beings. Second, it means that effective genocide prevention will need to consider 
how to prevent violence against other animals in addition to human animals. Such an 
endeavor entails more than expanding the concept of rights to cover more forms of life: it 
means fundamentally rethinking the ontological and metaphysical commitments and 
assumptions that make genocide and dehumanization in all its forms possible. 
In this chapter I present a brief overview of current genocide prevention efforts 
and how these efforts are tied to a human rights framework and discourse. I argue that 
human rights and other humanist approaches toward prevention will ultimately fail to 
achieve what they set out to do because they tacitly (and sometimes overtly) function 
according to (or in complicity with) the same metaphysical principles that underlie 
dehumanization and genocide, particularly the human/animal dualism. Even non-
foundationalist approaches to human rights risk falling into the trap. Whether human 
rights are treated as moral or legal or founded on religious or secular grounds, their 
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supposed universality and grounding on human dignity demonstrate that they have not 
escaped the logic of genocide. Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, I critique the 
non-foundationalist concept of human rights advocated by Ignatieff, Jack Donnelly, and 
Bertrand Ramcharan for its continued reliance on Western liberal ideals and their 
accompanying metaphysics, especially the principle of human exceptionalism. In the 
final section of the chapter I explain why extending rights to animals does not solve the 
issues caused by human exceptionalism. Though I hold human rights ultimately to be 
inadequate to the task of preventing dehumanization and genocide, I do not advocate that 
we stop using the framework altogether. As long as rights discourse can produce positive 
effects it can serve as a temporary stop-gap until a more effective solution that actually 
addresses the metaphysical problems at the root of dehumanization and genocide can be 
implemented.  
 
I: Genocide Prevention and Human Rights 
 
As we saw in chapter two, genocide scholarship largely regards genocide as a 
uniquely human problem, the worst of the crimes against humanity. Though genocide is 
regarded as a crime against humanity, the concept of humanity and the role of 
dehumanization in the practice of genocide get little attention. As such, investigations 
into the causes of genocide and the suggested methods of prevention focus predominantly 
on the problems that arise out of human political, economic, and social life and on 
generating respect for human life rather than in seeking out the ways in which the 
rejection of animality helps to facilitate genocidal thought. This means that genocide 
prevention is blind to the metaphysics that supports it.  
147 
From the traditional genocide studies perspective, the causes of genocide are 
diverse and can differ greatly depending on the context in which genocide takes place. 
Because there is not a single formula that genocide follows, determining which risk-
factors need the most attention and developing effective preventive measures is a 
constantly evolving endeavor. Yet, most prevention efforts aim at mitigating these risk 
factors. According to political scientist Scott Straus, the causes of genocide can be 
organized into three categories. Macro-causes involve risk factors at the level of countries 
and typically involve considerations regarding political institutions, the ethnic or 
religious make up of populations, the size and role of the military, and the conditions of 
the regional environment.
272
 At this level, the main predictors of genocide include the 
large-scale political or economic instability, armed conflict (often accompanied by an 
“adverse regime change” such as a revolution), transformative or exclusionary ideology, 
and prior discrimination or violence against a particular group.
273
 In addition to these 
risk-factors, some scholars have argued that deep-seated hatreds or social divisions, weak 
governmental capacity, authoritarianism, and economic crises can also escalate the 
chances of genocide.
274
 Though macro-level causes are often present prior to the onset of 
genocidal violence, these factors might be present for long periods of time before 
genocide occurs. Furthermore, not every situation in which one or several of these factors 
is present devolves into genocide.  
Macro-level causes are more likely to lead to genocide when other short-term 
causes arise. Short-term causes occur in the period just before or during the early stages 
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of genocide, triggering or escalating violence.
275
 These factors both cause and warn that 
genocide might be immanent: tension and polarization between groups, apocalyptic 
public rhetoric, labeling civilian groups as the “enemy,” development or deployment of 
irregular armed groups, stockpiling weapons, emergency or discriminatory legislation, 
removing moderates from leadership or public office, and impunity of past crimes. While 
issues of this sort foment, specific events might also trigger genocide. These include 
high-level assassinations, coups or attempted coups, a change in conflict dynamics, 
crackdowns on protests, and “symbolically significant” attacks on individuals or sites.276 
Once again, none of these factors will necessarily lead to genocide, but in most genocide 
one or more of these causes may be present.  
Other causes of genocide exist at the micro-level, at the level of the psychology 
and motivations of the perpetrators. Whether the perpetrators are high-level authorities 
like heads of state, mid-level actors like social organizations, or low-level actors like 
soldiers or civilians, the actors all have their own agendas, motivations, and 
psychological profiles that influence the likelihood of their participation, cooperation, or 
complacency with regards to genocide. These motivations may include frustration-
aggression, prior hatreds, obedience and identification with leaders, indoctrination, peer 
pressure, fear, greed and opportunity, and the power of the situation.
277
 Normocentricism, 
“membership in and connection to a group and its norms” is another motivating factor 
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insofar as conformity to a specific social group or culture is expected and goes 
unquestioned.
278
   
The ideas for genocide prevention are as varied as the causes of genocide. Prior to 
1948, there was almost no organized international support for genocide prevention 
efforts, in part because the concept of genocide was newly minted. This changed with the 
ratification of the United Nation’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (CPPCG), which states that anyone found charged with genocide will 
be tried in court. The CPPCG also states that any party that has ratified the convention 
may call upon the UN to take necessary steps to suppress or prevent genocide. Despite 
this, the CPPCG has little to say about what steps should actually be taken. In the absence 
of a clear set of steps developed by the UN, scholars and policy-makers have filled the 
vacuum with a variety of ideas including long and short term strategies. Policies 
developed at the macro-level include efforts like instituting the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P), which holds that each nation is responsible for the protection of their citizens, that 
the international community has a responsibility to help states fulfill this task, and that if 
a state is failing to protect its populations the international community can take 
appropriate collective action to protect those populations. Though, once again, what 
“appropriate collective action” looks like is somewhat unclear. Education and the 
promotion of human rights are other macro-efforts. In addition to these, there are a 
number of other longer-term prevention methods (some at the micro-level), many of 
which fit the bill of appropriate collective action. These include conflict prevention, 
deepening democracy, increasing the legitimacy of elections, reducing discrimination, 
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promoting ideologies of tolerance and pluralism, and increasing the legitimacy of state 
institutions. 
A number of these longer term, macro-level prevention methods are not just 
beneficial for genocide prevention, but aim to engender liberal, democratic, cosmopolitan 
norms that would, in the eyes of their advocates, ideally mitigate other social troubles and 
harms that, left to fester, might tend toward genocidal violence. But when it comes to 
responding to mass atrocity and genocide in particular, most prevention methods are 
aimed at assessing the current conditions of a situation and responding accordingly. 
These short term solutions include a variety of actions that states, NGOs, and other 
international bodies can take. They include actions such as increasing training for 
mediators, inducing states to make changes through the use of debt relief or economic 
sanctions, mediation or negotiation, media monitoring, withdrawal of military assistance, 
and military intervention.
279
  
One ideological strain of thought holds this multitude of preventive measures 
together: the belief in the validity of fundamental human rights, human dignity, and the 
“oneness” of the human group. Though the notion of human rights as it is described in 
the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) emerges out of European 
Enlightenment philosophies of natural rights, until the 1940s, following WWII and the 
genocide of the Jews, even in societies that saw themselves as liberal and democratic, 
rights belonged to limited classes of people. For example, even though the United States’ 
Declaration of Independence claimed that “all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” women, slaves, and Native Americans were 
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exempt from some or all of these rights to one degree or another.
280
 Though slow 
progress was made to expand these rights to more and more categories of people, it was 
in the aftermath of WWII that the concept of universal human rights took hold.  
According to the United Nations Charter of 1945, one of the purposes of the UN 
is to promote and encourage respect for human rights as enumerated in the (UDHR). The 
commitment to human rights carries through into the goals of the 1948 CPPCG and the 
2002 Rome Statute, which defines crimes against humanity. The UDHR, which was 
proclaimed the day after the 1948 CPPCG, calls for the “recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”281 In 
this statement the UN proclaims that human rights are universal and stem directly from a 
being’s membership in the human species. Not only do these rights emerge out of 
humanity itself, but they cannot be taken away or separated from the individual who 
bears them. In claiming that human rights are inalienable, the UN takes the position that 
any violation of these rights is an epistemological rather than an ontological problem. 
Human rights violations are thus a case of mis-recognition or denial on the part of the 
party refusing the right as we saw in Ignatieff’s analysis of Levi’s exchange with 
Pannwitz. 
The belief in the validity and usefulness of human rights for halting atrocity and 
securing the wellbeing of human individuals around the world emerged as a response to 
the first officially recognized genocide—the Holocaust. In this respect, genocide 
prevention and human rights discourse are inextricably entwined. But the turn to human 
rights is in itself noteworthy. The goal of human rights is to declare and uphold human 
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dignity. Human dignity refers to the special moral worth and status had by a human 
being. When a human person is treated without dignity, then it has been assumed that 
they have been deprived of something essential to their humanness—in other words, they 
have been dehumanized. Human rights, then, is a direct response to the dehumanization 
that occurs during atrocities like genocide. Human rights establish a standard by which 
human dignity can be measured and can provide a guideline for rehumanizing those who 
have been treated without dignity.  
The self-evidence of inherent and inalienable human rights permeates genocide 
prevention literature. In psychology literature, the attention to human rights is framed in 
terms of education and fostering empathy. Leo Kuper, for example, writes that the need 
for preventive action includes “developing education on human rights in the schools and 
universities.”282 Similarly Ervin Staub claims that “[m]embers of groups, whether nations 
or subgroups of societies, must develop an appreciation of one another’s humanity.”283 In 
political science and policy literature the concept of human rights is treated as both 
normative and legal. For example Madeline Albright and Richard Cohen state that 
“genocide is, fundamentally, a human rights issue” and argue that the promotion of 
human rights should be a key element of the strategy for genocide prevention.
284
 E.N. 
Anderson and Barbara Anderson are more straightforward. They say that when it comes 
to prevention, “Possibly the first and most basic need is to recognize human and civil 
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rights—the rights of all people to life, property, some degree of dignity, and above all 
equal treatment under the law.”285 
The R2P doctrine, developed by the UN under Kofi Annan in 2005, is an example 
of how genocide prevention and human rights discourse intersect. According to the UN 
Office on Genocide Prevention, “The responsibility to protect embodies a political 
commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution. It seeks to narrow the 
gap between Member States’ pre-existing obligations under existing international 
humanitarian and human rights law and the reality faced by populations at risk of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”286 The R2P rests 
on three pillars. First, states have a responsibility to protect the populations that live 
within their borders from mass atrocities. Second, the international community also has a 
responsibility to help other states in fulfilling this mandate. Third, if a state fails to 
protect is own populations, the international community must be prepared to intervene.
287
 
The R2P was developed in response to the failures of the CPPCG and UDHR. Though 
both documents created normative policies that set standards for valuing human life, they 
lacked practical steps that countries could take to ensure the protection of oppressed 
populations. The R2P aims to spread out the responsibility for protecting civilians from 
mass atrocities while also respecting the sovereignty of nation-states. As such, the R2P is 
motivated by maintaining political stability and security as much as by human rights, but 
ultimately the protection of individuals and seeing that their rights are respected is the 
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basis for the claim that international actors can and must intervene in situations in which 
populations are at risk.  
Despite the creation of resolutions like the R2P and the proliferation of human 
rights discourse, mass atrocities and crimes against humanity have not stopped, and some 
scholars have argued that mass atrocities and genocide in particular might even be on the 
rise.
288
 Since WWII, dozens of genocides (legally recognized or not) and other mass 
atrocities that deploy genocidal violence have occurred or are occurring. The proliferation 
of human rights discourse has not reduced the amount of dehumanization occurring in the 
world either even though it is a response to that dehumanization. Outside the context of 
genocide, dehumanizing rhetoric, images, and discourses infuse daily life from media and 
advertising tropes to political rhetoric.
 289
 For some, this means that education about 
human rights is needed more than ever as well as an expansion of the concept “human” to 
incorporate historically excluded groups of people. But, perhaps it means that there is a 
flaw in the human rights approach and that some other method of prevention is needed.  
 
II. The Metaphysics of Human Rights 
 
Human rights may be the current reigning model for dealing with questions of 
international ethics and justice, but the rise of human rights and their lasting 
establishment in the international arena has not gone unchallenged. The notion of “the 
human” in human rights has been accused of androcentricism,290 ethnocentricism,291 
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heterosexualism,
292
 and speciesism,
293
 with the claim that this notion of the human is 
modeled after property-owning, heterosexual, cisgender, Anglo-European males. 
Contemporary advocates of human rights acknowledge that this has been part of the 
history of human rights as it has emerged out of the European Enlightenment, but argue 
that contemporary human rights can be rescued from these problems should they be 
recognized as sufficiently expansive and inclusive.
294
 In this section I will review some 
current arguments by non-foundationalist human rights advocates who claim that the 
human rights paradigm is the best model for responding to human degradation and mass 
atrocities like genocide. By non-foundationalist I mean authors who do not presuppose a 
religious or transcendental principle for grounding human rights. They argue that human 
rights are a universal concept, and when put into action respectfully, can be applied in the 
international sphere without imposing colonial or gendered norms. Despite these claims, I 
argue that in their explanation and defense of human rights these authors continue to rely 
on the same metaphysical framework that supports genocidal and dehumanizing thought.  
As discussed in chapter four, dehumanization and genocide share three 
metaphysical principles: 1) a commitment to a rendering of reality and the beings and 
states that constitute it such that those beings can be separated into natural kinds 
according to fixed, unchanging essences (essentialism); 2) adherence to a naturalized 
logic that either excludes the possibility of middle terms and interstitial beings or treats 
such terms and beings as monstrous, deviant, or polluting (purity); and 3) a commitment 
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to a strict moral and ontological hierarchy in which humans outrank other beings, 
especially animals (human exceptionalism). I argue that human rights discourse also 
utilizes these three metaphysical principles to justify defending humans from atrocity. 
Though this seems like a powerful way of flipping the script on these potentially harmful 
principles by reclaiming them for a positive project, the way that human rights discourse 
takes for granted “the human” leads to several problems that keep genocide prevention 
efforts locked into a logic of dehumanization.  
In Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Ignatieff claims that human rights are 
“not a creed; it is not a metaphysics. To make it so is to turn it into a species of 
idolatry.”295 Human rights, he says, are not built on any particular religious or 
metaphysical foundations. Rather, even as they are touted as universal, they are 
foundationless. This is necessary to avoid privileging one set of principles over another 
and to ensure that human rights remain flexible and adaptable to the current needs of 
humans. He elaborates, “There is thus a deliberate silence at the heart of human rights 
culture. Instead of a substantive set of justifications explaining why human rights are 
universal, instead of reasons that go back to first principles…the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights simply takes the existence of rights for granted and proceeds to their 
elaboration.”296 For Ignatieff, avoiding the question of justifications is possible if human 
rights are not thought of as descriptions of what humans have or are, but describe that 
from which humans should be free. As he puts it, “Human rights is morally universal 
because it says that all human beings need certain specific freedoms ‘from’; it does not 
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go on to define what their freedom ‘to’ should consist in.”297 In this respect, human rights 
may be normative, but only insofar as they describe a future ideal of freedom with which 
all humans can participate. How that freedom is experienced is up to individuals.  
Though Ignatieff seems content to accept that rights are just things humans have, 
he does acknowledge that this raises some difficult questions for secular humanists like 
himself. For example, what makes the human the measure of all things? Does humanism 
prioritize human life over the lives of other animal species and over nature more 
generally?
298
 And if there is no difference between humans and other animals, then what 
is the harm of using humans for means to an end such as in medical experiments? Is 
humanism just a kind of secular worship? His response:  
Humanists do not literally worship human rights, but we use the language 
to say that there is something inviolate about the dignity of each human 
being…humanists must reply…there is nothing sacred about human 
beings, nothing entitled to worship or ultimate respect. All that can be said 
about human rights is that they are necessary to protect individuals from 
violence and abuse, and if it is asked why, the only possible answer is 
historical.
299
 
 
Ignatieff defers from making a satisfactory reply to any of these questions. Nowhere does 
he return to the issue of the difference between humans and other animals or why other 
animals do not also have “something inviolate” about their own dignity. Yet, as I pointed 
out earlier in the chapter, Ignatieff uses the term “species” to denote the group “human.” 
Human species membership, a biological category, ultimately determines who or what 
has dignity and rights. That Ignatieff fails to recognize that adhering to biological 
                                                 
297
 Ibid., 75. 
 
298
 Ibid., 82. 
 
299
 Ibid., 83. 
158 
difference is actually a kind foundationalism is a problem for both his claims to his 
approach to human rights and for human rights more generally speaking.  
A similar type of slippage occurs for other “non-foundationalist” authors. Political 
scientist Jack Donnelly, for example, states in Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice that there is no foundational human nature that grounds human rights. Human 
nature is a social construction, and in this respect it does not try to pre-determine the 
limits of human potential and human modes of being in the world. Adherence to human 
rights is just one way of creating or practicing a way of being human. In this respect, 
“human beings create their ‘essential’ nature through social action on themselves. Human 
rights provide both a substantive model and a set of practices to realize this work of self-
creation.”300 In this way, Donnelly makes the claim that there is no such thing as a human 
essence that provides the basis for a particular way of doing or practicing human rights. 
Rather, by engaging in rights discourse and participating in human rights-guided politics 
and ethics, a notion of what it means to be a human being emerges from that. If this 
seems troubling, it is, especially given the way in which human rights discourses today 
emerge largely out of Anglo-European political and ethical traditions. This suggests that 
whoever has the power to enforce and defend human rights gets to determine how to be 
human. Donnelly and authors like Ignatieff, Betrand Ramcharan, Paul Laurens, and 
others argue that the notion of human rights is not exclusive to European cultures, but has 
its origins in Hinduism, Buddhism, and ancient Mesopotamian cultures as well. 
Furthermore, the drafting of UDHR was a multicultural endeavor, backed by the many 
nations of the world. Yet, this seems to naively dismiss the imbalance of power that 
exists when it comes to recognizing the rights of marginalized peoples or recognizing 
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human rights violations, pursuing them in courts of law, and meting out punishment. For 
example, three affluent and powerful countries, the United States, Australia, and Canada, 
refused to ratify the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
because of what consequences that might have for these governing bodies given that 
there are indigenous peoples living under oppressive conditions in their own countries. In 
refusing to ratify, these superpowers were essentially saying that rights of indigenous 
peoples were not human rights. This is the point Wendy Brown makes when she 
criticizes Igantieff for describing a rights approach that ultimately produces power in the 
form of liberal individuals. This blindness to the fact that human rights projects are 
formed by certain assumptions about freedom and power leads her to issue the following 
warning: “Human rights activism is a moral-political project it if displaces, competes 
with, refuses, or rejects other political projects, including those also aimed at producing 
justice, then it is not merely a tactic but a particular form of political power carrying a 
particular image of justice, and it will behoove us to inspect, evaluate, and judge it as 
such.”301 
In addition to this problem, Donnelly’s anti-essentialist stance regarding human 
nature is belied by his claim that human rights are tied to species-being. He states, 
Human rights are literally the rights that one has simply because one is a 
human being…one either is or is not a human being, and therefore has the 
same rights as everyone else (or none at all). Human rights are also 
inalienable rights: one cannot stop being human, no matter how badly one 
behaves or how barbarously one is treated. And they are universal rights, 
in the sense that today we consider all members of the species Homo 
sapiens ‘human beings’ and thus holders of human rights.302 
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If human rights are inalienable, then they must attach themselves to some sort of aspect 
of human nature that exists across all human beings. Otherwise, it would be the case that 
being human would be contingent upon behavior, practice, etc. Clearly, for Donnelly this 
is not so. Human being is, it turns out, determined by one’s biology and membership 
within a species. Thus, human rights is not a practice that create humans. They belong to 
beings that are already human. They just shape humans to accord with a particular set of 
ideals. 
Political scholar and activist Bertrand Ramcharan echoes these sentiments in 
Contemporary Human Rights Ideas. Like Ignatieff and Donnelly, he claims that human 
rights as espoused in the UNDR do not have a metaphysical basis, but emerge out of the 
“shared heritage of humanity.”303 Like these authors he also holds that the idea of human 
rights means that “all human beings, wherever they are, enjoy certain fundamental, 
inalienable rights stemming from their humanity.”304 He also claims that human rights are 
an ordering principle.
305
 They create a particular type of world in which human dignity is 
respected and central to the pursuit of justice. Neither he nor Donnelly wonders what 
effects this might have on nonhuman life and nature. 
There are two problems with these explanations of human rights that I would like 
to examine. The first and most obvious is that these non-foundationalist approaches all 
clearly have a foundation: biology. The idea that humans are all part of the same 
biological family is compelling and can certainly tell us about common attributes and 
behaviors that beings that we call human share. But biology is a shaky foundation upon 
                                                 
303
 Ramcharan, Human Rights Ideas, 15. 
 
304
 Ibid., 29. 
 
305
 Ibid., 5, 29. 
161 
which to build a set of normative politics and ethics because human biology is not fixed, 
but is constantly and literally evolving. Furthermore, the biological differences between 
humans and other beings are porous. For example, recent research in biology has shown 
that gene transfer does not just happen vertically from parent to offspring, but 
horizontally across species. Studies indicate that 5-6% of the human genome has been 
shaped by horizontal gene transfer from bacteria, viruses, and mosquitoes.
306
 Nor does 
the notion of species membership here acknowledge the biomes existing within the 
human body that consist of all the creatures that keep humans alive. As symbiotic species 
that exist within human bodies, do they have inalienable rights as well?  
This leads to the second issue: to treat biology as a foundation is to make a 
metaphysical claim. As Ramcharan points out, human rights are “one of the pillars of the 
contemporary world order.”307 They determine who or what has dignity, is human, and 
deserves justice and representation before law. Thus, in practice, human rights organize 
the world such that humans and nonhuman animals are categorically different. This 
difference rests on the notion that humans and other animals have different essences, 
whether it is recognized as an essence or not. The assumption of essences lends credence 
to the notion that humans and other animals have different ontological and moral statuses. 
This provides the set up for a dualistic relationship between humans and nonhuman 
animals. As a normative project, human rights create and reinforce a reality in which 
nonhuman beings are inferior to human beings. This is problematic because the 
human/animal dualism makes dehumanization possible. In other words, the metaphysics 
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of human rights adheres to the metaphysics of dehumanization. As long as human rights 
try to operate within the same metaphysics, dehumanization remains a constant threat. 
The problem with the “human” of human rights can also be approached from the 
other side, through the concept of “the animal,” which often goes unmentioned in 
discussions of human rights, but is the assumed Other that marks the limit of the human. 
One concern that has been raised by critics of human rights is that the universal concept 
of the human erases the variety of human difference, forcing it to conform to a model of 
the human based on the European liberal ideal.
308
 Because nonhuman animals are 
contrasted with humans, the move to make a universal claim about human life has the 
same effect on nonhuman animal life. The concept of “the animal” becomes one-
dimensional, forced to represent a vast array of heterogeneous living organisms, or, as 
Derrida puts it, “more precisely…a multiplicity of relations between living and dead, 
relations of organization or lack of organization among realms that are more and more 
difficult to dissociate by means of the figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or 
death.”309 In other words, the boundary created between the human and the nonhuman 
animal fails to account for the ontological impurity of these categories and the way in 
which humans, animals, organic and inorganic defy, exceed, or transition between these 
limits. In this respect, the logic of human rights functions according to the metaphysical 
principle of purity. 
Furthermore, Derrida argues that the boundary between human and animal does 
not have two edges. Instead, the boundary is more like an abyssal rupture that is multiple 
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and heterogeneous.
310
 In other words, the difference between homo sapiens and zebras is 
just as different and significant as the difference between humans and bluebirds, humans 
and wasps, and wasps and zebras. The difference cannot be reduced to a simple 
dichotomy despite the way that Western thought strives to do so. But this border also 
speaks to human difference as well. No two groups of human are exactly alike and they 
cannot be reducible to the concept “human.” Yet, when this happens, difference becomes 
a negative attribute and grounds for exclusion or elimination. As Iris Marion Young 
explains, “…by seeking to reduce the differently similar to the same, it turns the merely 
different into the absolutely other. It inevitably generates dichotomy instead of unity, 
because the move to bring particulars under a universal category creates a distinction 
between inside and outside.”311  
As Derrida notes, animals become the receptacle for all qualities that are 
considered un-human: “The animal is deprived of language. Or, more precisely, of 
response, of a response that could be precisely and rigorously distinguished from a 
reaction; of the right and power to ‘respond,’ and hence of so many other things that 
would be proper to man.”312 This form of signification is what makes dehumanization so 
powerful. When one group of humans wants to exclude another from the category human 
by claiming that they do not display the requisite characteristics, they can point to “the 
animal.” This is precisely Carl Schmitt’s point when he says, 
The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of 
imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific 
vehicle of economic imperialism…whoever invokes humanity wants to 
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cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a 
term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy 
the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of 
humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme 
inhumanity.
313
 
 
Human rights discourse expresses a tension between essentializing humans and 
nonhuman animals and admitting that “the human” and “the animal” are arbitrary 
concepts. As a project that envisions universal humankind, human rights threaten to 
homogenize and essentialize human life, in turn doing the same to the nonhuman. But if 
human rights, as advocates like Ignatieff and Donnelly try to claim, really have no 
metaphysical basis whatsoever, then that would make them and the definition of the 
human arbitrary. Either way, the concept of the human becomes a tool of exclusion. If 
there is an essential human nature, then human rights will play the role of 
rehumanization, of transforming and returning people into the dignified beings that they 
are supposed to be. But if human nature is an arbitrary concept, its deployment 
throughout Western history has only served to demonstrate that it has been and is a tool 
of violence. As long as the human exists at the expense of the animal, other-than-human 
animals and humans who are considered animal-like will be on the receiving end of that 
violence.  
Human rights scholars claim that the purpose of a document like the UDHR is to 
provide the international community with a set of basic standards that, if met, will ensure 
that people have the ability to lead a good life. While this may be how the UDHR 
functions for people living within peaceful, democratic societies, often the UDHR 
functions as a guideline for those societies when violence and oppression are occurring 
elsewhere in the world. As a guide, the UDHR’s purpose is to help nations, NGOs, and 
                                                 
313
 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 54. 
165 
other institutions rehumanize victims of oppression and violence—that is, restore or give 
them the dignity that they merit based on their membership in the category Homo 
sapiens. Consider again the vignette that begins this chapter. For Ignatieff, the problem in 
the situation is that Pannwitz fails to recognize Levi as human, treating him, instead, as if 
he were an other-than-human animal. For Ignatieff, the principles of human rights are 
meant to correct this breach in respect by affirming and validating Levi’s humanity and 
dignity. Human rights doctrines also provide nations with a set of standards to help them 
decide when it is appropriate to take action against other nations who are failing to 
protect their populations and can provide those countries with an agenda. Thus, human 
rights are more than just a normative ideal of life that humans can aspire to; they are a 
tool for changing the ontological and moral status of certain humans, conforming them to 
those standards. Because human rights function according to the same metaphysical 
principles as dehumanization and genocide, they cannot solve the problems generated by 
those metaphysics. In this respect, the good that human rights do bring about are only a 
stop-gap measure until the metaphysical problems can be resolved. 
  
III. Why Not Animal Rights? 
 
Before I conclude this chapter, I wish to briefly address a possible objection to my 
above analysis. Perhaps Ignatieff, Donnelly, and the rest are honestly trying to avoid the 
problem of essentialism. Perhaps, they only discuss rights insofar as they impact humans 
in these texts because they are trying to tackle issues of injustice, oppression, and 
violence within and between human communities. Humans, along this line of 
argumentation, might not be the only bearers of rights, but we can talk about human 
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rights because we are talking about rights within the context of the human political and 
social spheres. In other words, the problems above would be solved if we extended rights 
to nonhuman animals. However, the problems caused by basing human rights on the 
membership in the biological category of Homo sapiens are not solved by expanding 
rights to nonhuman animals because the same metaphysics remain at work. As Kelly 
Oliver puts it, “If the man/animal binary is part and parcel of the history of rights 
discourse, then how can we use that same discourse to overcome it?”314 
In the vignette at the start of this chapter Ignatieff takes umbrage with the fact that 
Dr. Pannwitz treats Levi as though he is a nonhuman creature. This comparison is 
morally affronting only if it is already accepted that nonhuman animals are morally 
inferior to humans. As I have argued above and in previous chapters, the notion of 
dehumanization implies in its definition that human life has an ontological status that 
demands greater moral respect than the lives of other beings. In calling this moral and 
ontological degradation dehumanization, the focus of the concern becomes centered on 
human lives. As a result, little attention is actually paid to the nonhuman animals that are 
made to represent the disdain, fear, and disgust humans project toward one another. 
However, the stereotypical image of the animal other that is used to justify and motivate 
genocidal violence is also used to justify and motivate heinous acts of violence against 
actual animals. This violence occurs with such regularity and often without meaningful 
reflection, and has become so normal that it seems natural that humans would kill, 
experiment on, eat, and use other types of animals. 
For instance, in 2017, 32.2 million cows, 500 thousand calves, 121.3 million pigs, 
2.18 million sheep and lambs, 9 million chickens, and 200 thousand turkeys were 
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slaughtered in the US alone.
315
 This number is vastly higher when fish are included in the 
count. Though animal husbandry has almost always involved slaughter, the rise of 
concentrated feeding animal operations (CAFOs) and factory farms has significantly 
changed the relationship between humans and the other animals they eat. For example, 
chicken farms, even those labeled organic and free range, often consist of large buildings 
packed with thousands of chickens at once. In order to keep the peace in these 
overcrowded, dirty, and stinky confines, farmers de-beak chicks to prevent them from 
injuring one another and themselves.
316
 Adding to their pain, chickens are dosed with a 
mix of hormones and antibiotics that cause them to grow so fast and big that they become 
too heavy to support their own weight. Contrary to the bucolic vision of farm life that 
involves frolicking calves, cows contentedly munching on grass, and pigs rolling in fresh 
mud, many of the animals put to slaughter in the United States live in conditions that 
warrant the description “poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”317  
The violence endured by farm animals is just one aspect of the regular violence 
directed toward nonhuman animals in the US. Every year approximately 6.5 million 
companion animals enter shelters. Of these, 1.5 million are euthanized.
318
 The US also 
churns through laboratory animals, but the actual numbers are obscured for two reasons. 
First, the Animal Welfare Act of 1966 (AWA), which is the only federal law in the 
United States to regulate the treatment of animals in research, exhibition, teaching, and 
transport, defines “animal” as “live dogs, cats, monkeys (nonhuman primate mammals), 
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guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits.”319 Mice, rats, aquatic animals, and livestock, which 
make up the majority of animals used in laboratory settings, are all notably absent from 
this list. Second, aside from the few types of animals covered by the AWA, the US 
government does not require records to be kept of how many animals are used in 
laboratory testing. It is estimated, however, that between 17 and 22 million animals (85% 
of which are rats and mice) are used for research, education, and testing per year in the 
US, 2% of which are the animals covered by the AWA.
320
 
Given the indifference regarding the consistent and prevalent violence toward 
nonhuman animals occurring every day in the United States, is it any wonder that our 
society shows indifference or at most ambivalence toward the suffering of humans both 
within its own borders such as in the treatment of undocumented immigrants, Native 
American tribes, and Black men let alone the plight of humans facing oppression, mass 
violence, and genocide elsewhere in the world? As we saw in previous chapters, the 
frequent response to this question is to say that the suffering of humans is different in 
some morally significant way. As Nick Haslam notes in his studies of dehumanization, 
the reasoning follows any one of these excuses: humans are created in the image of god 
to rule over other animals; humans can express their suffering through language; humans 
have cognitive, spiritual, and moral reasoning beyond that of other animals; humans have 
a concept of the future, death, and their own mortality, and so on.
321
  
It is tempting to suggest that we could solve the problem of the human/animal 
dualism in rights discourse if we extend rights to nonhuman animals. Though this may be 
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an important step toward dissolving the human/animal dualism, animal rights—like 
human rights—continue to operate within the same metaphysical framework as genocide. 
Thus, they will never be a true solution to the metaphysical problem posed by 
dehumanization and genocide. Consider the following issues with animal rights. First, 
scholars and activists who are concerned about animal welfare and suffering do not even 
agree on whether animals should have rights. Some scholars argue in favor of animal 
welfare, which is focused on creating more stringent regulation around the human 
treatment of animals as a means of preventing unnecessary suffering and ensuring 
humane treatment.
322
  
Second, animal welfare and rights advocates do not agree on what qualities make 
it reasonable for a being to have rights. Peter Singer, for example, argues from a 
utilitarian standpoint that animal welfare should be focused on reducing as much 
unnecessary suffering in the world as possible.
323
 Because suffering is prioritized over 
other qualities, certain types of nonhuman animals (apes, cetaceans, elephants, and other 
vertebrates) would be more likely to be on the receiving end of this welfare than others 
(shellfish, corals, earthworms and other invertebrates). Another common qualification in 
animal rights literature is whether or not the being is sentient. For example, Lesley 
Rogers and Gisela Kaplan argue that the “more advanced its higher cognition, the better 
the case to include its species as the recipient of a set of new privileges.”324 Others, like 
Tom Regan, have argued that in order for beings to have rights they must be sentient as 
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well as have some sense of future-orientation.
325
 Such arguments draw on human 
conceptions of personhood, agency, and mental life to determine who or what is 
deserving of rights.
326
 
But approaches like these have problems. First, these qualifications would include 
certain types of creatures like apes, dolphins, crows, and elephants (and in the case of 
suffering, most vertebrates), but could exclude a whole realm of animal life that does not 
overtly exhibit the necessary traits according to a human measuring stick. If we draw the 
line at one set of animals, how is that not any more arbitrary than drawing the line at a 
certain group of humans? We would just be using the same exclusionary logic except that 
instead of asking “what is a human?” we would be asking “what is an animal?” To see 
how precarious this notion already is, consider the United States AWA described above. 
It defines “animal” as “live dogs, cats, monkeys (nonhuman primate mammals), guinea 
pigs, hamsters, and rabbits.”  
Second, the qualities used to measure worthiness of rights are based on what we 
value for human life. The qualities that make a human life good and worthwhile may not 
be the same for other kinds of animals. Some animal welfare advocates like Martha 
Nussbaum have tried to address this concern. Nussbaum, for example, adopts a 
capabilities approach for thinking about animal welfare: “The core of this approach...is 
that animals are entitled to a wide range of capabilities to function, those that are most 
essential to flourishing life, a life worthy of the dignity of each creature. Animals have 
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entitlements based on justice.”327 While Nussbaum offers a rich and thoughtful theory, 
she continues to rely on Aristotelian and Kantian notions of personhood. Determining 
happiness and a “good life” according to the standards of other animals is human hubris 
at its best, and has led to a variety of assumptions and policies based on those 
assumptions that attempt to regulate animal lives for their own good. A key example of 
this is the use of hunting to manage wildlife populations.  
Third, another problem with expanding rights to animals is that in the current 
rights framework, rights are a legal and moral construct designed for navigating the 
human socio-political-ethical realm. Because animals cannot engage as equals in this 
realm (they will always need surrogates and representatives), humans will always 
ultimately decide the limits, scope, and worthiness of their rights claims. Ultimately, 
animal rights, like human rights, attempt to solve an ethical and metaphysical problem 
from within the system that is built on those principles. Playing around with the dualistic 
relationship—such as changing it from human/animal to animal/plant or sentient/non-
sentient—does not change the logic at work; it only moves the line somewhere else. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
As the ideology of current international politics, rights frameworks can serve the 
important function of drawing attention to acts of violence toward humans and other 
animals that may have been ignored or accepted as normal and natural. For humans, they 
can provide a venue for the oppressed, vulnerable, and dispossessed to seek justice for 
harms from which they have and are suffering. However, rights discourse is just a 
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temporary solution because it is embedded in a metaphysical framework that continues to 
operate according to the principles of essentialism, purity, and human exceptionalism. 
Human rights do not help to achieve the ethics of difference and relationality suggested 
by Ann Cahill and Kelly Oliver in the previous chapter. As a project of universalism that 
has a tendency to essentialize the human and the animal, rights discourses attempt to 
subsume everything into the same by simply changing the parameters of who is 
protected. However, rights often fail at this effort, leaving millions of humans and 
billions of other animals vulnerable to a variety of forms of violence. In the next chapter I 
connect violence against animals to violence against humans through a decolonial 
critique of the distinction between ecocide and genocide. In the final chapter, I return to 
the notion of an ethics of difference in an effort to develop what such an ethics might 
look like and what types of metaphysical principles it would entail. This will require a 
radical shift away from traditional Western metaphysics to a non-Western mode of 
thinking, namely a Native American worldview. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ECOCIDE, GENOCIDE, AND INDIGENOUS PHILOSOPHIES  
OF NONHUMAN AGENCY 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, dehumanization—the process of making a 
human person become less than human—is necessary for the practice of modern 
genocide. Studying the role of dehumanization in genocide reveals an underlying set of 
metaphysical assumptions in genocidal thought that are present in dehumanizing thought 
as well. These include essentialism, purity, and human exceptionalism. Though the 
problems of essentialism and purity have been recognized and discussed to some extent 
by various scholars of both genocide and dehumanization, the last issue—human 
exceptionalism—has been largely neglected, especially in conversations around the 
causes of genocidal violence and for preventing genocidal violence. Treating genocide 
and rights as strictly human issues that do not apply accept by metaphor to other animals 
has several problematic ramifications. First, it reinforces the supposed ontological divide 
between humans and other animals so that the logic of exclusion continues into 
perpetuity. Second, it erases or occludes the link between human acts of violence against 
other animals and inter-human violence.
328
 Third, it normalizes and naturalizes violence 
to nonhuman animals, relegating such violence to a different ontological and ethical 
status. Fourth, as a product of the previous three issues, it fails to account for the 
intertwining of human-animal relationships and the various forms these might take 
outside of the Western metaphysical purview.  
This last point is a problem that affects how genocide is defined and how 
genocide needs to be responded to. As we will see, it not only reveals the neglect of 
nonhuman animals, but shows that neglecting animals (and other nonhuman beings) may 
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be genocidal in itself. The principles of Western logic and metaphysics may inhibit this 
understanding of genocide, but if we adopt a non-Western approach to logic and 
metaphysics this notion becomes more viable. This is the case when it comes to 
considering the genocides of Indigenous peoples, many of whom belong to cultures 
where other types of beings besides human animals can be persons and community 
members.  
The previous chapters have dealt to some extent with those first three problems. 
In this chapter, I wish to explore the last issue in greater depth, through the lens of Native 
American experiences of genocide and Native American ethics and metaphysics. In this 
chapter I argue that the study of genocide and our current responses to it are still largely 
colonial and speciesist, and that the two problems go hand-in-hand with the Western 
metaphysical principles I have outlined in earlier chapters. By looking at examples from 
the colonization of North America, I will demonstrate how the destruction of nonhuman 
animals, land, water and other nonhuman beings constitutes genocide according to 
indigenous metaphysics without requiring a complete revision of either Raphael 
Lemkin’s or the UN’s definitions of genocide. In Environmental and Genocide Studies, 
the destruction of nonhuman beings and nature is typically treated as a separate, but 
related type of phenomenon—ecocide. In this chapter I follow in the footsteps of Native 
American and First Nations scholars like Donald Grinde, Winona LaDuke, Tasha 
Hubbard, and Laurelyn Whitt to argue from an Indigenous perspective on nonhuman 
personhood that ecocide and the genocide of indigenous peoples are inextricably linked 
and are even constitutive of the same act.
329
 I draw on the work of many different Native 
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American scholars from different tribes and nations. This approach to genocide is also 
consistent with my claim that dehumanization is necessary for the practice of genocide, 
because dehumanization, which denies the humanity of certain groups, involves 
perpetrators acting in accordance with the belief that the people they are killing are 
nonhuman animals. Recognizing that ecocide is genocide challenges the notion of human 
exceptionalism and expands the concept of genocide without significantly altering its 
official legal definition.   
 
I. Cultural Genocide, Social Death, and Ecocide 
 
One of the primary shortcomings of the human rights approach to responding to 
genocidal violence is that the focus of humanitarian efforts becomes based almost 
entirely on the wellbeing of individual humans rather than with concern for the natural 
world that sustains them. Not one of the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) mentions the environment, natural world, or other than human creatures 
even though human life depends on nonhuman nature for sustenance and cultural 
development. Both the definition of genocide—which only accounts for human groups—
and the UDHR exhibit such shortcomings, writing nonhuman animals and other beings 
out of the ethical and political equation when it comes to atrocities. Yet, such a limited 
definition of genocide and human wellbeing has not been the only way of interpreting 
genocide and genocidal violence. As noted in chapter two, Raphael Lemkin, who coined 
the term genocide and worked tirelessly to have the UN make genocide into a 
prosecutable crime, defined genocide in a significantly different way than the definition 
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eventually adopted by the UN. According to Lemkin, genocide does not necessarily entail 
the physical destruction of a national or ethnic group. Rather, genocide signifies,  
a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of 
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves. The objects of such a plan would be 
the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, 
language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of 
national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, 
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such 
groups.
330
 
 
Whereas the UN definition restricts genocide largely to acts carried out against the bodies 
and individuals of the targeted human group, Lemkin’s definition accounts for a much 
broader understanding of what constitutes group destruction. While mass murder, 
preventing births, and physical destruction all count as genocidal acts for Lemkin, he also 
includes the dissolution of political parties, colonization, abolition of local law, 
censorship, restrictions on language, withholding food and medicine, moral debasement, 
and crippling economic development. Unlike the acts listed in the UN definition, each of 
which describes a harm that would directly affect the physical body of the group 
members, these acts are indirect harms that compromise quality of life and the ability of a 
group to carry on as a group. The acts that Lemkin lists destroy a group not by taking 
lives per se but by forcefully supplanting one group’s way of being in the world—the 
principles, institutions, and values that make that group distinct from other human 
groups—with the principles, institutions, and values held by another group. In this 
respect, genocide is not just about the physical destruction of a group, but the cultural 
destruction of that group as well.  
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By adopting this broader notion of genocide, the range of acts that the concept 
“genocide” covers grows enormously. This broader conception aligns with more recent 
conversations about genocide. Claudia Card, for example, argues that what distinguishes 
genocide from other crimes against humanity is its role in bringing about social death.
331
 
According to Card, a social group is not just a collection of individuals, but a set of 
relationships that are constituted by social, institutional, political, and moral practices. 
Social death involves the breakdown or eradication of these relationships so that what 
made life as a group meaningful no longer exists. Social life applies not only to living 
members of the group, but is intergenerational, connecting the members of the group 
through history and time. Genocide, both physical and cultural, inhibits the flourishing, 
growth, and organic development of these relationships. Though social death can be 
understood within the terms of the UN definition of genocide, Lemkin’s account, which 
directs attention to the destruction of cultural relationships makes this particular harm all 
the more evident. 
Recently, there has been a renewed interest by genocide scholars in Lemkin’s 
writings, some of which are still unpublished. Unsatisfied with the limitations of the UN 
definition, researchers like Dirk Moses, Damien Short, and Jürgen Zimmerer note that by 
excluding cultural destruction from the definition of genocide, many groups of people 
who have experienced loss of group life are not considered to be victims of genocide and 
see Lemkin’s research as one way of conceptualizing problems related to genocide that 
have been under-theorized or overlooked, especially in regard to colonization.
332
 These 
authors note that the narrow definition of the UN does a great disservice to colonized 
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indigenous peoples who were not always killed in the process of colonization, but whose 
group life was forcibly altered and destroyed through the efforts of colonizers. Even acts 
that were considered “humanitarian” or “humanizing” by settler colonists such as 
residential schools, the designation of reservations, and other efforts at assimilating 
native peoples into the new dominant culture often brought about social and cultural 
death by depriving people of carrying on traditions, language, and relationships not just 
with one another but with the land and other elements of nonhuman nature around them. 
Though there is growing interest in the link between colonization and genocide, the 
majority of genocide literature, which debates definitions and legal action, as well as 
much of the human rights literature that responds to genocide, perpetuate (often 
unintentionally) the erasure of the plight of indigenous peoples as an act of genocide. The 
experiences of colonized indigenous people are treated as something categorically 
different from genocide. This is similar to the way that violence directed toward 
nonhuman animals has been treated as well. For example, in Native America and the 
Question of Genocide Alex Alvarez argues that the term genocide is overused when 
discussing the harms experienced by the indigenous peoples of North America. Many of 
these assertions of genocide, he says, “seem to be based more on a general sense of 
outrage and horror than on any clear and rigorous understanding about what is or is not 
genocide.”333 Though he approaches the claims of genocide in North America with some 
skepticism, Alvarez does not say genocide did not occur. Rather, “care needs to be taken 
when applying this label to specific historical events.”334 Following a review of various 
episodes of violence perpetrated against Native Americans, Alvarez concludes that the 
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Trail of Tears, though horrific, was not genocide while the residential school system was 
a form of cultural genocide (notice here that “cultural” modifies genocide, but is not 
genocide properly so-called), and the massacres of Californian Indians were definitely 
genocide. As noted in chapter two, Native scholar Joseph P. Gone of the Gros Ventre 
Nation makes a similar argument in his article “Colonial Genocide and Historical Trauma 
in North America,” but he goes a step further than Alvarez in restricting the definition of 
genocide. As noted in chapter two, Gone argues that for the sake of conceptual clarity, 
genocide should only refer to instances of violence that involve mass murder. He argues 
that there are already a variety of terms to describe various acts of violence including 
ethnic cleansing, colonization, massacres, and human rights violations; “Thus, what 
seems to be distinctive about the term genocide is its reference to the ‘crime of all 
crimes,’ namely, group-based mass murder.”335 Given this definition, Gone holds that 
much of the violence that occurred against Native Americans through colonization is not 
genocide even though intermittent genocides did occur as colonization proceeded. He 
specifically calls into question the value of lumping Indian killers, buffalo hunters, and 
residential school teachers together as perpetrators of genocide.
336
 In other words, Gone 
claims that genocide was not “at all typical or representative, of the European project of 
colonization, or that colonization can be casually equated with genocide.”337 For both 
authors, the goal of making these distinctions is to ensure that the power of the word 
genocide does not become diluted.  
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Alvarez’s and Gone’s reasons for defining genocide so narrowly might be 
beneficial for bringing about conceptual clarity, might reflect a consideration for the legal 
standing of the definition, and might be useful for helping communities to overcome past 
violence and reconcile past differences,
338
 but mass killing is hardly exhaustive of the 
methods that can be used to destroy a group. Lemkin’s definition, which does take into 
account the destruction of language, religion, and other cultural institutions can provide a 
more nuanced account of what happened to (and is still happening to) Indigenous peoples 
around the world with the arrival of the Europeans. Though Lemkin did not specifically 
talk about the destruction of nature, the environment, or ecosystems in his definition of 
genocide, his expanded definition leaves room for consideration of this issue as well. 
This is especially relevant for indigenous peoples whose physical and cultural destruction 
coincided with their removal from their land, the decimation of various indigenous 
nonhuman animal species including beaver and bison, and with alterations to the 
landscape including the damming of rivers, deforestation, and the introduction of new 
pollutants. As I will discuss in greater depth later, because many indigenous cultures 
lived in close proximity to the other-than-human world around them, the destruction of 
these relationships would have constituted a type of social death as well.  
The majority of genocide literature does not seriously or thoroughly analyze the 
connection between genocide and the destruction of nonhuman nature, otherwise known 
as ecocide. In this respect most genocide scholarship (and human rights scholarship) 
remains anthropocentric, considering only the destruction of and the dignity of human 
life to be of consequence. The term “ecocide” was coined in 1970 by a group of scientists 
to describe the devastation being wrought to the land in Vietnam as a result of chemical 
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weapons like Agent Orange. Later it was defined by lawyer and activist Polly Higgens as 
“extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether 
by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the 
inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished.”339 Because “ecocide” is still a 
relatively under-theorized subject, the term is used to cover a wide array of acts and 
harms. Unlike the UN definition of genocide, which stipulates that genocidal acts require 
intent, the definition of ecocide above does not. This means that humans may commit 
ecocide unintentionally or as a means to a different end as in the case of many businesses 
that do not intentionally set out to destroy land, forests, or water, but do so negligently or 
in pursuit of some other goal. In fact, natural events such as tsunamis, hurricanes, or 
floods could be considered perpetrators of ecocide. Higgens distinguishes between two 
forms of ecocide: ascertainable and non-ascertainable. The former kind has no discernible 
human cause, while the latter does.
340
 For the most part, however, the term is commonly 
used to describe harms done by humans to nonhuman beings and the planet with the 
effect of inhibiting the flourishing of human life. As Arthur W. Galston argued in his 
proposal for an international agreement on banning ecocide, “It seems to me that willful 
and permanent destruction of environment in which a people can live in a manner of their 
own choosing ought similarly to be considered a crime against humanity, to be 
designated by the term ecocide.”341 Thus, examples of ecocide are quite varied, including 
everything from the mass death of bees due to the overuse of pesticides to the clear-
cutting of the Amazon Rainforest for the purposes of creating more farmland to the 
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poaching of rare species to be sold on the black market as medicine, as pets, or as 
delicacies.  
Though the concept of ecocide has gained traction among environmentalists and 
advocates for indigenous rights, ecocide is not considered a crime on the international 
stage. Only ten countries have adopted laws criminalizing ecocide.
342
 Even though the 
inclusion of ecocide as an international crime has been debated at the UN various times 
between the years of 1973 and 2010, culminating with a proposal to amend the Rome 
Statute to include ecocide as the fifth Crime against Peace, each effort to incorporate it 
ultimately failed.
343
 However, as the threats of anthropogenic climate change become 
increasingly real, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in the connections 
between ecocide and genocide. As Higgens points out, “ecocide leads to resource 
depletion, and where there is escalation of resource depletion, war comes chasing close 
behind.”344 And often with war comes a surge of crimes against humanity, one of which 
may be genocide.  
In Ecocide of Native America, Donald Grinde of the Yamasee tribe and Bruce E. 
Johansen link ecocide with the genocide of Native Americans and other indigenous 
peoples. By examining the testimonies of Native people impacted by a variety of 
environmental disasters that followed colonization including uranium mining, depletion 
of fisheries, and destruction of the plains for ranching, the authors demonstrate how these 
practices have interfered with traditional Native methods of engaging with the nonhuman 
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world and the devastating impact this has had on the future of those communities, 
physically, spiritually, and culturally. According to the testimony of Jewell Praying Wolf 
James of the Lummi Tribe, the destruction of land, water, and nonhuman life has been 
central to this experience of genocide:  
At one time our plains, plateaus, and ancient forests were respected and 
not considered a wilderness. The skies were darkened with migrating fowl. 
The plains were blanketed with massive herds of buffalo. Our mountains 
teemed with elk, deer, bear, beaver, and other fur-bearing animals. All the 
rivers were full of salmon and fish—so much that you could walk across 
their backs to get to the other side. The plants and trees were medicines or 
food for us.  
 
We knew neither hunger nor disease until contact came in 1492, then our 
holocaust began and that of the plants, animals, and environment.
345
 
 
Though Grinde and Johansen link ecocide and genocide, their focus is primarily on 
ecocide and less on how this connects to the problem of genocide more generally 
speaking. In Redefining Genocide, sociologist Damien Short provides some of this 
theoretical groundwork by taking a closer look at what he deems the “genocide-ecocide 
nexus.” Drawing on Lemkin’s broad definition of genocide that takes genocide to be the 
destruction of a group’s culture as well as physical life, Short argues that ecocide has 
been used again and again in the modern era to destroy group life, especially for 
indigenous societies. According to Short ecocide is a method of genocide if “such 
destruction results in conditions of life that fundamentally threaten a social group’s 
cultural and/or physical existence.”346 According to Short, humans are “ecologically 
embedded beings.”347 As such, wrecking the ecosystems in which humans persist would 
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ultimately lead to the destruction of human lives and cultures. Through various case 
studies of situations in Palestine, Sri Lanka, Australia, and Canada he shows how settler 
colonists put profits and resource extraction ahead of the lives and livelihoods of 
indigenous groups who share(d) the territory. Exploitation of land and resources for 
political and economic gain on the part of the state and businesses becomes a justification 
for ethnic cleansing, extermination, and forced removal of indigenous groups.  
For example, in one case study Short looks at the effects of Canada’s tar sands 
project on nearby First Nations communities. Short reports that in the name of energy 
security, the US and Canada have pursued opportunities to extract oil and other resources 
using risky and especially environmentally destructive technologies. The exploitation of 
the tar sands in Alberta, Canada has involved extracting bitumen, a viscous and dense 
form of petroleum, through techniques such as strip mining and fracking. The site of the 
tar sands, which is almost as large as the state of Florida, consists of mined pits, pools of 
oil, and rivers of water that have been redirected from all available nearby sources. The 
land has been stripped of wildlife, trees, and top soil. Runoff from the mining procedures 
contaminates rivers on the level of major oil spills on a regular basis. These lands, which 
had traditionally belonged to the Cree, Metis, and Dene peoples, are now entirely 
uninhabitable.
348
 Though members of these First Nations still live in Alberta not far from 
the site of the tar sands, the contamination of the land and water has been so bad that 
members of these tribes fear to drink water, hunt, or plant on the land. Cancer rates have 
soared in their communities with a large number of cases of rare cancer occurring.
349
 The 
Canadian government has repeatedly denied that the tar sands have anything to do with 
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these issues and insist that the project provides jobs for members of these indigenous 
communities, even though prior to beginning extraction, the indigenous peoples were 
able to survive and carry on their traditional cultural practices through their relationship 
with the land and by way of subsistence hunting.  
Short demonstrates that the oil-extraction process is genocidal insofar as it 
damages the physical health and wellbeing of the indigenous peoples who live near this 
site while inhibiting their ability to carry on their traditional cultural practices by 
inducing fear and by taking over more and more of the land on which they lived. 
Indigenous scholars like Michelle Jacob of the Yakama Nation agree: “From an 
Indigenous perspective, the Tar Sands extraction project represents an assault on the 
earth; the fracking, drilling, extraction, and massive construction of pipelines across 
Turtle Island, from Alberta to the Gulf Coast, is creating a wasteland. Tribal treaty rights 
and tribal people’s ability to protect their homeland become casualties of war in the 
settler colonial quest to extract resources for profit in the energy wars.”350 Environmental 
devastation of this sort functions like a slow genocide, eroding the health of the people, 
their sovereignty as a nation, and the land, all of which are integral to their group identity. 
Because this form of genocide might occur over such a long period of time, it may not 
always be immediately recognizable as genocide, especially when compared to other 
genocides like the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, or the genocide in Darfur. 
In this case study and the others that Short recounts, ecocide is a method of 
genocide, but not equivalent to genocide. In other words, environmental devastation is 
one way of destroying human groups that could potentially fall under two criteria for the 
UN definition of genocide: causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
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group and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction. Through these case studies Short convincingly demonstrates that 
ecocide carried out by dominant colonial cultures disproportionately affects indigenous 
peoples in a genocidal way. His analysis, one of the few in genocide scholarship that 
makes an explicit connection between the effects of ecocide and its role in genocide, 
provides new avenues for thinking about the causes of genocide and how they might be 
prevented.  
However, I argue that ecocide is more than just a method. It is genocide. As I will 
show in the following section, Short’s analysis relies on one of the same Western 
metaphysical assumptions that appear in dehumanizing and genocidal logic: human 
exceptionalism and the existence of the human/animal and human/nature binaries. This 
assumption is especially problematic when thinking about the effects of ecocide on 
indigenous peoples. Though Short takes an important step toward bringing a new 
decolonial lens to the study of genocide, I argue that we need to go further by recognizing 
that the metaphysical assumptions that exist for Westerners do not necessarily hold for 
indigenous peoples, and that by attending to some of those differences we will see that 
ecocide is not just a method of genocide, but genocide itself. This is especially evident 
when the worldviews of indigenous peoples are taken into account. It is not just a 
method, which suggests that destroying the natural world is a tool for destroying a group 
of human people, but an act of genocide because it literally eliminates, disfigures, and 
maims the other-than-human members of indigenous communities. Furthermore, by 
treating ecocide as a method rather than genocide itself, a distinction between the value 
of human life over and above that of nonhuman animal and plant life remains. For both of 
187 
these reasons, I draw on Native American philosophies of nonhuman personhood to 
argue in the next sections that ecocide and genocide should be thought of as the same 
thing, and that preventing genocide, dehumanization, and ecocide require the same 
metaphysical and ethical solution—namely, a metaphysical reorientation. 
 
II. Nonhuman Personhood and the Genocide-Ecocide Nexus 
 
Though Short connects the role of ecocide to the practice of genocide, there are 
two aspects of his analysis that need further development. The first is that Short deems 
ecocide problematic because of its devastating effect on human life but not necessarily 
because of the harms it does to nonhuman beings and the planet. In this respect, Short 
relies on and maintains a human/nature dualism that understands ecocide to be more 
morally problematic because of its effects on humans over and above its effects on other 
beings. Throughout Redefining Genocide, Short frames the problem of ecological and 
environmental destruction in terms of how it will impact human communities. For 
example, in a discussion of fracking, Short states,  
Indeed, in numerous studies from both countries [the US and Australia], 
local communities most affected by developments often cite considerable 
negative impacts on the environment and human health, including 
groundwater contamination, air pollution, radioactive and toxic waste, 
water usage, earthquakes, methane migration, and the industrialization of 
rural landscapes, the cumulative effect of which has led to calls for the 
United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) to condemn fracking as a 
threat to basic human rights, particularly the rights to water and health. 
Fracking development is fast becoming a human rights issue.
351
 
 
As this passage shows, Short frames ecocide as a human rights problem. As such, ecocide 
is bad because of the toll it takes on human lives. Short briefly mentions the negative 
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impact fracking has on the environment, but this is part of his case for why fracking is 
ultimately harmful to humans. Nowhere in the book does he specifically examine the 
implications of fracking and other types of resource exploitation practices on the lives of 
nonhuman beings, even though all of these acts are done at their expense. Perhaps he 
frames ecocide anthropocentrically because it is discussed in relation to the problem of 
genocide, which by nature of its definition, is anthropocentric and is a problem that has 
been treated as solely affecting humans. In following the logic of genocide and human 
rights, Short relies on and perpetuates the metaphysical principle of human 
exceptionalism. This is especially ironic given that ecocide, by its definition, should shed 
a light on the specific harms suffered by nonhuman beings and nature on their own terms 
and not necessarily mediated through the lens of human goods, desires, and needs. 
Implied in this reading of ecocide and genocide is the notion that nature is passive, 
waiting to be exploited or preserved at the whims of whatever various groups of humans 
seem to value it at the time. In this outlook, the land, water, air, plants, and nonhuman 
animals exist for the sake of human use, and their depletion, overuse, extinction, and 
destruction might be tragic on its own but is only immoral insofar as it puts human life in 
jeopardy. This approach to ecocide leads into the second problem, which has to do with 
the way that Short understands the impact of ecocide on Indigenous peoples.  
Short’s analysis of the impact of ecocide on indigenous peoples follows the logic 
that nature is a passive recipient of human action that supplies humans with the necessary 
resources they need. For example, in his assessment of the impact of the tar sands 
extraction, he writes, “The effects on downstream indigenous groups are truly staggering. 
Their ability to hunt, trap and fish has been severely curtailed and, where it is possible, 
189 
people are often too fearful of toxins to drink water and eat fish from waterways polluted 
by the ‘externalities’ of tar sand production.”352 Elsewhere he writes, 
Indigenous peoples living close to and in the midst of tar and sand 
deposits have been expressing concern over the lethal impacts that these 
industrial events have had on their communities for years, with elders 
citing caustic changes to water quality, meat quality, and to the availability 
of fish and game. Concern is growing recently as health professionals and 
community members witness more and more friends and family fall ill 
with a variety of serious illnesses, and local fish populations are inflicted 
with ever more severe deformities.
353
 
 
 In both of these quotes, Short notes that tar sands extraction has a detrimental effect on 
nonhuman creatures, but the language he uses indicates that he is thinking about this 
harm in terms of its consequences for humans. In this way, the extraction process does 
not harm deer, elk, and other wildlife, but affects the freedom of humans to hunt game 
and acquire meat. His mention of fish is connected to the human fear of eating them. The 
changes to water quality, the explosion of illnesses, and the increasing precariousness of 
life in these areas are only understood in terms of human suffering.  
To be clear, these issues pose serious problems for the health and wellbeing of the 
individual members of indigenous communities and for the perpetuation of their cultures, 
which rely on their ability to live according to traditional practices that are rooted in their 
connection with particular areas of land and the beings that live there. Short demonstrates 
that he recognizes the importance of this connection, but even this is described in 
anthropocentric terms. He states,  
As Native author and activist Andrea Smith noted (Smith 2005: 121), 
‘when Native peoples fight for cultural/spiritual preservation, they are 
ultimately fighting for the landbase which grounds their spirituality and 
culture’. That is, the land or ‘specific geographical setting’ (Churchill 
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2005: 168) with which many indigenous nations/communities identify 
themselves fundamentally embodies their ‘historical narrative’ (Abed 
2006: 362) and who they are as peoples; with both their ‘practices, rituals, 
and traditions’ (ibid.: 327), and their political and socio-economic 
cohesion as a group, inextricably bound to the surrounding landscape. 
Alienation from that landscape, therefore inevitably results in the 
dissolution of an indigenous people’s ‘network of practical social 
relations’ (Powell 2007: 538), for they will no longer be able to carry out, 
develop and preserve their ‘cultural heritage and traditions,’ or ‘pass these 
traditions on to subsequent generations - thereby rendering them ‘socially 
dead.’354 
 
In this passage, Short continues to think in terms of a human/nature dualism. Even though 
indigenous peoples rely on the land to ground their spirituality, history, and culture, the 
land is treated as something fundamentally other. According to Short, Indigenous peoples 
have strong connections to the land on which they live and the land is a site at which 
“practical social relations” take place, but the land itself is not recognized as a 
participating member in these relations. In fact, for Short, it is not so much that 
indigenous peoples become alienated from land, but from “landscape,” which is defined 
as a particular place or territory in which activity (presumably human) happens.
355
 But 
this is not the predominant way in which many Native peoples— especially Native 
Americans, First Nations, and Maori, among others—identify with land. In fact, if we 
take into account the metaphysical principles and expansive notion of personhood that 
grounds many of these cultures, we can see that ecocide is a far more direct and 
egregious crime for these communities than even Short seems to recognize. To 
demonstrate this, I turn to the philosophies of Native American and First Nations peoples.  
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In what follows I will touch on three metaphysical “principles” of indigenous 
philosophies.
356
 These include 1) there is a diversity of creations,
357
 2) everything is 
related, and 3) the universe is alive and must be approached in a personal manner.
358
 
Though these principles are interconnected, in this chapter I will mainly focus on the 
third principle insofar as it resists the principle of human exceptionalism. 
According to Muscogee scholar Daniel Wildcat, “Stated simply, indigenous 
means ‘to be of a place.’”359 However, this does not just refer to the fact that individuals 
are born in particular places. To be of a place is an active concept that denotes an ongoing 
relationship that shapes and reshapes the identity of the place and the individuals that 
inhabit it. As Oglala Lakota scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. elaborates, in an indigenous 
worldview “power and place are dominant concepts—power being the living energy that 
inhabits and/or composes the universe, and place being the relationship of things to each 
other.”360 Because relationships are not abstract, but are particular from many Native 
American perspectives, the notion of place is also deeply connected to a physical 
location—the land. In contrast to Short’s description of the relationship between Native 
peoples and the land, the land is an active, lively participant in the making and sustaining 
of relationships. As Choctaw scholar Laurelyn Whitt explains, “The land and living 
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entities which make it up are not apart from, but a part, of the people. Nor is the ‘the 
environment’ something outside of, or surrounding a people. The relation of belonging is 
ontologically basic. With inherent possession, agency is sometimes held to be 
reciprocal—a people belongs to/owns the land, and the land belongs to/owns a 
people.”361 In other words, in this cosmology the land is a person, not a thing or a 
resource to be consumed. Haudenosaunee and Anishinaabe scholar Vanessa Watts 
reinforces this notion when she states that not only is the land in relation to indigenous 
peoples, it actually is a relation: “in a majority of Indigenous societies, [people] 
conceive[s] that we (humans) are made from the land; our flesh is literally an extension 
of the soil.”362  
Though Short recognizes that land is not generic and that removing indigenous 
peoples from their lands is harmful because they have specific ties to those particular 
lands, insofar as he is still working from the perspective of Western metaphysics, he 
misses an important point: that “power and place produce personality.”363 According to 
Deloria, what this is means is that “the universe is alive, but it also contains within it the 
very important suggestion that the universe is personal and, therefore, must be 
approached in a personal manner.”364 If the land is a living being that possesses power, 
particularity, personality, and agency, then acts like strip mining, tar sands extraction, 
fracking, deforestation, and other activities that disfigure the land are not just ecocidal, 
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but genocidal. Destruction of the land is not just a means of destroying human group life; 
the land itself is a living member of the community. 
The same argument can be made in regards to nonhuman animals, plants, and 
other beings. According to Shawnee philosopher Thomas Norton-Smith, Native 
Americans have an expansive notion of personhood, which reflects the insights that “(1) 
personhood does not constitute the essence of a human being; (2) an entity is a person by 
virtue of its membership and participation in a network of social and moral relationships 
and practices with other persons; and (3) moral agency is at the core of personhood.”365 
This view of personhood contrasts sharply with many theories of personhood in the 
Western worldview, which almost exclusively attribute personhood to humans due to 
various characteristics that are supposedly unique to human life—primarily rationality, 
agency, moral reasoning, and free will.
366
 Because the Western notion of personhood 
relies on human uniqueness, it assumes a hierarchy between humans, animals, and other 
beings. However, this hierarchy does not exist for many Native American communities. 
Chickasaw writer Linda Hogan, explains, “For us, the animals are understood to be our 
equals. They are still our teachers. They are our helpers and healers. They have been our 
guardians and we have been theirs.”367  
Difference is not a barrier to these relationships. Rather than ascribing to a 
metaphysics that values sameness (i.e. purity), indigenous thought holds that there is a 
diversity of creations. But, in contrast to an essentialist metaphysic, this diversity is not a 
cause for ontological and moral division. This is because underlying this approach to 
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nonhuman personhood and diversity is the ontological principle that everything is related. 
As Deloria explains, “Everything in the natural world has relationships with every other 
thing and the total set of relationships makes up the natural world as we experience it.”368 
Put differently, no one human or nonhuman exists independently; all things are connected 
to one another in lively relationships. In contrast to the view that nonhuman nature is 
dead, inert, or passive, in Native American worlds, nonhuman animals like deer, bears, 
and salmon, along with bodies of water, features of the land like canyons or buttes, and 
sacred objects like drums and pipes, all possess a kind of power/force/spirit. Algonkin 
tribes call it manitou, but other tribes use the terms nilchi’i (Dine), usen (Apache), wakan 
(Lakota), and orenda (Wendat).
369
 This quality imbues these beings (and humans as well) 
with their own animacy, power, and purposiveness, which calls for recognition and 
respect. Because all beings share these attributes and all beings are in relation to one 
another, there is no innocent, passive, or isolated being-in-the-world. Everything and 
anything is a person through its relationships and through the obligations it owes and 
receives.  
This notion of personhood has real effects in the world, guiding the form that 
relationships between humans and other animals take. According to some Native 
American philosophies, the relationship between humans and other animals is one of 
kinship. Both the Ojibwa and Lakota regard nonhuman persons as ancestors or 
siblings.
370
  Black Elk of the Oglala Lakota, for example, describes how his life story is 
“of all life that is holy and is good to tell, and of us two-leggeds sharing in it with the 
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four-leggeds and the wing of the air and all green things; for these are children of one 
mother and their father is one spirit.”371 In other words, other-than-human animals and 
plants are siblings to humans. In many Western societies it is accepted that humans have 
moral obligations first and foremost to their immediate kin and family. By understanding 
relationships with nonhuman persons as familial, Indigenous peoples more easily fold 
those beings into their realm of moral obligation. What binds people together is not 
species membership, but a shared experience, knowledge, and participation in life that is 
rooted or born of a particular place.  
Other forms these relationships take are more political in nature. For instance, 
First Nations and Native American scholars like Nuu-cha-nuulth philosopher E. Richard 
Atleo, Anishinaabe writer Leanne Simpson, and Tewa philosopher Gregory Cajete say 
that for many tribes nonhuman animals and humans are in treaty relationships: 
“According to Nishnaabeg traditions, our relationship with the moose nation, the deer 
nation and the caribou nation is a treaty relationship like any other, and all the parties 
involved have both rights and responsibilities in terms of maintaining the agreement.”372 
All three authors describe particular protocols
373
 that must be followed when dealing with 
nonhuman animal nations that demonstrate the proper amount of respect for those beings 
whose activities and lives sustain Native communities.
374
 Accepting either claim about 
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human/nonhuman relationships leads to a radical rethinking of who and what is affected 
by ecocide/genocide. The UN definition of genocide states that genocide involves killing 
a group in whole or in part. If we accept that nonhuman beings can be kin to humans, 
then killing other-than-human persons is a direct attack on a given community or group. 
If land, salmon, and maize can be kin to humans, than their destruction constitutes 
destroying part of a group. Likewise, if we accept that there is a political relationship 
between humans and other-than-human persons, then this will also amount to genocide. 
One of the groups named in the UN definition of genocide is the national group. If groups 
of nonhuman animals consist of nations, their destruction is genocide. And that genocide, 
while it may lead to the genocide of the humans who are in relation with them, can also 
be recognized as independent from the genocide experienced by humans. To illustrate 
this, consider the mass slaughter of buffalo that was carried out during westward 
expansion in the US. 
In her article “Buffalo Genocide in the Nineteenth Century,” Tasha Hubbard of 
the Cree, Nakota, Anishinaabe and Metís makes this point exquisitely. She argues that the 
destruction of the buffalo was not genocidal simply because it led to the physical and 
social deaths of human persons, but because “specific genocidal practices and their 
theoretical underpinnings can be applied to the buffalo slaughter.”375 Citing historical 
documents, she shows how settlers intentionally set about slaughtering buffalo with the 
goal of exterminating them, killed vast numbers of them or kidnapped calves, which 
resulted in the social death of the buffalo and the decline of their mental and emotional 
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health.
376
 Though Hubbard’s argument is quite compelling, it is worth reviewing the case 
of the buffalo here to clearly demonstrate what is at stake.  
 
III. Buffalo Genocide  
 
Prior to the 1800s, 30 million to 60 million buffalo lived on the plains stretching 
from what is now known as Northern Saskatchewan to New Mexico and as far east as the 
Appalachian Mountains.
377
 Their presence shaped the environment, making them a 
keystone species.
378
 For the plains tribes that lived in those areas, the buffalo were also a 
keystone of their cultures and social fabric. Not only did the buffalo create a particular 
habitat suited to a diverse ecosystem on which indigenous peoples could survive, their 
bodies provided a source of food, clothing, and other tools. In addition to this, the buffalo 
were also central to the spiritual identity of the community. According to Black Elk, “For 
it was the White Buffalo Cow Woman who in the beginning brought to us our most 
sacred pipe, and from that time, we have been related with the Four-Leggeds and all that 
moves. Tatanka, the buffalo, is the closest four-legged relative that we have, and they live 
as a people, as we do.”379  
By the mid-1800s, the buffalo populations were starting to decline. White settlers, 
who were bringing their cattle onto the land, took up the space that buffalo roamed. In 
addition, tribes from the east, forced to vacate their traditional homelands, were removed 
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onto plains land, leading to greater demand for the buffalo as a resource.
380
 This was 
accompanied by sudden growth in the market for buffalo hide robes. In 1835, the 
American Fur Co. alone had an order for 36,000 buffalo robes. By 1857, the number of 
hides being delivered to retailers was up to 70,400 hides a year.
381
 Between 1872 and 
1873 alone, over 825,000 hides were transported by rail from the plains to the east.
382
 But 
the real devastation took place in the 1870s and 80s as hunters, the military, and growing 
numbers of cattle ranchers moved deeper into the plains, eliminating buffalo for their 
own varied purposes. The expansion of the railroad and cattle ranching into the west 
occurred simultaneously as part of the industrialization of American agriculture and was 
bolstered by the Homestead Act of 1862, which granted individuals and families of 
settlers 160 acres of land each. The destruction of the buffalo herds made more room for 
ranchers as well as opened up a new market of beef buyers, the Native Americans who 
were starving as a result of the depletion of the buffalo herds.
383
  
Historian Daniel Smits argues that the military also played a significant role in the 
extermination of the bison.
384
  The army was integral to securing the frontier and pushing 
it westward, making room for the railroads and accompanying ranchers and settlements. 
General William T. Sherman, for example, held that getting rid of the buffalo was 
necessary for the development of the rail system, and frequently sponsored civilian 
hunting expeditions as one solution to the problem. Likewise, in his memoirs, Lieutenant 
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John M. Schofield, commander of the department of the Missouri from 1869-1870, 
wrote, “With my cavalry and carbined artillery camped in front, I wanted no other 
occupation in life than to ward of the savage and kill off his food until there should no 
longer be an Indian frontier in our beautiful country.”385 Slaughtering the buffalo had a 
two-fold benefit. Not only did it open up land for settlers, it took care of the so-called 
“Indian problem.” An article in Navy Journal from June 26, 1869 reported that Sherman 
stated “that the quickest way to compel the Indians to settle down to civilized life was to 
send ten regiments of soldiers to the plains, with orders to shoot buffaloes until they 
became too scarce to support the redskins.”386 In a twist on dehumanization, for the army, 
the buffalo and Native Americans were so inextricably linked that soldiers would 
occasionally pretend that when they were killing buffalo they were actually killing 
Indians.
387
 In this respect, the killing of buffalo was a symbolic act of killing Indigenous 
peoples, while having real life-threatening consequences for indigenous peoples and their 
cultures.  
The army worked in tandem with hunters as a method of eradicating Native 
Americans, often sponsoring hunting expeditions and inviting hunters to accompany 
them.
388
 For the hunters, killing the buffalo provided both sport and profit. With the 
development of the railroads, amateur hunters took excursions to the plains to shoot 
buffalo from the train windows as they passed herds.
389
 Their impact on the herds was 
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relatively benign compared to the market hunters, some of whom claimed they could kill 
40 to 50 buffalo in a day. 
[The hunters] often worked in pairs. They would hide in a foxhole and 
wait for a herd to pass. Killing the herd leader was the most effective way 
to start. If you could kill the boss, the herd would dissolve into grand 
confusion, because it would take some time for a new leader to emerge. 
The next best plan was to kill an animal and wait until others in the herd 
caught the scent of blood. With the aid of a needle gun and telescopic 
sight, it was easy to hit one animal. After it had fallen, all those near 
enough to smell the blood would circle around the fallen one, sniffing the 
air and pawing the ground. These stationary targets were easy to pick off, 
one by one.
390
 
 
According to Hubbard, the hunters were not simply taking advantage of the fear and 
chaos incited by the buffalo’s sense experience, but preying on the complex social and 
inner lives of the buffalo as well. She states, “Buffalo feel grief for their dead, according 
to both my traditional teachers and the longtime buffalo warden at the Grasslands 
National Park, Wes Olson. He has observed [that]…rather than abandon the body, 
buffalo will stay with the deceased, attempt to revive their family member, and make 
audible sounds of grief.”391 Hubbard contends that ignoring the personhood of the buffalo 
reinforces the human-centric bias in genocide scholarship, which leads to a failure to 
account for the particular types of relationships between humans and other-than-human 
beings that exist in many indigenous cultures.
392
 Not only could buffalo feel grief for 
their dead, but the killing of adults and kidnapping of young buffalo broke down the 
bison’s own social relations and led to mental illness. Hubbard recounts the experiences 
of John Cook, a buffalo hunter:   
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[T]he hunters’ [had a] practice of surrounding available waterways, 
forcing the buffalo to approach anyway, and gunning them down. Those 
buffalo who managed to find a water source that was free from hunters 
‘would rush and crowd in pell-mell, crowding, jamming, and trampling 
down both the weak and the strong, to quench a burning thirst. Many of 
them were rendered insane from their intolerable, unbearable thirst’ (Cook 
1938: 198). Instead of living cooperatively in their herd society, the 
buffalo were tortured prior to their death at the hands of the hide hunters. 
 
The death of the buffalo had a debilitating effect on the Indigenous communities 
who regarded them as kin, allies, and protectors. According to environmental activist 
Winona LaDuke of the Anishinaabe, “Many Native people view the historic buffalo 
slaughter as the time when the buffalo relatives, the older brothers, stood up and took the 
killing intended for their younger brothers, the Native peoples.”393  
As we can see, given the principle that personhood is not restricted to human 
beings, ecocide is not simply a method of genocide. It is genocide. According to Short, 
ecocide is genocidal when it harms human groups. But, from an indigenous perspective, 
there is no distinction. In their co-authored book Indian from the Inside, Ojibwa scholar 
Dennis H. McPherson and philosopher Douglas J. Rabb sum up this point: “There is, we 
suggest, a moral obligation to protect the habitat of the moose, the beaver, the muskrat, 
and the lynx; the habitat of geese, ducks, grouse and hare, not just because members of 
the Band wish to continue hunting and trapping, but because these other-than-human 
persons are also extended members of the Ojibwa society.” 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Ecocide and genocide function according to the same metaphysical principles. In 
ecocide, nonhuman beings are considered to be essentially other than human beings, 
                                                 
393
 LaDuke, All Our Relations, 154. 
202 
locating them outside of the realm of moral obligation. While ecocide is often motivated 
by human exceptionalism, which manifests as a belief in the human right to nonhumans 
as resources for human consumption, ecocide can also be the result of a desire for purity. 
This arises through efforts to eradicate certain species deemed dangerous to human life or 
deemed obstacles to human development. Oftentimes ecocide and genocide coincide 
because ecocide involves the destruction of the material conditions for human life. 
Sometimes the effects of this have an immediate impact, but in other cases the effects are 
not felt or recognized until many years later.  
One of the aims of this discussion of ecocide and genocide is to call attention to 
the way that research within the field of genocide studies remains locked within the logic 
and metaphysics of Western, liberal, cosmopolitan societies. As long as Westerners 
remain the dominant voices in the field without incorporating non-Western voices, 
important insights into the nature of genocide and dehumanization will remain 
overlooked. This puts artificial limits on the possibilities for thinking about how to 
respond and prevent dehumanization and genocide. In this chapter, I have shown that 
Native American philosophies can broaden the notion of what counts as genocide. In 
contrast to rehumanization and human rights—two responses developed from within a 
Western metaphysical framework—Native American philosophies rely on a different set 
of metaphysical principles. As mentioned above, these include the recognition that there 
are a diversity of creations, that everything is related, and that the universe is alive and 
must be approached in a personal manner. Starting with these principles as the foundation 
for thinking about developing an ethics for countering genocide opens the door for new, 
more radical approaches to prevention. These principles value difference rather than 
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sameness, recognize the relational aspect of all beings in the world, and do not privilege 
human modes of being over the experience of other beings. This is in contrast to many 
ethical responses developed in a Western metaphysical framework. Such ethics tend to 
value sameness over difference, focus on the rights and autonomy of individuals over the 
relationships in which the individual finds herself, and, sometimes overtly and sometimes 
implicitly, privilege human wellbeing at the expense of other beings. 
In the following chapter I conclude my dissertation with a brief exploration of the 
three principles of Native thought that I have identified as alternatives to the three 
metaphysical principles of Western thought that underlie dehumanization and genocide. I 
argue that the principles of Native philosophies can more effectively form the basis for an 
ethics of difference and an ethics of relationality that were called for by philosophers Ann 
Cahill and Kelly Oliver in chapter five. In this respect, by drawing on the metaphysical 
principles of Native thought, I offer an alternate way of responding to genocide and 
dehumanization that is both decolonial and nonhumanist. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: DEVELOPING A GROUNDWORK  
FOR A NONHUMANIST ETHICS 
 
Preventing genocide and dehumanization requires a radically different approach 
than the dominant methods that have been put forward in the Western philosophical and 
political traditions. Solutions like rehumanization and human rights may provide stop-gap 
measures for responding to these injustices, but ultimately they fall short of their intended 
goals. This is because human rights and rehumanization discourses take the problem of 
dehumanization and genocide to be the violation of human life and dignity when the real 
problem is the metaphysical foundations on which genocidal and dehumanizating logics 
rest.  
In this dissertation I have argued that dehumanization is a necessary condition of 
genocide, serving three functions: 1) lowering moral inhibitions against violence; 2) 
motivating violence; and 3) legitimizing violence. In addition to this, dehumanization 
characterizes the practice of genocide. Dehumanization is an effective tool for carrying 
out these roles because of how it plays on a particular set of metaphysical principles that 
are integral to dominant, mainstream Western culture. These principles are 1) a 
commitment to a rendering of reality and the beings and states that constitute it such that 
those beings can be separated into natural kinds according to fixed, unchanging essences 
(essentialism), 2) adherence to a naturalized logic that either excludes the possibility of 
middle terms and interstitial beings or treats such terms and beings as monstrous, deviant, 
or polluting (purity), and 3) a commitment to a strict moral and ontological hierarchy in 
which humans outrank other beings, especially animals (human exceptionalism). Because 
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dehumanization is a necessary condition for genocide, the metaphysical principles that 
apply to the logic of dehumanization also apply to the logic of genocide.  
Remarkably, current dehumanization and genocide studies literature recognizes 
essentialism and purity as themes in both phenomena, but not as metaphysical issues. 
Instead, they are explained away as effects of psychology or ideology.
394
 With only a few 
exceptions, these same scholars do not address the principle of human exceptionalism.
395
 
This is striking given that dehumanization only makes sense when there is an active 
concept of the sanctity and purity of “the human” and if there is some Other nonhuman 
being to which the human can be compared. In almost all cases, this nonhuman refers to 
the animal.
396
 I argue that preventing dehumanization, and consequently genocide, 
requires a confrontation with and reassessment of these metaphysical principles followed 
by a reorientation toward a different set of principles. This means admitting that there are 
no essential natures, that purity is an impossible ideal, and that there is nothing so unique 
or special about human life that would warrant the exclusion of nonhuman animals and 
nature from the realm of moral obligation. 
When genocide scholarship fails to confront the metaphysics of dehumanization 
and genocide, especially the principle of human exceptionalism, it not only limits the 
possibilities for developing new solutions, but it continues to perpetuate colonial 
definitions of the term “genocide” that do not fully recognize indigenous experiences of 
genocide. For many indigenous peoples, the mass murder, forced removal, and 
                                                 
394
 Smith, Less Than Human.; Smith, “Paradoxes of Dehumanization.”; Haslam “Dehumanization.”; 
Kiernan, Blood and Soil.; Kuper, Genocide. 
 
395
 Costello, “Exploring the Roots.”;  Smith, “Paradoxes of Dehumaniztion.” 
 
396
 In chapter two I noted that sometimes dehumanization involves comparisons of humans to machines or 
objects. 
206 
assimilation of the human members of their nations only capture one aspect of the 
genocide they suffer. The other component is the destruction of nonhuman animals, land, 
and water, and this is treated as a separate phenomenon—ecocide. For the majority of 
dehumanization and genocide scholars, the principles of Western metaphysics seem 
natural. This natural attitude obscures the way that using this metaphysics in the analysis 
of indigenous genocide and for developing a method of prevention is just another way in 
which indigenous cultures and contributions to the conversation continue to be erased and 
undervalued. 
As we saw in chapter seven, thinking of ecocide as genocide requires an 
orientation towards a different set of metaphysical principles than those that ground 
dehumanizing and genocidal thought. While this is one way of challenging the definition 
of genocide from a decolonial and nonhumanist standpoint, there is more that indigenous 
philosophy can offer for discussions about understanding genocide and dehumanization 
and for developing new methods of preventing dehumanization and genocide. To 
conclude this dissertation, I will briefly outline how Native metaphysics can provide a 
foundation for an ethics of difference and relationality called for by feminist scholars like 
Ann Cahill and Kelly Oliver. In this conclusion, I draw on three principles of native 
metaphysics to show how this set of principles provides an alternative to the principles of 
essentialism, purity, and human exceptionalism for the grounding of ethics. These 
principles are 1) there is a diversity of creations (diversity), 2) everything is related 
(relationality), and 3) the universe is alive and must be approached in a personal manner 
(liveliness). I argue that if the metaphysics of dehumanization is the problem that needs 
resolving in order to prevent dehumanization and genocide, then Native American 
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metaphysical principles offer a better starting point for responding to those problems, 
allowing for the development of approaches that differ from rehumanization and human 
rights.  
 
I. Native American Metaphysics vs. the Metaphysics of Dehumanization 
 
Rehumanization and human rights are both normative responses to 
dehumanization and genocide that treat sameness as the condition for overcoming 
prejudice, discrimination, and dehumanization. The thinking goes that if we can prove 
that some other individual or group shares qualities with ourselves or our own group then 
we have demonstrated why that individual or group should be included within the realm 
of our moral responsibility. In both rehumanization and human rights, the condition of 
sameness is humanness. Even in the case of some animal welfare and rights scholarship, 
the more human-like characteristics a nonhuman animal has, the more likely that animal 
will be considered a subject that has rights. Recall, for example, the studies carried about 
by Costello and Hodson from chapter two. In these studies they found that showing 
participants videos that compared animals to humans reduced the participants’ levels of 
discrimination and prejudice toward immigrants.
397
 Their findings show that highlighting 
similarities can have some effect on reducing prejudice; however, the comparison only 
worked in one direction—when that which was perceived as inferior on the moral and 
ontological hierarchy was likened to something higher up. This suggests that ethics based 
on sameness might only be effective when the common traits are deemed desirable and 
valuable. Other commonalities that are less flattering or desirable will be rejected or 
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could exacerbate discrimination. This way of approaching the Other does not ultimately 
respect the Other for who or what they are, but only insofar as the Other is like oneself. 
This approach may teach people to tolerate differences, but not to respect, value, or seek 
out differences. 
This is unlike many Native American approaches to difference, which are 
expressed in the principle that there is a diversity of creations. As Vine Deloria, Jr. 
explains, “To recognize or admit differences, even among the species of life, does not 
require then that human beings create forces to forge to gain a sense of unity or 
homogeneity. To exist in creation means that living is more than tolerance for other life 
forms—it is recognition that in differences there is strength of creation and that this 
strength is a deliberate desire of the creator.”398 According to Jicarilla Apache 
philosopher Viola F. Cordova, to say that there is a diversity of creations is to affirm the 
notion that “each group has a creation story that tells only of their unique creation. No 
one group claims to have the one, and absolute, story of creation that concerns all peoples 
everywhere.”399 Diversity is expected and even necessary because each being has a role 
to play as part of a greater whole. This sentiment is echoed by Leanne Simpson, who 
writes that “Nishnaabeg society in its fullest realization requires a diversity of excellence 
to continue to produce an abundance of supportive relationships.”400 According to 
Simpson, no one person can know everything. In order for society to flourish, different 
people with different skills and knowledge sets must work together cooperatively and in 
appreciation of their differences in order to live successfully.  
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Though difference is privileged, it is not essentialized. Both Cordova and 
Simpson emphasize autonomy and self-actualization as core values of Native American 
philosophies and practices.
401
 In some contexts, identities are not pre-given but acquired 
or earned. Seminole philosopher Anne Waters describes the case regarding gender in 
traditional Chipewyan societies: “Males must achieve the status of having maleness by 
attaining Inkoze. They do so by displaying behavior appropriate to having the knowledge 
of Inkoze…Prior to attaining Inkoze, men do not have gender.”402 This is similar to 
Cordova’s claim that for some Native societies, humanness itself was an earned status. 
Each new human being born into a group represents an unknown factor to 
that group…he must be taught what it is to be a human being in a very 
specific group…The newborn is at first merely humanoid—the group will 
give him an identity according to their definition of what it is to be human. 
The primary lesson that is taught is that the individual’s actions have 
consequences for himself, for others, for the world. The newcomer’s 
humanness is measured according to how he comes to recognize that his 
actions have consequences for others, for the world.
403
 
 
In other words, a person’s identity is not fixed or determined ahead of time. Through 
practice, one becomes oneself. This stands in sharp contrast to the principle of 
essentialism discussed in chapter two, which relies on an Aristotelian notion of identity in 
which A = A. Such a concept of identity relies on sharp boundaries that separate one pre-
determined kind from another. But this is not the case in Native notions of identity. As 
Scott Pratt explains in his article “The Metaphysics of Toleration in American Indian 
Philosophy,” “Unlike the Aristotelian notion of essences…such identities are not 
enclosures; rather they are intersections of the purposes and activities of the individual, 
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the individual’s kind, and the purposes and activities of those around her.”404 Individuals 
are not static or fixed. As self-determining beings they have agency over themselves and 
their being-in-the-world.  
This notion of essences and the privileging of difference over sameness in Native 
American thought and practice makes sense in relation to the two other metaphysical 
principles mentioned above. As we can see from the quotes above, the value of difference 
emerges insofar as difference helps to connect and build relationships. This may seem 
counter-intuitive—that difference is the basis for relation—but the fact that there are 
differences means that people (human and nonhuman) can each bring something 
meaningful to the community. If everyone were the same then there would be less overall 
knowledge and skill to be shared among the group. So even though autonomy and self-
determination are valued, “the autonomous person, in this environment, is one who is 
aware of the needs of others as well as being aware of what the individual can do for the 
good of the group.”405 This compounds with the Native notion of identity, so that “the 
changing character of a relational being means that a thing may be, in its transitions, both 
itself and not itself and, as such, neither itself nor not-itself.”406 The changeable nature of 
identity not only rejects essentialism, but the notion of purity as well. As beings in 
relation that adapt to their purposes in accordance with those relations, no being is totally 
discrete, autonomous, or individual in the way that Western philosophies understand 
these terms.  
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The principles of diversity and relationality are enriched by the principle that the 
universe is alive and must be approached in a personal manner. To say that the universe 
is alive is to say that it is populated by lively beings that are not passive recipients of 
human actions, but active participants in relations. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
these active beings include nonhuman animals, the land, water, and sacred objects. Just as 
humans can alter the world, the world can act on and alter us. In this respect, the universe 
is personal—that is, having personality and particularity. Beings are respected as 
individuals who have their own particular modes of behaving and participating in the 
community. According to Deloria, this means that “the personal nature of the universe 
demands that each and every entity in it seek and sustain personal relationships.”407 This 
also means there are no static or unchanging elements of the world. The world is always 
in motion and changing. Furthermore, because the universe is populated with animate, 
purposive beings whose differences matter in the formation of relationships, these beings 
are regarded as equals rather than superiors or inferiors. Everyone has something to 
contribute. In this respect, ontologically speaking, American Indian philosophies 
generally do not recognize hierarchies of difference. According to Cordova, “Instead of 
hierarchies [Native Americans’] see differences which exist among equal ‘beings.’ The 
equality is based on the notion, often unstated, that everything that is, is of one 
process.”408 In other words, Native American thought tends to ascribe to a relational 
ontology in which there are no discrete, atomistic individuals, but, rather, ongoing 
processes and practices that make and remake the world and its inhabitants. This stands 
in direct contrast to the principle of human exceptionalism, which ranks beings in a 
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hierarchy based on how like or unlike humans they are. Native American origin stories 
clearly demonstrate the interplay of these principles, especially the notion that the 
universe is alive.  
Consider the following two stories. The first is the Potawatomi story of 
“Skywoman Falling.” The second story, “How Son of Raven Captured the Day” belongs 
to the Nuu-cha-nuulth people of Vancouver Island. Like metaphysical principles, which 
ground the way we perceive reality, these two stories are origin stories—that is, they tell 
of the beginning of the world and the peoples who inhabit it. As such, they, too, are 
meant to be read as foundational for Native cultures and philosophies. I have selected 
these stories not only because they illustrate principles of Native American metaphysics, 
but also because they illustrate the values that should be part of an ethics of difference 
and relationality. As I will discuss below, these values include consent, reciprocity, 
recognition, and respect. In both stories, the goals of the people involved can only be 
achieved when these values are present. Finally, these stories also demonstrate 
cooperation and equality between humans and nonhuman animals.  
 
a. Skywoman Falling 
My retelling of the story is based on the version that Robin Wall Kimmerer of the 
Potawatomi recounts in Braiding Sweetgrass.   
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“She fell like a maple seed, pirouetting on an autumn breeze.409” From a hole in 
skyworld, Skywoman falls, light streaming behind her from the hole into a world of 
darkness. Below she can only see water and, from the water, many eyes glinting up at her 
in the new light. The eyes saw “a small object, a mere dust mote in the beam. As it grew 
closer, they could see that it was a woman.” Recognizing her for what she was, the geese 
agreed to break her fall, rising from the water to cushion her descent with their wings. 
Slowly, they gently brought her down. 
However, they couldn’t hold Skywoman above the water forever, so they called a 
council to decide what to do. All the different animals arrived, and Turtle offered to let 
Skywoman sit upon his back while they hatched a plan. “The others understood that she 
needed land for her home and discussed how they might serve her need.” Having heard 
rumors of something called mud beneath the water, the deepest divers and strongest 
swimmers among them—sturgeon, loon, otter, and beaver—offered to search for it. After 
many attempts the swimmers either returned empty-handed or not at all, until only 
Muskrat was left. After a time, they had all but given up hope when the body of Muskrat 
surfaced. Though he had given his life, clutched in his paw was a handful of mud.  
Turtle told Skywoman to spread it on his back, which she did. “Moved by the 
extraordinary gifts of the animals, she sang in thanksgiving and then began to dance, her 
feet caressing the earth. The land grew and grew as she danced her thanks.” Together, 
through their cooperation, perseverance, hard work, and gratitude, Skywoman and the 
animals created the earth.  
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Like a good guest, Skywoman had come with a gift of her own. As she toppled 
from Skyworld, she had grasped at the tree of life, taking branches, seeds, and fruits to 
the world below with her. Strewing them across the new ground, she tended them until 
they grew and flourished. “Wild grasses, flowers, trees, and medicines spread 
everywhere. And now that the animals, too, had plenty to eat, many came to live with her 
on Turtle Island.” 
 
b. How Son of Raven Captured the Day 
The second story is retold based on the version presented by E. Richard Atleo of 
the Nuu-chah-nulth in his book Tsawalk.  
 
“They had no light in the beginning. Son of Raven suggested that they try to 
capture the day” from a Chief who lived across the waters and kept the light of day in a 
box.
 410
 The people who lived in darkness asked Son of Raven if he had a plan.  
Son of Raven suggested that they send Son of Deer, known for his grace and 
beautiful leaping, to dance for the Chief and his people. Once the audience was so 
captivated by Son of Deer’s dancing, he could swing by the Day Box, dip in a piece of 
dry cedar bark, then with his strength and quickness, bound back across the water with it.  
The people liked this plan, so they observed the proper protocols. Son of Deer 
dressed in his best costume, crossed the water, and performed. However, as soon as he lit 
the cedar on fire, the Chief was upon him and put the fire out. Realizing that Son of 
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Raven was trying to get the daylight, the Chief and his people decided to guard the box 
more closely.  
“The people who lived in darkness regrouped.” They decided to call wise Wren 
for help. Wren suggested that the people turn into sockeye salmon, which were plentiful 
this time of year. “Women will be cleaning and preparing fish,” he told them. “Turn 
yourselves into sockeye and swim to the other shore. When you are captured you will 
have an opportunity to kidnap the Chief’s daughters.” Everyone transformed into sockeye 
except Son of Raven, who insisted on being a large king salmon. But when the people 
saw the giant king salmon, they suspected it was Son of Raven, and the plan was foiled.  
The same happened when Wren suggested that everyone become Salmonberry 
shoots. Son of Raven insisted on being the biggest, and it again drew the suspicions of the 
Chief’s people. Finally, “rather than rejecting or chastising Son of Raven for his blunders, 
Wren devised a plan that would take advantage of Son of Raven’s great desire to do great 
deeds.” For this plan, Son of Raven must become a tiny leaf, float on the water of the 
Chief’s well, and get swallowed by one of his daughters.  
Sure enough, when the Chief’s daughter drank from the well, Son of Raven 
slipped toward her mouth, and she swallowed him. Not long after, the daughter became 
pregnant. Eventually she bore a son, and it was a crybaby. It cried so much they everyone 
suspected he was Son of Raven. However, since they weren’t sure, they accepted him.  
“As the baby grew, it continued to cry and whine a lot. When the baby was old 
enough, he loved to play in the canoes. All day he would play in these canoes. He also 
knew about the paddle of great power owned by his mother. With one stroke the paddle 
could propel any canoe a great distance. The boy began to whine for this paddle.” He 
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kept whining until the adults gave in and allowed him to play with it. Seeing that he 
wasn’t doing anything unusual, they began to trust him. Then the boy asked to play with 
the Day Box in the canoe. When he was refused, he threw tantrums until his mother 
relented in exasperation. Once he had the Day Box, he did nothing unusual, and everyone 
relaxed.  
In the meantime, Wren sent mice to cross the water and chew holes in all of the 
Chief’s canoes except for the one belonging to the boy. The next morning, when the boy 
asked to play with the Day Box in the canoe again, he wasn’t watched as closely. “Then 
all of a sudden, the boy gave a mighty thrust of his mother’s paddle. Swiftly his canoe 
raced over the water toward the other shore.” The Chief and his people tried to follow, 
but as they launched their canoes, they began to sink.  
As the boy neared the other shore, he slowly uncovered the Day Box, and the 
people who lived in darkness saw that it was Son of Raven bringing them daylight for the 
first time. “Today, when the tide is out, you may notice Son of Raven is the first to enjoy 
any food that is found at water’s edge. This is his right and privilege, recognized by all 
Nuu-chah-nulth.” 
 
II. Lessons from Skywoman and Son of Raven 
 
Storytelling is a powerful tool for evoking sympathy, changing sentiments, 
passing on knowledge, and instilling values into individuals and communities. The same 
is true of stories in many indigenous cultures. Stories are one of the primary means by 
which knowledge is communicated and, as a result, are treated with respect and 
reverence. Some stories, for example, are only told at certain times of year or on certain 
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occasions. Yet, whatever the occasion, stories provide a means for the listener to work 
out for themselves the knowledge that has been presented and the value it provides. 
Stories, as vehicles of knowledge that are meant to be shared and that depend on and 
establish relationships in the telling, provide a foundation upon which to build a 
community. Through stories the community develops a shared knowledge-base. The 
above stories are one such example of knowledge being generated and shared.  
For example, in “Human Rights, Rationality, Sentimentality,” Richard Rorty 
argues that telling the right kinds of stories is one of the key ways for establishing a 
culture and ethics that can effectively combat dehumanization, genocide, and other 
crimes against humanity. In his case, this culture is a human rights culture. As Rorty 
explains, “[I]t seems that most of the work of changing moral intuitions is being done by 
manipulating our feelings rather than increasing our knowledge…We pragmatists argue 
from the fact that the emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to 
increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories.”411 
For Rorty, simply pointing out what humans have in common is insufficient for dealing 
with dehumanization, because doing so fails to account for the fact that certain humans 
have already been designated as nonhuman or subhuman. Thus, change from a culture 
where human rights are not valued to one where they are involves “sentimental 
education,” an education that “sufficiently acquaints people of different kinds with one 
another so that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as quasi-
human. The goal of this manipulation of sentiment is to expand the reference of the terms 
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‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us.’”412 Through stories our feelings can be 
manipulated to increase our sympathy for others and adjust our notions of who is worthy 
of moral consideration. To achieve a human rights culture, the right stories need to be 
told. 
Though I disagree with Rorty’s conclusion that human rights culture is the best 
method for countering dehumanization for the reasons provided in chapter five,
413
 his 
notion of sentimental education addresses one way that dehumanization is practiced. In 
chapter three, I explain how Rowan Savage argues that dehumanization involves the 
composition of narratives, of manipulating language to invoke feelings and stories that 
make it natural to regard one group as essentially different from another.
414
 Likewise, 
Costello and Hodson’s research shows that by telling certain stories they can manipulate 
sentiments to encourage greater sympathy. Priming, propaganda, cultural narratives, and 
metaphysical principles are all stories that we tell each other and ourselves as a means of 
organizing and making sense of the world. In this respect, telling different stories could 
lead to an adjustment of sentiment. The above stories are one example of storytelling that 
can provide the foundation for a new kind of knowledge and sentimentality that builds 
community across difference and species membership. 
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For the Native peoples to whom the above origin stories (and many others) 
belong, these stories are not just folklore. As Haudensaunee and Anishnaabe philosopher 
Vanessa Watts explains, “[T]hese two events took place. They were not imagined or 
fantasized. This is not lore, myth or legend. These histories are no longer versions of ‘and 
the moral of the story is….’. This is what happened.”415 Accepting these as genuine 
origin stories presents a way of viewing the world that entails a different orientation that 
makes different demands and involves having a different set of behaviors than the origin 
stories of the West. In these stories diversity, relationships, and the agency of nonhuman 
beings all feature prominently and are necessary for the successful completion of the 
goals within the stories.  
The knowledge and sentiment developed in these stories runs counter to the 
stories of human exceptionalism in many Western cultures. As we saw in earlier chapters, 
dehumanization and the metaphysics of genocide depend on the principle of human 
exceptionalism, the notion that the ontological status of humans corresponds to their 
moral status. As the highest beings on the hierarchy, they deserve moral consideration 
first and in the greatest amount. According to many Native American traditions, humans 
are not different in kind from other animals. In fact, as the last beings to arrive on earth, 
humans are like the younger siblings of the animals, and, thus, have to learn from them. 
As Kimmerer explains, “human people are often referred to as ‘the younger brothers of 
Creation.’ We say that humans have the least to experience with how to live and thus the 
most to learn—we must look to our teachers among the other species for guidance.”416 
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In both of the above stories nonhuman animals have important roles to play, and 
their actions give meaning and life to others. In “Son of Raven” the different animals 
band together to bring daylight to the world. In “Skywoman Falling,” Skywoman would 
surely not have survived had the animals not seen the danger she was in and offered their 
help. Not only did they bring her safely down, many of them gave their lives to help her 
live. From a Western utilitarian perspective, for example, this would be nonsensical. 
Letting Skywoman drown would have certainly saved more lives in the short term, and 
her arrival definitely brought suffering, especially for the animals who died to help her. 
Or, if the animals had ignored the plight of this stranger who showed up in their midst, 
acting selfishly, they also could have continued on with their lives as they were. 
However, this story is not based on selfishness, or putting oneself and one’s own group 
first, but about recognition, consent, respect, and reciprocity. The emphasis on these 
values and the way that they tap into emotion, sentiment, and experiential knowledge is 
what makes these two stories so powerful. 
As these stories demonstrate, cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships 
like the ones depicted demand that beings act toward one another in certain ways, 
particularly with recognition, respect, consent, and reciprocity. Atleo and Anishnaabe 
scholar Leanne Simpson argue that recognition is central to Native approaches to ethics, 
politics, and community building. Recognition involves seeing another for who they are 
and accepting that person as they are with all of their strengths and flaws. It also means 
recognizing them as in relation to oneself and in relation to the greater community. This 
goes for nonhuman animals as well as other human beings.
417
 As Simpson explains, 
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recognition or aaniin “is akin to working to see the energy they [others] put into the 
universe through their interactions with the land, themselves, their family, and their 
community. Aaniin isn’t an observation but a continual process of unfolding; it is a 
commitment to the kind of relationship where I have dedicated myself to seeing the 
unique value in the other life as a practice.”418 In other words, recognition is not just 
about seeing an individual separated from her relations, but the network of relations in 
which that person is embedded. Furthermore, the act of recognition is a practice that 
establishes and reaffirms relations. It is not a passive, objective observation, but an 
activity that helps to create the desired reality.  
Atleo notes that recognition involves “mutual respect and understanding.”419 
Respect is not a synonym for idolization or worship, but a form of mutual recognition of 
individual identities and the ability of those individuals to seek self-determination and 
fulfillment. As Vine Deloria, Jr. of the Lakota explains, “The willingness of entities to 
allow others to fulfill themselves, and the refusal of any entity to intrude thoughtlessly on 
another, must be the operative principle of this universe.”420 To have respect for another 
means establishing relationships in which one person does not dominate the other. By 
centering respect for self-fulfillment, relationships, even across species or with the land, 
do away with obvious or sedimented hierarchies because no one member of the 
relationship can have full access to the purpose or intentions of the other. One must 
accept the other for whom or what that other is and go along with it. According to 
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Deloria, respect entails two attitudes: “One attitude is the acceptance of self-discipline by 
humans and their communities to act responsibly toward other forms of life. The other 
attitude is to seek to establish communications and covenants with other forms of life on 
a mutually agreeable basis.”421 
Mutual agreement requires consent from all parties involved in the relationship. In 
a Western context, consent involves agreement free of coercion, arbitrary rules, and 
tyranny. This is similar to the way it appears in the Native context, but it is explicitly tied 
to recognition and respect. For the Nuu-chah-nulth, this is encapsulated in the concept 
qʷaasasa is, which means “that’s just the way she is!”422 Qʷaasasa is connects to the 
notion of consent insofar as it “expresses the belief that each individual is unique and that 
this uniqueness requires free expression.”423 It follows from recognizing the free 
expression of another individual as a part of consent that one must accept another’s 
differences, disagreements, and purposes, even if those purposes are contrary to one’s 
own. Respect for these differences coupled with consent leads to greater freedom for 
everyone, building stronger, more mutually beneficial relationships because such 
relationships do not violate the freedom of others to be.
424
  When consent is privileged it 
leads to less interference with others, more respect for self-determination, and an 
abundance of diversity.
425
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Another important aspect to the stories above is the act of reciprocity. Reciprocity 
involves responding in kind to others—that is, engaging in mutual giving. Gift giving, 
according to Kimmerer, is a form of mutual flourishing. In addition to this, gifting helps 
to restore and maintain equilibrium in the world.
426
 Though gifts come without a price 
tag, without necessarily being earned or deserved, they establish a kind of relationship, a 
relationship in which to show gratitude is to give back in some way. As Kimmerer 
explains, “The essence of the gift is that it creates a set of relationships. The currency of 
the gift economy is, at its root, reciprocity.”427 In other words, reciprocal relationships do 
not involve direct one-to-one exchanges; rather, the recognition of the value of the gift is 
demonstrated through re-gifting, through reciprocity. Norton-Smith elaborates on this 
point: “[T]o accept a gift is to receive a symbol of respect from another, and the gift 
obligates the recipient to show respect in return, to reciprocate.”428 In this way, the 
relationship remains strong and ongoing.  
Each of these values applies to humans and nonhumans alike. Just because a 
being cannot give verbal consent in a language spoken by humans does not mean that it is 
incapable of giving consent. How it gives consent is different, and the form that consent 
takes must be learned through a process of recognition and respect for the other’s mode 
of expressing itself. For many indigenous people, the practice of hunting epitomizes the 
confluences of these values. As Simpson explains, “We recognize animals’ spirits before 
we engage in hunting them. Reciprocal recognition within our lives as Nishnaabeg people 
                                                 
426
 Norton-Smith, Dance of Person, 114. 
 
427
 Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass, 28. 
 
428
 Norton-Smith, Dance of Person, 113. 
 
224 
is ubiquitous, embedded, inherent. Consent is also embedded in this recognition. When I 
make an offering and reach out to the spirit of Waawaashkesh before I begin hunting, I 
am asking for that being’s consent or permission to harvest it. If a physical deer appears, I 
have their consent. If no animal presents itself to me, I do not.”429  
Engaging without consent, respect, recognition, and reciprocity results in the 
dissolution of relationships. Simpson relates one such story in which the deer, moose, and 
caribou disappeared from the lands. Not knowing what had happened to members of the 
Hoof Clan, people became worried, anxious, hungry, and angry. Eventually, they decided 
to send out runners to look for the hoofed ones. Only one person returned with news, and 
it wasn’t good. The single deer this runner encountered had told him that she and her 
relatives had left the people’s territory because they were no longer being respected. This 
prompted some self-reflection on the part of the Nishnaabeg, who realized they had been 
wasting meat, not sharing the meat with all of the community members, killing deer when 
they didn’t need them, and not treating the deer bodies with proper reverence. The 
Nishnaabeg decided to send a delegation to the Hoof Clan to repair the relationship. After 
long negotiations, they set up boundaries and guidelines for properly maintaining the 
relationship with the promise that if a member of the Hoof Clan should give its life as 
food to one of the Nishnaabeg, then the Nishnaabeg would perform proper ceremonies to 
honor that creature’s life and gift.430 Key to this story is the element of ceremony and 
practice. The repetition of ceremony with certain acts helps to remind people of the 
agreements they have made with others. Ceremony, when practiced, (re)creates and 
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strengthens relationships, reminding those involved of the importance of respect, 
reciprocity, consent and recognition.  
These four values are also central to the origin stories relayed above, and are 
clearly qualities and values important to both humans and nonhumans. Though the 
animals in “Skywoman Falling” were different from Skywoman, they recognized her 
personhood and acted accordingly. And they did so of their own volition and with the 
consent of one another. The diversity of the different beings was also integral to the 
success of their endeavors. If the geese had not been able to fly, then Skywoman might 
have fallen to her death. If Turtle had not had a broad, sturdy shell then the geese might 
have been injured trying to keep Skywoman afloat. The sturgeon, beaver, muskrat, loon, 
and other diving animals each had skills they employed to do what Skywoman, Turtle, 
and the geese could not. Put into relation with one another in service of a communal goal, 
their diversity became an asset rather than a cause for strife and conflict. Though 
Skywoman came from a different world, she did not treat the other creatures with 
contempt; she did not assume that she was better than them. Instead, she approached 
these other beings with humbleness, respect, and gratitude, not telling them what to do 
but accepting their suggestions for how to resolve her predicament. Recognizing their 
sacrifices, she reciprocates their gifts with gifts of her own. In this way, Skywoman’s 
coming to be in the world is literally grounded on her relationships with the other animals 
she encounters. 
Diversity and the recognition of difference and qʷaasasa is are also central 
aspects of “How Son of Raven Captures the Day.” In this story the various animals each 
have their own skills and talents and are called on to utilize those talents for the good of 
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the group. Son of Deer’s exceptional grace and elegance, Wren’s wisdom, the mice’s 
discretion, and Raven’s craftiness all have a part to play. And while everyone is willing 
to work together, they all have different personalities, which, especially in Son of 
Raven’s case, sometimes spoil their endeavors. But instead of getting angry and trying to 
change Son of Raven, Wren recognizes Son of Raven for who he is and instead comes up 
a with a plan that will take advantage of Son of Raven’s behavior and personality. Thus, 
through recognition, consent, and respect, the people who live in darkness establish 
relationships of trust and reciprocal recognition that allow them to successfully complete 
their mission.  
Dehumanization and genocide stand in direct contrast to these values. As tools for 
putting people into their ontological and moral place and for eradicating them when they 
refuse to accept that place, these phenomena become acts of domination that fail to 
recognize, respect, or gain consent from others. As we saw in chapter four, the logic of 
domination often involves backgrounding—refusing to acknowledge the contributions of 
the Other—which is the opposite of a reciprocal relationship. Many Indigenous scholars 
have pointed out that the Western model of being in the world (i.e. liberalism and 
capitalism) discourages the types of relationships described above even as it idealizes 
them. Instead, the Western model involves various practices that discourage individuals 
from recognizing and respecting others, seeking consent, and reciprocating. The more 
these practices continue, the more sedimented particular worldviews become. Thus, 
developing new stories and practices based on a set of metaphysical principles and values 
that respect diversity and relationality while recognizing that the universe is alive are 
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necessary for countering the logical conclusions of the Western metaphysical principles 
of essentialism, purity, and human exceptionalism. 
 
III. Practices for a World without Dehumanization and Genocide 
 
Combating dehumanization and genocide requires the establishment of respectful, 
reciprocal relationships based on recognition and consent between all beings, not just 
humans. This is easier to do when starting with a metaphysical framework in which 
diversity, relationships, and the liveliness of the universe are fundamental. However, 
abstract discourse is insufficient for bringing about change; rather, it is necessary to 
develop practices that (re)affirm and (re)establish the desired relationships. Telling 
stories like those above is one way of seeding a culture that respects and values diversity, 
relatedness, and nonhuman agency. But there are other practices that can begin to instill a 
nonhumanist culture. As discussed in chapter three, according to Norton-Smith, 
performances have ontological consequences. They transform and empower the 
participants and the symbolism of their acts. They function as “the principle vehicle of 
meaning and the way in which the world is made.”431 In other words, practice and 
performance are both methods of creating a world and coming to know the world.  
For Westerners, learning how to engage in practices that build respectful, 
reciprocal relationships based on recognition and consent will take time and effort given 
the dominant political and economic systems and institutions in place in the world today, 
but many Native scholars are cautiously optimistic about the prospects for bringing 
Westerners on-board to their way of doing things. As Atleo points out, when Europeans 
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and Aboriginal nations encountered one another for the first time, they were unprepared 
for the meeting. They lacked the experience and knowledge to properly interact with one 
another. But now, after five hundred years of coexistence, Atleo believes the time is right 
for that to change. For him, the recognition of Indigenous people’s rights by the UN is 
one step in the right direction.
432
  
Daniel Wildcat of the Yuchi and Muscogee tribes and Kimmerer share similar 
sentiments. For Wildcat, the cooperation of Indigenous peoples and Westerners is an 
urgent imperative in order to combat global climate change. From Wildcat’s perspective, 
Indigenous people have much they can teach Westerners about building healthy 
relationships between humans and the other beings on the planet. This begins with 
challenging certain myths central to Western culture: “Primary among the myths to which 
modern humankind faithfully adheres is the notion of their moral and intellectual 
superiority among all other living beings on the planet…Humankind now needs a good 
dose of indigenous realism that demonstrates the miseducative character of the dualisms, 
dichotomies, and categorizations that dominate the thinking and activities of growing 
numbers of humans on the planet today.”433 Wildcat’s injunction calls for indigenous 
peoples to share their knowledge with the rest of humankind by modeling practices for 
building respectful, reciprocal relationships. Kimmerer also recognizes that indigenous 
resurgence might not succeed without getting settler society on-board, but she wonders 
how and if this compromises the very notion of indigeneity: “Immigrants cannot by 
definition be indigenous. Indigenous is a birth right word. No amount of time or caring 
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changes history or substitutes for soul-deep fusion with the land.”434 Yet, she is reminded 
of the fact that in the Potawatomi people’s origin story Skywoman herself was an 
immigrant, and through reciprocal relations of respect and consent with the animals she 
met in the world below, both she and they were able to work together for mutual 
flourishing. Kimmerer compares immigration to two models of plant life—invasive 
species like kudzu and naturalized plants like plantains (also known as White Man’s 
Footstep for the way that it followed settlers from Europe across North America). Kudzu 
colonizes the land while plantains integrate with the other beings they encounter. 
Reflecting on these behaviors, Kimmerer speculates that “[m]aybe the task assigned to 
Second Man [settler colonists] is to unlearn the model of kudzu and follow the teachings 
of White Man’s Footstep, to strive to become naturalized to a place, to throw off the 
mindset of the immigrant.”435 
For each of these authors, the issue of teaching and integrating Westerners into 
indigenous practices is motivated by a concern for the state the world is in as a result of 
European domination. Colonization, ecocide, and genocide are practices based in a 
fundamental disrespect and disregard for the purposiveness, liveliness, and diversity that 
characterizes other human and nonhuman beings in the world. Teaching Westerners to 
become “naturalized” in a world based on indigenous metaphysics requires modeling and 
engaging in practices that establish the desired relationships. Practices that emphasize 
essentialism, purity, and human exceptionalism must be replaced with new practices that 
celebrate diversity, relationality, and the liveliness of the universe. These might, for 
example, take form through indigenous pedagogical methods.  
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In “Nature-Culture Constructs,” Ojibwe scholar Megan Bang and non-Native 
scholar Ananda Marin develop a set of specific pedagogical practices for children 
designed to expand views of nonhuman agency. These include interactive nature walks 
and land-based learning activities that invite children and their families to engage in 
education outside of the classroom setting. While their immediate goals in the essay are 
to provide educational support for Native and non-dominant communities, their methods 
could be leveraged for non-Native students as well. This type of education is important 
because it involves activities outside of classroom learning, which is often abstract and 
does not always have clear connections to the world. Through nature walks and other 
interactive land-based learning, students get practice observing and learning from the 
world and other-than-human beings around them. 
Similarly, in their book Stop Talking, Aluet educator Ilarion Merculieff and non-
Native scholar Libby Roderick collaborated with Alaska Native elders to develop a 
model for Native-designed strategies for applying indigenous pedagogies in Western 
educational institutions. Some of these strategies included incorporating Native values 
like respect for ancestors, self-sufficiency, and respect for nonhuman nature into the 
classroom or prompting students to attend to their relationships with place and the 
knowledge that emerges from that relationship. Once again, these authors engaged in this 
project as a way to meet the needs of their indigenous students, but they could also 
benefit non-Native students by establishing practices of engaging with the world based on 
the recognition of and respect for nonhuman beings.  
Native peoples are also involved in various movements and causes that matter to 
non-Native peoples, too. According to Michelle Jacob of the Yakama Nation, one pillar 
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of indigenous environmentalism is “embracing allies who understand the shared 
responsibility of protecting Mother Earth.”436 Building on shared values between groups 
can foster the integration of differences while providing the motivation to develop 
methods of working cooperatively to achieve a common goal that will benefit the greater 
community. Climate change and environmental protection is the kind of effort that 
requires a diversity of ideas, skills, backgrounds, and contributions—not unlike the 
collaborative efforts of the animals in the story of Skywoman.   
Though Native scholars and educators have much to offer Westerners, it is not 
finally their responsibility to teach Western-educated peoples to critique and re-evaluate 
their own metaphysics. For scholars like Atleo, Wildcat, Kimmerer, and Jacob, who are 
making an effort to bridge the space between cultures, it is imperative that those of us 
who accept this gift do our part to reciprocate. As a non-indigenous person who has 
learned and benefited from the stories and lessons provided by Native American and First 
Nations scholars, I endeavor to and encourage others to bring these lessons to bear in 
their own lives and work. For academics, this means bringing the history and philosophy 
of Native Americans into the classroom and featuring it when possible. It also means 
using these lessons to critique and reflect on the methodological and philosophical 
practices in which we have been trained so that we can identify and resist methodologies 
that commodify, reify, and exclude marginalized philosophies and epistemological 
practices. Furthermore, given the history of colonialism and genocide in the U.S., for 
settlers who have and will continue to benefit from this state of affairs, reciprocity entails 
finding ways to unsettle the colonial state and dismantle colonialism beyond simply 
acknowledging its history. To this end, and in acknowledgement of the traditional lands 
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of the Kalapuya on which I currently reside, I have created a brief guide for educators to 
use for incorporating Native American thought into their courses and work. This 
“handout” can be found in the appendix.  
These are just a few examples of methods for incorporating Indigenous 
metaphysics into Western life. They alone are insufficient for putting an end to 
dehumanization and genocide, but they provide a premise for thinking about and 
developing new models of prevention that might not otherwise become apparent for those 
people entrenched in Western metaphysics. As we have seen, even scholars concerned 
with preventing dehumanization often take for granted human exceptionalism.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Adopting an Indigenous metaphysical framework is not a panacea for resolving 
all issues of violence and disrespect. Simpson’s story about the disappearance of the Hoof 
Clan shows that even indigenous peoples make mistakes, overstep themselves, and must 
resist the allure of selfishness. However, accepting that the world is composed of 
interacting, agential, and purposive relationships leads to the notion that one’s actions do 
not happen without consequences.  
Like Western metaphysics, Native metaphysics are also making a claim about 
reality, one that states that diversity, relationality, and the liveliness of the universe are 
preeminent. Such principles call for a different orientation toward the world and a 
different way of approaching ethics that does not limit the moral realm to humans alone. 
In a world where everything is alive and is in a necessary relationship with everything 
else, then every being is both giver and receiver of moral consideration and 
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responsibility. As Deloria explains, “In the moral universe all activities, events, and 
entities are related, and consequently it does not matter what kind of existence an entity 
enjoys, for the responsibility is always there for it to participate in the continuing creation 
of reality.”437 
Dehumanization is an effective tool for inciting and legitimizing genocide 
because it relies on the premise that the only beings that really matter are beings that meet 
the criteria for being human (a set of criteria that shifts based on who is in power). When 
the principles that support this logic are not questioned or revised, the result is that ethical 
solutions to these views are devised within the same framework that perpetuates the logic 
of domination. In Animal Lessons, Kelly Oliver calls for an explosion of the concepts 
“human” and “animal” as a means of capturing the diversity of the beings slotted into 
these categories. Rejecting the homogeneity of these terms will help demonstrate how the 
human/animal dualism has been used to justify oppression and violence by sharply 
delineating the two kinds from one another while making way for a new form of ethics—
an ethics based on difference and relationality. Such an ethics would recognize and affirm 
the array of beings in the world while acknowledging the way in which humans and other 
animals co-constitute one another through their relationships. The dream of this ethics 
has the potential to be fulfilled by Native philosophies and practices, which never created 
a human/animal dualism in the first place. 
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APPENDIX 
In the preceding pages, I have argued that genocide prevention needs to involve a 
thorough re-evaluation of and change to the metaphysics that rules Western life. Such 
changes do not come about instantaneously, but through long-term cultural shifts that 
occur, in part, through education. For educators who live in a settler colonial nation-state 
or a nation-state formed in part by settler-colonialism, we can help Indigenous peoples 
resist the destruction of their cultures while also educating all students in a metaphysics 
that will be less likely to lead to dehumanization and genocide. In what follows I present 
several suggestions for how to incorporate nonhumanist and Indigenous philosophy, 
history, and pedagogical practices into the classroom and into other academic spaces. 
While these acts alone are insufficient for preventing violence on the scale of genocide or 
for putting an end to settler colonialism, they can be a way for educators to engage in 
recognition, respect, and reciprocity toward Native peoples. 
 
I. How to Do a Land Acknowledgment 
 
A land acknowledgement is typically a brief statement before a presentation, class, or 
workshop that calls attention to the history of the territory on which the presentation is 
about to occur and of the Indigenous people who live or lived there.
438
 In some cases a 
land acknowledgement may be brief. In others, it is more appropriate to do a longer 
acknowledgement. When preparing a land acknowledgement, consider the following: 
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1. Why are you doing this acknowledgement? 
2. Who are the Indigenous people who lived on this land? Where are they now? 
3. What is the history of these people/this territory, and what are the impacts of 
colonialism on them? 
4. How does this acknowledgement relate to the work you are doing/about to do? 
5. What is your relationship to the land? 
6. How else do you intend to disrupt settler colonialism? How can you become a 
better ally to Indigenous people? 
 
 
II. Designing a Decolonial Campus Tour 
One of the rituals of selecting a college is the campus tour. These tours often 
involve a current student guiding prospective students and their families around the 
campus, praising all of the wonderful amenities and opportunities students will have at 
that school. Such tours do not tells students about who or what may have been removed, 
excluded, or exploited in order for that school to be where it stands, functioning as it 
does. A decolonial campus tour is an activity you can design for your classes to give 
them insight into the often untold histories of their college and university campuses.  
To design a tour, research the land that you are on. On whose Indigenous 
homeland is the campus placed? Prioritize Tribal sources in examining the history of the 
land. Using the school’s archives and historical data or relevant internet searches, find out 
about who the buildings on campus are named, who donated money to the college, and 
what parties participated in the construction of the campus. What is the significance of 
any public art or monuments on the campus grounds? In addition to learning about the 
human history of the university, also consider the ecological and environmental history. 
What native species used to live here? Where are the oldest trees on campus? How did 
the university acquire the land on which it now stands? A decolonial tour can be an 
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interactive experience. For example, involve students in the task of doing the research 
and have them present to one another along the tour.  
 
III. How to Bring Indigenous Philosophies into Your Syllabus 
For philosophy instructors who wish to incorporate Native American philosophies 
into their syllabi, here are is a brief bibliographical list by topic of books and articles that 
pertain to the major areas of philosophical thought. These essays are accessible for lower 
and upper level courses. 
General Philosophy 
McPherson, Dennis H. and J. Douglas Rabb. Indian from the Inside: Native American 
Philosophy and Cultural Renewal. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 
2011. 
Waters, Anne, ed. American Indian Thought: Philosophical Essays. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
 
Ethics 
Atleo, E. Richard. Principles of Tsawalk: An Indigenous Approach to Global Crisis. 
Vancouver, CA: UBC Press, 2011. 
Cordova, Viola F. “Ethics: The We and the I.” In American Indian Thought: 
Philosophical Essays. Ed. Anne Waters. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
2004. 
 
Epistemology 
Deloria, Jr., Vine. Spirit and Reason: The Vine Deloria, Jr. Reader. Golden, CO: 
Fulcrum Publishing, 1999. 
Fixico, Donald L. The American Indian Mind in a Linear World: American Indian 
Studies and Traditional Knowledge. New York: Routledge, 2003. 
 
Metaphysics 
Leon-Portilla, Miguel. Aztec Thought and Culture: A study of the Ancient Nahuatl Mind. 
Trans. Jacked Emory Davis. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963. 
Norton-Smith, Thomas M. The Dance of Person & Place: One Interpretation of 
American Indian Philosophy. New York: State University of New York Press, 
2010. 
 
History 
Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne. An Indigenous People’s History of the United States. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2014. 
237 
Stannard, David E. American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
 
IV. Recognizing Nonhuman Difference and Agency 
 
Dehumanization is made possible in part when other-than-human animals are 
treated as a monolithic category that homogenizes and essentializes both humans and 
other animals. Shifting the way we speak about humans and animals is one small 
adjustment that can be made. For example, speak about specific types of animal beings 
when possible such as trout, iguanas, and honey bees rather than making general 
statements about nonhuman beings. If using the term “animal” is unavoidable, modify it 
with terms like “nonhuman” or “other-than-human,” which helps to signal that humans 
are animals, too.  
 Philosophical issues related to nonhuman animals, plants, and other beings can 
also be incorporated into syllabi beyond the usual animal rights/welfare debates. Articles 
on how nonhuman beings think and interact with the world as well as how they relate to 
human animals can be incorporated into a variety of courses including ethics, feminist 
philosophy, global justice, environmental ethics, bioethics, social and political 
philosophy, and general survey courses. A brief bibliography of texts on these topics 
includes: 
 
Adams, Carol J. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory. 
New York: Bloomsbury, 1990. 
Coetzee, J. M. The Lives of Animals. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Bekoff, Marc. The Emotional Lives of Animals: A Leading Scientist Explores Animal Joy, 
Sorrow, and Empathy and Why They Matter. Novato, CA: New World Library 
2007. 
de Waal, Franz. Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2016. 
Donaldson, Sue and Will Kymlicka. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights. 
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Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
Gruen, Lori. Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with 
Animals. New York: Lantern Books, 2015. 
McKenna, Erin. Livestock: Food, Fiber, and Friends. Georgia: The University of 
Georgia Press, 2018. 
Watts, Vanessa. "Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency Amongst Humans and Non-
humans (First Woman and Sky Woman Go on a European World 
Tour!)." Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 2, no. 1 (2013): 20-34. 
 
V. Land-Based Pedagogy 
 
One aspect of developing a practice that can reduce dehumanization and counters 
the logic of dehumanization is developing pedagogical methods that locate human beings 
within a context and network work of relations. In Stop Talking: Indigenous Ways of 
Teaching and Learning and Difficult Dialogues in Higher Education, Ilarion Merculieff 
and Libby Roderick advocate place-based or land-based education that emphasizes the 
ties we have to the world around us and the other beings that populate it. Land-based 
pedagogy involves asking to students to recognize and reflect on their relation to the land 
on which they are learning. This means asking students to learn some of the history of the 
place as well as consider the relationships between both human and nonhuman beings 
that make life sustainable there. Such nonhuman beings might also include technological 
beings like cellphones, vehicles, and buildings. When considering these relationships, 
students could be asked to reflect on what it means to be in a healthy relationship and 
what it would require to bring harmony and balance to that relationship.  
Another way to practice land-based pedagogy would be to incorporate outdoor 
activities into the curriculum that would encourage students to observe and learn from the 
land itself. One such activity might include asking students to walk around campus and 
note how the space is constructed to encourage or discourage certain behaviors or how 
the space might be designed to keep in or out certain types of people or beings. Another 
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activity might involve asking students to observe animals, weather, or plants over the 
course of several weeks and reflect on what they have learned and how it affects their 
understanding of the relationship with and responsibilities toward other-than-human 
beings.  
Additional sources for learning about land-based or place-based pedagogy 
include: 
 
Bang, Megan and Ananda Marin. "Nature-culture Constructs in Science Learning: 
Human/nonhuman Agency and Intentionality." Journal of Research in Science 
Teaching. 52, no. 4 (April 2015). 
Goralnik, Lissy, Tracy Gobson, and Nelson Michael Paul. “Place-Based Care Ethics: A 
Field Philosophy Pedagogy.” Canadian Journal of Environmental Education. 19 
(2014): 180-196. 
Merculieff, Ilarion and Libby Roderick. Stop Talking: Indigenous Ways of Teaching and 
Learning and Difficult Dialogues in Higher Education. Anchorage: University of 
Alaska Achorage, 2013.  
Simpson, Leanne Betasamosake. As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom 
through Radical Resistance. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017. 
Sun, Yi, Roger C.K. Chan, and Huiwei Chen. “Learning with Geographical Sensitivity: 
Place-Based Education and Its Praxis.” In The Professional Geographer. 68, 4 
(2016): 574-583. 
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